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ABSTRACT
The defense establishment of the United States underwent many changes after its 
magnificent victory in World War II. Budget cuts and a rapid demobilization that 
President Truman described as "disintegration" shrunk the Armed Forces to less than a 
quarter of their wartime strength in less than two years, just as the world's geopolitical 
landscape was hardening into the bi-polar relationship of the Cold War. Adding to the 
resulting confusion was Truman's successful effort to unify the three services in an 
overarching National Military Establishment which eventually became the Department of 
Defense.
The resulting pressures on the three military services led to a prolonged, 
acrimonious inter-service squabble over position, mission, and funding which often 
appeared to be merely selfish survivalism. Actually, the arguments which surfaced in the 
late 1940s over the various proposals for employing nuclear and conventional forces arose 
out of sincere and rational concerns for the best interests of the Nation.
Admiral Louis Denfeld served as the Chief of Naval Operations, the uniformed 
head of the Navy, from December 1947 through October 1949. He attempted to support 
the policies of President Truman in public statements, during congressional testimony, and 
in talks to his subordinates but was unable to satisfy all three groups. 1949 brought a 
new, economy-minded Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Pentagon. Admiral 
Denfeld soon came into conflict with Johnson over the new Secretary's preference for the 
Air Force and strategic bombing over the Navy's aircraft carriers and tactical air 
operations. Johnson chose Francis P. Matthews, an Omaha lawyer, as Secretary of the 
Navy, making Denfeld's position even more difficult. Denfeld attempted to compromise 
and temporize his way through the resulting conflicts, but only succeeded in alienating 
both his superiors and his subordinates.
The deep-seated bitterness in the Navy over budgetary cuts and seemingly 
arbitrary restrictions boiled over in the summer of 1949, leading to Congressional hearings 
on military unification and national strategy. This bitter episode has become known as the 
"Revolt of the Admirals." Denfeld did not lead the "revolt." He tried to maintain a sense 
of discipline, albeit ineffectively. Eventually, he sided with the rebels in his testimony, and 
was promptly removed by Matthews, Johnson, and the President.
Congress, the media, and the public were divided on the removal of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that his firing had 
been a reprisal for his candid testimony before Congress and reacted angrily because this 
firing might discourage future military witnesses from providing honest and open 
testimony. The Senate Armed Services Committee also examined the firing of Admiral 
Denfeld but concluded that his testimony had not been the cause of his removal. This 
Committee agreed with Matthews' contention that many small matters over the course of 
several months had rendered the Admiral unsuitable for continued service as the Navy's 
senior officer. To date, no historical works about this incident have reconciled this 
difference of opinion.
This thesis attempts to show that Admiral Denfeld's Congressional testimony was 
only a symptom of the real cause of his firing. His inability to communicate effectively 
with his civilian bosses and to unify his subordinates in support of the administration led to 
an intolerable situation in the Navy. Matthews never publicly explained his rationale for 
removing his subordinate, but the Admiral's testimony was not the only cause of the 
Secretary of the Navy's decision. Both Matthews and Denfeld have been neglected by 
historians, generally being dismissed as the Navy's leaders in an embarrassing "family 
feud." Nevertheless, they were both patriotic Americans and deserve a better legacy.
Their principal shortcoming was their inability to work effectively together.
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INTRODUCTION
"Admiral Denfeld was ousted because of'an accumulation of many small conflicts on 
policy making,' and not as the result of any one incident." (1950 news report of a 
statement by Senator Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee)1
"The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving testimony to 
the House Armed Services Committee." (1950 House Report)2
This stark contrast in Congressional opinions on the cause of the October 1949 
firing of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, is one example of many 
passionate disagreements between all parties involved in the "Revolt of the Admirals."
This "revolt" marked the low point in the struggle for position and influence between the 
armed services following their 1947 unification in the predecessor to today's Defense 
Department. Many senior officers o f all services sincerely defended their often conflicting 
concepts of what the United States needed for national defense. Drastic cuts in military 
budgets and a growing Soviet threat at the start of the Cold War gave an even greater 
sense o f urgency to this debate. Admiral Denfeld, traditionally a conciliator, decided on 
27 October 1949 to take his stand at the head of the "revolting admirals" during a public 
Congressional inquiry into military unification and strategy. Two weeks later, President 
Truman, at the Secretary of the Navy's request, removed Denfeld from his position as the 
uniformed head of the Navy and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a lack of 
"loyalty to superiors and respect for authority."3
1 "Denfeld Firing Probe Closes," Omaha World Herald. 31 January 1950, p. 1.
2U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st 
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 56.
3Letter from Francis P. Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
2Admiral Denfeld's removal punctuated the "revolt" and served as a catharsis for the 
Armed Forces. President Truman had selected him to be Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) for a two-year term starting 15 December 1947. Admiral Denfeld had thereafter 
led the Navy through the tumultuous battles of military unification and oversaw the 
dramatic draw down from its 1945 heyday. He set the Navy on a course to meet its Cold 
War responsibilities in the atomic age. Despite these and many other tangible 
achievements, most historical accounts have neglected, and the Navy has largely 
forgotten, Denfeld's unselfish performance of duty because of his enduring association 
with the embarrassing "Revolt of the Admirals." This attempt by naval officers to save 
their service from relegation to the second echelon in national defense backfired badly. 
Their allegations that the Air Force's weapons programs and strategic bombing doctrines 
were inflexible, ineffective, and immoral resulted in an emotional Congressional 
investigation. This investigation did not produce any immediate, tangible gains for the 
Navy and caused great concern and frustration among the leaders of the U. S. defense 
establishment. To them and to Congress and the public, the Armed Forces appeared to 
have sunk to a new low in petty bickering and undisciplined, inter-service rivalry.
President Truman's dismissal of the Chief of Naval Operations, although resolving none of 
the issues in contention, marked the end of this painful period in the evolution of the 
United States Armed Forces.
The findings of the two Congressional committees which dealt with the "Admirals' 
Revolt" continue to frame the debate concerning the CNO's removal. The House 
concluded that Denfeld's dismissal was clearly a reprisal for testimony not welcomed by 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. The Senate accepted the latter's 
view that there was no reprisal, only an accumulation of many minor incidents which led
3to an impossible working relationship in the Navy's headquarters. None of the existing 
historical works have settled this conflict.
Many historians have examined the "revolt" and commented on its consequences, 
yet none have focused on the culminating episode in the struggle, the firing of Admiral 
Denfeld. Moreover, scholars have not yet tried to settle the ongoing controversy about 
what motivated this firing. This thesis will attempt to address these unanswered questions 
and demonstrate that the Secretary of the Navy had, for various reasons, contemplated 
removing the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) before Denfeld delivered his testimony to 
the House Armed Services Committee. Although this testimony was not the only cause of 
Denfeld's removal, it persuaded Secretary Matthews to decide to accelerate the 
implementation of the plan he had already been developing to replace the CNO.
The opinions expressed in this thesis are based primarily on evidence obtained 
from the archives of the U. S. Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Strategic Air Command and from the papers of President Truman, Secretaries of the Navy 
Sullivan and Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force Symington, and Admiral Denfeld. The 
resultant clarification of Secretary Matthews' motivations, while not a final and definitive 
answer, should go far to settle the controversy surrounding the firing of Admiral Denfeld.
Historians have written many analyses of the conflicts accompanying the Truman 
administration's efforts to consolidate the armed services under one Department of 
Defense. In doing so, they have consistently denigrated Admiral Denfeld and described 
him as having been everything from "the consummate bureaucrat" to an "oleaginous 
timeserver. "4 Some of his naval colleagues have attempted to defend the CNO but have
4Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making of the Modem U. S. Military. 1945 - 1953. (Boston: 
Little Brown and Company), p. 139, and Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure - 
America's Armed Forces. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 96.
4had little success in reversing this historical judgment.5 The only depiction of Admiral 
Denfeld in the Truman Library's museum is a blown up political cartoon that unflatteringly 
casts Denfeld as a reluctant bride for Air Force General Spaatz in a military version of a 
shotgun wedding. Historians have caricatured Admiral Louis Denfeld predominantly as 
"Uncle Louie," and trivialized him as an insignificant figure in an era of giants.
Discussions of the "Revolt of the Admirals" as early as 1950 concluded that 
Denfeld was to blame for the lack of discipline and control in the Navy. These studies 
denounced him as a "weak leader" and "a commander who was incapable of controlling 
his subordinates."6 Much scholarship in subsequent decades totally neglected him, and 
where he is mentioned, his role is frequently misrepresented. Norman Polmar's biography 
of Admiral Rickover incorrectly describes Denfeld as "a naval aviator and former carrier 
commander."7 Mark Perry's study of four star officers and Lawrence Korb's analysis of 
the Secretary of Defense's relationship with the JCS both attribute Denfeld's removal to 
some sort of internal mutiny where the Navy's aviation community somehow forced the 
CNO from his position.8 Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews has suffered the same sort 
of historical neglect. His only claim to fame is his role as a "rowboat Secretary" who
5Admiral Arleigh Burke wrote that he had "a great regard for Admiral Denfeld" and that "a lot of other 
people would have been worse." (Interview with Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral, USN (Ret.), "A Study of OP- 
23 and its Role in the Unification Debates of 1949," Volumes III and IV, by John T. Mason, 1980 - 81,
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1983, U. S. Naval Academy Library, Special 
Collections, p. 533). Admiral Radford stated that "only the fact that with Admiral Denfeld as its military 
head, the Navy was united made it possible to keep going." (Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed., From Pearl Harbor to 
Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1980), p. 109).
6Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman MERRY-GO-ROUND. (New York: The 
Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), p. 455.
7Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 251.
8Mark. Perry, Four Stars. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 19, and Lawrence J. Korb,
"The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947 - 1971," 
Naval War College Review. December 1971, p. 26.
5briefly took on the Navy's brass in the revolt. Both men's characters and imprint on 
history have been overlooked.
The best scholarly treatments of the period, Paul Hammond's "Super Carriers and 
B-36 Bombers," and Jeffrey Barlow's The Revolt of the Admirals, portray the CNO as a 
well-meaning but ineffective leader who found himself in an impossible position.
Hammond describes Denfeld's firing as "a true administrative tragedy, for the seeds of his 
destruction were inherent in the office which he held."9 Barlow concludes that the CNO's 
testimony "sealed his fate," but shares Hammond's appreciation of the difficulty of his 
position.10 Professor Isenberg's 1993 history of the modern U. S. Navy describes Denfeld 
as being a "man of high moral principles" who "lacked something as an inspiring leader."11 
Isenberg goes on to claim that Fleet Admirals King and Nimitz "were, by any measure, 
head and shoulders over Louis Denfeld."12 Only Barlow has extensively studied Denfeld's 
papers, but his monograph does not concentrate on the CNO. There has been no scholarly 
effort to understand or assess Admiral Denfeld as a naval officer or evaluate the causes 
and consequences of his removal. Secretary Matthews is similarly overdue for a thorough 
reexamination.
In order to understand the causes of Denfeld's firing, one must first understand the 
circumstances surrounding the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the personalities involved 
therein. After laying this groundwork, this thesis will describe and analyze the events 
leading up to the President's and the Secretary of the Navy's decision to remove Admiral 
Denfeld, a decision taken during a painful period of military consolidation and
9Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," in 
American Civil-Militarv Decisions, pp. 465-576, edited by Harold Stein, (Birmingham, Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 246.
10Jefffey G. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994), p. 269.
1 M ichael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Naw in an Era of Cold War and 
Violent Peace, Vol. I. 1945 - 1962. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 145.
12Ibid„ p. 165.
6reorientation. This thesis will conclude by seeking to demonstrate that the "revolt" and 
Denfeld's firing offer many lessons on civil-military relations, naval leadership, defense 
unification, and interactions between the Congress and the Executive Branch. These 
lessons should be particularly relevant to today's national policy-makers and military 
professionals who are engaged in a very similar process of military "downsizing" and 
strategic reevaluation accompanied by its own embarrassments and confrontations.
7DEFENSE UNIFICATION TO 1947
"Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact 
that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional 
military setup has been an open invitation for catastrophe." (1944 magazine article by 
then-Senator Harry S. Truman)13
"All the services, but the Navy and Air Force in particular, descended rapidly - far 
too rapidly - into a gutter world characterized by spying, character assassination, and 
half truths. In the process the true goal of unification, the strengthening of national 
defense, got lost." (1993 historical perspective)14
From 1798 to 1947, the responsibility for the defense of the United States had 
been divided between the Departments of War (Army) and the Navy. The differences in 
their missions, clearly based on the geographical division between land and sea, had 
enabled the Army and Navy to prosecute the Country's wars successfully as independent 
fighting forces. Rarely did their operations overlap until the growing mobility and 
complexity of twentieth century warfare forced them into close contact and eventual 
confrontation.15 The introduction of the airplane into military operations opened an new 
arena for combat, one which overlapped both the land and sea and led to an acrimonious 
inter-service struggle for control of military aircraft. The Billy Mitchell affair of the 1920s
13Senator Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified," Collier's. 26 August 1944, p. 16.
14Isenberg, p. 115.
15Many historians have discovered the genesis of a formal, joint military system in the Spanish-American 
War. Inter-service disagreements during this war convinced the services to create the Joint Army and 
Navy Board in 1903. (U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Staff Report 
to the Committee on Armed Services, S. Rept. 99-86, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, p. 276.) A recent 
Defense Department publication, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces," also known as "Joint Pub 1," 
(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991) attempts to show that joint operations have been 
crucial to American military efforts since the Revolutionary War. Its uses the 1781 Battle of Yorktown 
and the Mississippi River campaign of the Civil War as historical examples of joint operations. These 
examples were actually the exception rather than the rule. The normal character of warfare prior to 
World War II was service-pure rather than joint.
8is the most well-known episode in this conflict. Both services eventually regarded aviation 
as necessary to the success of operations on land and at sea, yet neither service trusted the 
other to provide the necessary air support. The expanding importance of amphibious 
operations and of the logistics involved in supporting complex military and naval forces 
also contributed to a blurring of what had been a clear division of responsibilities between 
the Army and the Navy. By the outbreak of World War II it had become obvious to even 
the most stubborn military traditionalists that the services needed to work together, but 
this cooperation proved exceptionally difficult to achieve in practice.
Before World War Two, the United States Congress also perceived the trend 
toward service unification and studied both the influence of aviation on military 
organization and the prospect for unifying the two services under one Department of 
Defense. Representative Carl Vinson, who would play a key role in the 1949 "revolt," had 
served on the Morrow Board in 1925 which examined these issues in the wake of General 
Mitchell's court martial.16 Although this Board had rejected arguments for a separate Air 
Force and a unified Defense Department, the proponents of these ideas did not give up.
The "economy bill" of 1932 originally contained a provision to unify the American 
military, but this section was deleted on the floor of the House.17 In the 1930s, advocates 
of unifying the small defense establishment primarily touted unification as an economy 
measure. Although Congress did not then pass any reorganization bills, it demonstrated 
its willingness to consider new ideas on defense organization.
World War II forced the services into close cooperation in all theaters of that 
global conflict. Naval forces served under General Eisenhower's command during the 
Normandy landings, and Army troops followed the orders of Marine generals in the island-
16Captain John F. Tarpey, USN, "Uncle Carl," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1982, p. 38.
17Lawrence J. Korb, "Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies," U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, May 1978, p. 172.
9hopping campaigns of the Pacific. The Pacific region was divided up into two regional 
joint commands under Admiral Nimitz and General Mac Arthur to facilitate each exercising 
unified command over multi-service operations in their respective regions. President 
Roosevelt created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to parallel a British structure and gave this 
body the responsibility to coordinate the operations of the services throughout the globe.18 
Despite these organizational shifts, competition and rivalry between the services 
continued. Veterans of World War II saw a clear need for improving cooperation 
between the services after 1945. Public pressure encouraging closer inter-service 
coordination and even unification was such that in 1950, Rear Admiral Gallery observed 
"through some magic process since the end of World War II, this word 'unification' has 
become a fetish; anything with that label attached to it is assured to be sacred. Nobody 
knows exactly what it means, but everybody is for it."19
Harry Truman, who as President became the chief standard bearer for this concept, 
had served during the war as the head of Congress' "Truman Committee" charged with 
inspecting and evaluating the homefront defense production, procurement, and distribution 
systems. In the course of this two-year review, Truman found so many examples of 
counterproductive rivalry between the services that he became "a staunch unifications!"20 
In late 1944, after being chosen as President Roosevelt's running mate on the strength of 
his work in the Senate, Truman published an article in Collier's entitled "Our Armed
18The Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has produced an excellent overview of the 
development of joint operations and joint organizational structures titled "History of the Unified 
Command Plan, 1946 - 1977." Although it is unpublished, it can be obtained from the Joint Staffs 
History Office in the Pentagon. Other good studies of this topic include Paul Y. Hammond's Organizing 
for Defense. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), Paolo E. Coletta's The United 
States N aw  and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press,
1981), and the introduction to the 1985 Senate Report 99-86, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed 
Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change. 99th Cong., 1st sess.
19Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN, "If This Be Treason Collier's. 21 January 1950, p. 15.
20Tarpey, p. 40.
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Forces MUST be Unified." He believed current relations between the services to be 
marked by "prejudices and jealous rivalries that masquerade as esprit de corps," and noted 
the "stiff-necked contentiousness" of the uniformed leaders. He complained of "the 
operational gulf which yawns between the services" and advocated the disestablishment of 
Annapolis and West Point as "competitive institutions." His overall solution was "the 
integration of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible 
head."21 As one might expect given Truman's experience as an Army Captain during 
World War I, most of his examples of poor inter-service cooperation faulted the Navy 
rather than the Army.
When Truman became President upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945, he 
continued to advocate service unification. Shortly after he took over, an observer in the 
Oval Office noted that "Roosevelt's naval scenes had been replaced with a series o f prints 
of early airplanes."22 Although Truman's subordinates were hardly unanimous in viewing 
him as an Air Force partisan, the new President was clearly less sympathetic to the sea 
services than had been his predecessor who had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
and retained a great fondness for nautical things. Secretary of the Navy Sullivan went as 
far as to state that "it wasn't the United States Navy, it was Roosevelt's Navy, and he 
protected them all through the years . . . [causing] the natural instincts of self-preservation 
in the Navy to atrophy. "23
Naval personnel, knowing of Truman's Army service and his 1938 Senate 
advocacy for an air force "second to none," agreed with Admiral Radford, who saw 
Truman as "a hard-line Army man."24 The Navy's civilian leaders were more charitable.
21 Truman, pp. 16 and 63-64.
22David G. McCullough, Truman. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 402.
23Interview with John L. Sullivan by Jerry N. Ness, 27 March 1972 and 13 April 1972, Washington, D.C., 
Transcript, 1973, Harry S. Truman Library, p. 31.
24Ibid., p. 234, and Jurika, p. 83.
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Secretary Forrestal, who led the Navy from 1944 to 1947 before becoming the first 
Secretary of Defense, recorded in his diary in mid-1946 that "the President is not taking 
sides either for or against the Army or the Navy" and later noted that Truman "said he was 
not prejudiced in favor of one service or the other - what he wanted was a balanced 
system of national defense."23 Forrestal's successor as Navy Secretary, John L. Sullivan, 
agreed with this assessment. When asked in an interview if he believed Truman's Army 
service caused him to be partial to the Army, Sullivan stated, "No, I think he was very 
fair."26 Regardless of his prejudices, Harry S. Truman was now Commander in Chief of 
all the services, and the Navy was forced to redevelop its capacity for self-preservation in 
the ensuing debates over the implementation of President Truman's unification plans.
The military requirements and strategic landscape of 1946 differed markedly from 
those of the pre-war period. Whereas a typical 1930s combined Army and Navy budget 
amounted to less than $1 billion, post-war funding for the defense establishment never 
dropped below SI 1 billion.27 Nuclear weapons and long-range aircraft had seemingly 
rendered much of military doctrine and weaponry obsolete and had made the Nation 
vulnerable to a devastating enemy attack. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer 
served as shields to keep aggressors at arm's length. Professors Allan Millett and Peter 
Maslowski have noted that "amid the casualties of World War II lay the corpse of 
traditional American defense policy."28 Vast budgetary growth, changes in the nature of 
warfare, and lessons learned from that war prompted renewed calls in the press and in 
Congress for unification of the armed services to improve efficiency and economy in 
national defense. Only the Navy seemed to oppose these proposed changes.
25Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 152, 160.
26Sullivan interview, p. 32.
27Korb, "Service Unification," p. 172.
28Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United 
States of America. (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p. 471.
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The Navy, under the leadership of its wartime CNO, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, 
began, in 1945, to develop plans for its post-war forces. Its first plan called for a 
peacetime force based around 14 battleships and 14 carriers, and reflected more the Navy's 
traditional view of what it was rather than what it should be in light of lessons learned in 
World War II regarding its probable future obligations. Admiral Radford was one of the 
few naval leaders who vigorously opposed this unrealistic plan.29 In November 1945, he 
stated that "things were really in a mess. The Department as a whole and, worse, the 
Navy at large had no guidance. "30 The only thing most naval leaders could agree on was 
their opposition to unification, recognizing that their Army and Air Force counterparts 
were generally unfamiliar with naval warfare and would be able to outvote them on issues 
critical to the future of the naval services.
At the same time, the Army Air Corps, under the leadership of Generals Arnold 
and Spaatz, was aggressively endorsing the creation of a separate Air Force and had a 
good plan and strategy to back up their ideas. They contended that their capability to 
drop atomic weapons from long-range bombers would effectively deter any potential 
enemy from attacking the United States, and, if this deterrent was ignored, the bombers 
could quickly devastate an enemy's homeland just as they had done to Germany and Japan 
in 1945. As commanders of this primary American striking force, the air generals felt 
justified in cutting all organizational ties to the ground army. The concept of a long-range 
"atomic blitz" and an independent Air Force was not new. In the early 1920s the Italian 
aviation prophet Guilio Douhet asserted in his Command of the Air the omnipotence of 
strategic bombing. General Billy Mitchell and other U. S. Army Air Service officers had 
quickly adopted Douhet's ideas and adapted them to American strategies. Finally, in 1945,
29Jurika, pp. 78-79.
30Ibid.,p. 81.
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atomic weaponry gave them the means to wield the strategic force Douhet had envisioned. 
The only obstacle to attaining their objectives was the need to convince either Congress or 
the Army and the Navy that the creation of an independent Air Force dedicated to 
strategic bombing was in the nation's best interests. For obvious reasons, they believed 
Congress and the public to be most susceptible to persuasion, and began a vigorous 
campaign for military reform.
The Air Corps generals did not miss any opportunities to try to influence their 
sister services as well. In November 1945, General Spaatz offered Admiral Radford, one 
of the Navy's ranking aviators, the chance to succeed Spaatz as the head of a combined 
Air Force if Radford would support giving it command over Navy as well as Army 
aircraft. Radford respectfully declined to accept this offer even though he considered it to 
be "an alluring prospect" and "felt highly complimented."31 The armed services could 
reach no agreement on any overall military strategy. And with President Truman's tight 
limits on the military budget, all three services were cut to the bone. The inter-service 
competition to develop an effective and politically acceptable strategic concept and 
protect each service's place in the national defense establishment rapidly degenerated into 
a public relations war which Carl Borklund characterized as "one of the shoddiest spitting 
contests in U. S. military history."32
President Truman introduced his first defense reorganization proposal in late 1945, 
but opposition from military leaders and their Congressional supporters prevented 
approval of any bill until 1947. The President's initial proposal followed the lines of his 
1944 Collier's article by placing the services under a strong Secretary and a single military 
Chief of Staff. This structure resembled the German General Staff, a pattern that
3 Aurika, p. 82.
32Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 45.
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Truman's opponents frequently charged was incompatible with a democratic form of 
government. The Army fully supported this strongly centralized organization, but the 
Navy vehemently opposed any efforts to establish a single commander of the Armed 
Forces other than the President. The admirals and their Secretary, James Forrestal, feared 
that they would be subordinate to the ground and air services and publicly raised the 
specter of a military "man on horseback" usurping the President's constitutional powers 
and imposing military controls over the Nation.33 Secretary Forrestal also repeatedly 
pointed out that no man would be able to control the vast defense establishment and retain 
his sanity - an opinion he would tragically and ironically validate several years later.
Forrestal expended great effort studying the various unification proposals and even 
commissioned an independent effort under Ferdinand Eberstadt to develop a defense 
organization that would protect the Navy's interests while providing the economy and 
coordination the President and the public sought. This 250-page report, completed in 
September 1945, eventually served as the basis for the National Security Act of 1947.34 
The Army and its air component opposed Eberstadt's weaker structure, and the inter­
service arguments concerning the structure of a unified defense establishment continued 
for two years. The leading naval officers in this debate, representing the new CNO, Fleet 
Admiral Nimitz, were Vice Admiral Arthur Radford, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(DCNO) for Air, and Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, DCNO for Operations. Both were 
naval aviators and played distinct roles, Radford taking the hard line and Sherman acting 
as the contemplative intellectual. Both men acted in similar fashion in the 1949 "revolt." 
As Forrestal's views began to gain the upper hand in the protracted negotiations, the
33Navy Secretary Forrestal was even urged by Vice Admiral Radford to resign in protest due to Truman's 
adoption of the Army's plan. Forrestal chose to stay and fight, eventually successfully, in order not to "let 
the Navy down." See Jurika, p. 93.
34Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 64.
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President's exasperation with his military leaders was obvious. In 1946, he stated that 
"naval officers were engaged in propagandizing and lobbying" and that "the Air Force had 
no discipline."35
The publicity machines of the two camps continued to present their cases to the 
public. Neither camp favored restraint. A 1946 speech by Army Air Corps General Frank 
Armstrong, Jr. at a "goodwill dinner" arranged by businessmen in Norfolk, Virginia, the 
home port of the Atlantic Fleet, is a good example of the emotion and arrogance displayed 
by both sides:
You gentlemen had better understand that the Army Air Force is tired of 
being a subordinate outfit. It was the predominant force during the war, and 
it is going to be a predominant force during the peace . . . and we do not care 
whether you like it or not. The Army Air Force is going to run the show.
You, the Navy, are not going to have anything but a couple of carriers which 
are ineffective anyway, and they will probably be sunk in the first battle.
Now, as for the Marines, you know what the Marines are, a small bitched-up 
army talking Navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the Regular 
Army and make efficient soldiers out of them.36
Given this type of ammunition, it is no wonder the military leadership seemed to explode 
at the mere mention of unification.
Despite of - or maybe because of - his frustration with this squabbling, President 
Truman remained convinced that greater central direction of the services was required and 
forwarded a compromise unification bill to Congress.37 He signed the resulting National 
Security Act of 1947 into law on 22 July. Richard Haynes has speculated that the
35Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief. (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 100, and Millis, p. 149.
36General Armstrong's speech is quoted in Demitrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 151. In a later article, General Spaatz even asked "Why 
Should We Have a Navy at All?" See Caraley, p. 100.
37McCullough, p. 476.
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President may have "deliberately allowed the services to pick at each other in public . . .  to 
strengthen [his] case for unification. "38
Whatever the cause, the true losers in this struggle were the Nation and the armed 
services in general and James Forrestal in particular. The Armed Forces spent two years 
wrangling over organizational structures and thereby drifted and fragmented, costing the 
Nation dearly. A 1 May 1946 telephone conversation between Navy Under Secretary 
Sullivan and Under Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington clearly demonstrates that 
this cost was obvious even to the partisans on each side:
Symington: I think that if we're going to continue to argue as to who did 
this and who did that we're going to get ourselves in a hell of a mess, 
instead of cleaning it up. I think the only people who are really suffering by 
this argument is the country, the people, not the services.
Sullivan: That's righ t. . ,39
So uncontrollable did the services appear to be that Admiral Radford concluded that 
"ranking unification high in the list of problems that our leaders had to study and attempt 
to solve in those immediate post-war days was one of the gravest mistakes ever made by a 
president."40 But, taking a longer view in retrospect, the President's memoirs contend that 
military unification was one of the "outstanding achievements" of the Truman 
administration.41
The National Military Establishment (NME) set up by the new legislation has been 
described as "a loosely knit grouping of executive departments" and a "confederation
38Haynes, p. 97.
39Transcript of telephone conversation between John L. Sullivan and W. Stuart Symington, 1 May 1946, 
Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File "Air Force," Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
40Jurika, p. 85.
41Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1956), p. 53. The best analysis of President Truman's role as a military reformer can be found 
in Haynes, pp. 93-115.
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rather than a unified or even a federal structure. "42 This essay will not attempt to describe 
its organization in detail, but suffice it to say that unification had not found its final form 
under this legislation.43 An organizational chart of the NME is attached at Appendix I. 
Secretary Forrestal was given the responsibility of coordinating all services' budgets, 
strategies, and operations but was given little authority to enforce his decisions. Michael 
Isenberg has written that
no one in Forrestal's modest suite of offices facing the Mall (he had only sixty 
people at first) dared use the resulting acronym - NME - although ENEMY 
was as good as any other single word to describe the bitterness and hostility 
generated by unification.44
Precious little was accomplished under this structure other than intensifying inter-service 
arguments.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were officially chartered under this act but received 
no direction on how they were to resolve disputes between the services. In fact, rather 
than becoming a unifying authority to settle issues, this body continued to serve as a forum 
for inter-service wrangling. The chiefs who filled the JCS positions when the National 
Security Act was approved were General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Army Chief of Staff, 
Admiral Nimitz as CNO, and General Carl Spaatz, as Air Force Chief of Staff, all 
distinguished World War II field commanders. These leaders were relieved by Army 
General Omar N. Bradley, Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Admiral Denfeld 
between December 1947 and April 1948.45 The new group was obliged to hit the ground
42William Frye, "The National Military Establishment," The American Political Science Review. June 
1949, p. 545, and Korb, "Service Unification," p. 175.
43Pages 543-555 of Frye's article provides an excellent discussion of the new organization's structure.
44Isenberg, p. 114.
45Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Key Officials. 1947 - 1992. 
unpublished compilation, 1992. A good summary of JCS organization and procedures can be found in 
Arthur A. Ageton, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret ), "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," Shipmate. July 1951, p. 3ff.
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running because budget struggles and disagreements about unification's ultimate form had 
not gone away.
Economy had always been touted as one chief benefit of unification. Defense 
Secretary Forrestal struggled to achieve consolidation of the military budgets and 
elimination of duplication, but was unable to persuade his uniformed leaders to place 
national interests above their parochial service concerns. Instead, this consolidation of 
budgets actually served as "an exhilarating stimulant of inter-service rivalries."46 Outside 
the privacy of their own meetings, Truman restricted the Chiefs to mere advocacy of the 
administration's "party line" regarding defense budgets and strategy. Richard Betts 
concluded that the Truman administration "positively politicized" the Chiefs, making them 
administration spokesmen rather than military advisors. This policy contradicted the intent 
of unification to make them "non-partisan professionals."47 Inside the Pentagon, these 
professionals continued to expend much energy fighting one another. Into this lion's den 
in late 1947 went Admiral Louis E. Denfeld as the new CNO and successor to the retired 
Fleet Admiral Nimitz.
46Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions. (Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1963), p. 7.
47Richard K. Betts, Soldiers. Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), p. 53.
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ADMIRAL DENFELD TAKES THE HELM
"He is liked by everyone." (1912 - Midshipman Denfeld's Naval Academy 
graduation yearbook entry)48
President Truman "asked me who I wanted for the Navy as CNO and I told 
him the choices remained the same: Ramsey, Blandy, and Denfeld; that I was 
somewhat concerned about Denfeld's political activity. . . . However, it is 
obvious that the President would find Denfeld the easiest of the lot to work 
with." (1947 - diary entry by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal)49
Louis Emil Denfeld was born on 13 April 1891, in Westboro, Massachusetts. His 
parents, Professor Robert E. Denfeld and Etta May Denfeld, were the first generation of 
each of their families to be born in the United States. Robert's father had emigrated from 
Germany in 1848.50 The Denfeld family had already produced one U. S. naval officer by 
the time of Louis' birth. George William Denfeld, Louis' uncle, had graduated from the 
Naval Academy in the class of 1877 and risen to the rank of Captain before retiring in 
1905.51 Current Biography. 1947 claimed that Louis was inspired by his uncle to seek an 
appointment to the Naval Academy.52 After Louis' graduation from the Academy in 1912, 
his cousins, Fred and Richard, both followed in his footsteps, graduating in the classes of 
1922 and 1952 respectively.53 Fred reached the rank of Commander, but Richard broke
48Luckv Bag. U. S. Naval Academy Class of 1912. (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Academy, 
1912), p. 102. The Lucky Bag is the Naval Academy's yearbook. Each member of the graduating class is 
allocated one page which contains his picture and a semi-biographical note, usually written by one of his 
classmates.
49Millis, p. 325.
50Letter from Admiral Louis Denfeld to Karl Denfeld of Kassel, Germany, 23 September 1949, Denfeld 
Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld," Naval Historical Center Archives, Washington, D. C., and Naval Office of 
Information, Biographical Sketch, Admiral Louis Emil Denfeld, U.S. Navy, Retired, 20 December 1967.
5 United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, Register of Alumni. (Annapolis, Maryland: U. S. 
Naval Academy Alumni Association, Inc., 1987), p. 143.
52Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography. 1947. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1948), p. 160.
53U. S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni, pp. 184 and 295, Letter from Admiral Louis Denfeld to 
Congressman Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, 10 November 1948, Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld,"
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with the family's Navy tradition by transferring to the Air Force upon graduation and rising 
to the rank of Colonel before retirement.54
Louis was a remarkable midshipman only in his lack of noteworthy achievement.
He stood 88th in a class of 156, and his graduation entry in the Lucky Bag notes his 
pleasant disposition but makes no mention of his having attained any leadership positions 
in the Midshipman regiment or in any team sports.55 His roommate, Ralph Parr, held a 
"three-striper" leadership position while lettering in basketball and distinguishing himself 
as a rifleman. Other classmates who later achieved public recognition included Richard E. 
Byrd, the famous polar explorer, and DeWitt Clinton Ramsey, one of Denfeld's 
competitors for the CNO position in 1947. The Lucky Bag described Louis Denfeld as "a 
rough-house kid with a happy-go-lucky disposition, . . . [and] often one of the boys."56 
To accompany his personal entry and picture, Louis chose an intriguing quotation, given 
his future fame as the half-hearted leader of rebellious admirals: "Where ignorance is bliss, 
'tis folly to be wise."57 As CNO, Admiral Denfeld was often criticized for ignoring or 
delegating difficult problems rather than taking them on himself.
After graduation, Denfeld was commissioned an Ensign and served in succession 
on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. In 1915, he married Rachel Metcalf and returned 
to sea duty, eventually rising to command the destroyer U.S.S. McCall at the end of 
World War I. In 1922, he completed submarine training and served during 1923 and 1924 
in the submarine force where he earned the submariners' gold dolphins and commanded 
the submarine S-24. Afterward, Denfeld began to serve in staff billets, beginning with two
Naval Historical Center Archives, Washington, D. C., Telegram from Admiral Louis Denfeld to Admiral 
Roper, 23 April 1948, Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld," Naval Historical Center Archives, 
Washington, D. C., and interview with Richard Denfeld, telephone, 14 February 1995.
54U. S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni, p. 295.
55Ibid., p. 163, and Lucky Bag, p. 102.
56Luckv Bag, p. 102.
57Ibid.
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years in the Office of the CNO followed by a brief destroyer command. Thereafter, 
Admiral Richard Leigh, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet's Battleship Division, selected 
Commander Denfeld to be his aide, a position he retained as Admiral Leigh rose to 
command the United States Fleet in 1933. Following additional sea and shore 
assignments, in June 1937, Denfeld was chosen to be the aide of the CNO who became his 
chief patron, Admiral William Leahy.58
During World War II, Captain Denfeld served as the Chief of Staff for the 
Commander of the Navy's Atlantic Support Force, coordinating the escorts for North 
Atlantic convoys bound for Great Britain. He then moved to the Navy's Bureau of 
Personnel as Assistant Chief and supervised the manning of the wartime Navy from early 
1942 through March 1945. Admiral King finally awarded Rear Admiral Denfeld a sea 
command toward the end of the Pacific war, assigning him to lead Battleship Division 
Nine under Admiral Halsey in support of the Okinawa landings and naval operations 
against the Japanese home islands. Immediately after the Japanese surrender Denfeld was 
ordered to Washington to head the Bureau of Personnel and coordinate the Navy's 
demobilization. Denfeld ably managed the Navy's manpower pool from August 1945 
through February 1947 under the new CNO, Admiral Nimitz. Through his routine 
opportunities to testify before Congress on personnel issues, he made important contacts 
which would facilitate his later becoming an effective advocate of the Navy's interests as 
CNO.59 Admiral Nimitz rewarded Denfeld in February 1947 by awarding him a fourth
58Naval Office of Information, Biographical Sketch, Admiral Louis Emil Denfeld, U.S. Navy, Retired, 20 
December 1967 and Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations. (Annapolis, Maryland: 
Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 193.
59See Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File "Denfeld," and Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar, Truman 
Library, Independence, Missouri for examples of contacts with Congressional and Executive Branch 
leaders.
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star and making him Commander in Chief of the Navy's Pacific Fleet and of the joint 
Pacific Command, Admiral Nimitz's wartime position.60
Although Admiral Denfeld had now escaped from the tense Washington 
atmosphere and could enjoy the warm Hawaii sun, his name remained on the lips of the 
NME's leaders. Secretary Forrestal wrote him a friendly, conversational letter in May 
1947 giving his ex-personnel chief an update on the current budget negotiations.61 
Speculation had also already begun regarding Admiral Nimitz's successor as CNO, since 
his 2-year term was due to expire in December. Nimitz provided his recommendations to 
his civilian superiors at the end of the summer. He favored Admirals W. H. P. Blandy, 
DeWitt C. Ramsey, Richard L. Connoly, Charles M. Cooke, and Louis E. Denfeld as 
suitable candidates to fill his position.62 Blandy, Connoly, and Cooke were surface ship 
officers in the standard naval tradition, and all had impressive combat service records. 
Ramsey, an academy classmate of Denfeld's, had made his mark in the Navy as an aviator 
and had commanded an aircraft carrier with great success against the Japanese. Admiral 
Denfeld was the only candidate with extensive Washington experience, and his patron, 
Admiral Leahy, still exercised great influence in the Nation's capital.
As Secretary Forrestal narrowed his choices, he received recommendations for 
Cooke from retired Fleet Admiral King and for Denfeld from Leahy. Nimitz gave no 
preference. By early October, the Secretary had narrowed his choices to Denfeld, 
Ramsey, or Blandy and discussed his difficult decision with the President. Professor 
Isenberg has concluded that Leahy's recommendation helped determine the President's 
choice of a new CNO because Leahy had served as Truman's Chief of Staff and was
60Ibid., andRothe, Current Biography. 1947. pp. 161-62.
61Millis, p. 275.
62Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, p. 193.
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"practically the only naval officer the President trusted."63 Forrestal suggested that 
Denfeld would be "the easiest of the lot to work with," and this seemed to Truman to be 
the deciding argument.64 Given the fact that no candidate appeared markedly superior to 
the others, the President was hesitant to give his new CNO a full four-year term, the 
maximum authorized under the regulations. Nimitz had served for only two years, a fact 
that the Admiral "regretted and rather resented,"65 and the President saw no reason to 
grant a longer commission to his successor. It has been asserted that Denfeld's two year 
term in some way reflected of the President's lack of confidence in him, but this can not be 
demonstrated with any credibility.66 The President made his choice on 12 November 
1947, and the very next day, Admiral Denfeld began work in Washington by meeting with 
Secretary Forrestal and senior naval aviators on "Project A," the Navy's code name for the 
newly designed flush-deck aircraft carrier, later popularized as the "supercarrier" and 
destined to play an important part in the unfolding saga of unification.67 On 15 December 
1947, Admiral Denfeld officially relieved Nimitz.
The new CNO was very familiar with the Navy's organization, having spent five of 
the last eight years in Washington. His official primary duty was "to command the 
operating forces and be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for their use." He was 
also to serve as the "principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary of the 
Navy on the conduct of war, . . . [and to be] the Navy member of the Joint Chiefs of
63Isenberg, p. 145, and Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. 
(Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 328.
64Millis, p. 325.
65Potter, Nimitz. p. 428.
66Isenberg, p. 145.
67Sullivan Papers, Box 8, Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar, Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri.
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Staff."68 Because the Navy Department also included the Marine Corps, Denfeld became 
the advocate for the Marines in the JCS. The Commandant of the Marine Corps did not 
become a full-fledged JCS member until the Eisenhower administration.
Denfeld was authorized to assign a Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) and 
no more than six Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) to assist him in meeting his 
responsibilities. The structure Denfeld inherited included five DCNOs: "OPOl" took 
charge of personnel matters, "OP02" dealt with administration, "OP03" was responsible 
for operations, "OP04" oversaw the Navy's logistics, and "OP05" ran the Navy's aviation 
programs.69 A Navy Department organizational chart is attached in Appendix I. Shortly 
after assuming his new duties, Denfeld brought in Vice Admiral Radford as his VCNO and 
right hand man, and would rely heavily on Radford's extensive background in naval 
aviation and unification issues.
As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Denfeld took on several 
additional responsibilities. The Chiefs served as "the principal military advisors to the 
President and the Secretary of Defense," and carried out the following specific duties:
- to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the
military forces;
- to prepare joint logistic plans . .
- to establish unified [joint] commands in strategic areas . . .;
- to formulate policies for the joint training of the military forces;
- to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the
military forces;
- to review major military material and personnel requirements . . .  in
accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
68U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Management Engineer, The United States Navy: A 
Description of its Functional Organization, unpublished manual, 1948, p. 57, contained in the Papers of 
Francis P. Matthews, File "Navy," Truman Library, Independence Missouri.
69Ibid., p. 22, and Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal and the Naw. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 239.
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- to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of 
the United Nations . . 70
The service chiefs were individually assigned to supervise appropriate joint theater 
commands, and, given the Navy's interests, Admiral Denfeld assumed the responsibility for 
the Pacific Command (his previous assignment) and the Atlantic Command, then under 
Admiral Blandy's leadership. Later, Denfeld, as the Navy's senior officer, also became 
responsible for the naval support command for Europe, designated as the Northeastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Command under Admiral Connoly.
Denfeld took these responsibilities seriously and sought to help the Joint Chiefs 
provide the best possible national defense, but he was certainly aware of the on-going 
inter-service struggles. Shortly after taking over the Pacific Command, he had observed 
that "the Army and the Air Force seek to shackle, restrict, or otherwise prevent the Navy 
from exploiting its intrinsic capabilities."71 He later reflected that "the task [of the JCS] 
would be, I thought, to fit the best tools each service could provide to the joint problem of 
winning any war by swift, efficiently co-ordinated teamwork."72 But, as he was soon to 
find out, service politics and struggles for budgetary allocations often overrode these 
larger concerns. The Hoover Commission studied the functioning of the JCS in mid-1948 
and concluded that the Chiefs were influenced too much by considerations of "service 
particularism and aggrandizement" and failed to devote adequate "time and thought" to 
their broader duties.73 Despite Admiral Denfeld's original intentions, he soon discovered
70U.S. Department of the Navy, The United States Naw. p. 50. These duties are reprinted from the text of 
the National Security Act of 1947.
71 Admiral Denfeld's March 1947 statement, quoted in Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. Volume I: The Formative Years. 1947-1950. (Washington: Historical Office,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), p. 395.
72Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN (Ret.), ''The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force ever SANK," Collier's.
25 March 1950, p. 33.
73 Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The National 
Security Organization. (The Hoover Commission Report) H. Doc. No. 86, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, 
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, pp. 66-67.
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that if he failed to look out for the Navy’s interests, the other Chiefs would run roughshod 
over his service. He came to understand that he must fight for every dollar in the Navy's 
budget.
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DENFELD BATTLES FOR THE NAVY (DECEMBER 1947 TO MARCH 1949)
"Denfeld was a very nice person. . . .  He was a very decent person, but this 
[the JCS] wasn't his league." (1949 - Wilfred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense)74
"The admirals frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim 
religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his only prophet, and the 
United States Navy the only true Church." (1947 - McGeorge Bundy,
Presidential Adviser)75
1947 and 1948 were two of the most turbulent peacetime years experienced by 
Americans in recent memory. At home the American people sought to return to a normal 
routine following the trauma of the Second World War, yet this led to inflation, strikes, 
and other problems. Finding productive work for returning servicemen was increasingly 
difficult as the wartime economy contracted, leading to serious unemployment problems 
and a dramatic rise in the Nation's homeless population. Pent up labor frustrations 
paralyzed many industries, eventually causing the President to break one strike with 
federal troops. Truman's concern for the health of the economy caused him to place very 
tight limits on all allocations, especially those for defense projects, in an attempt to 
minimize budget deficits.
The United States was unable to return to its traditional isolationist posture 
following the war. Its commitment to the new United Nations and its status as the only 
nuclear power required extensive international obligations. The Marshall Plan, the 
Truman Doctrine, and aid to the Chinese Nationalists demanded that vast sums be
74Interview with Wilfred J. McNeil by Jerry N. Ness, 1972, Washington, D C., Transcript, 1979, Truman 
Library, p. 113.
75Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1947), p. 506.
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appropriated from the national treasury to promote political stability abroad and to protect 
democracy from the growing communist menace. Soon, the Berlin crisis, the creation of 
NATO, the victory of Mao's Chinese communists, and Soviet nuclear tests would harden 
the battle lines of the Cold War. National interest and the support of allies obliged the 
United States to remain engaged in this global struggle.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible for formulating military contingency 
plans to meet all crises effecting the United States' interests throughout the world.
Despite growing international dangers, domestic economic and social pressures severely 
constrained available military options. Postwar demobilization had left the United States 
with only the sixth largest Army in the world by mid-1947.76 The American Armed 
Forces had dropped from their 1945 peak strength of 12 million to just over 1.5 million in 
1947. Even President Truman characterized this process as "efficient disintegration."77 
The limited capabilities of the Nation's forces were, for obvious reasons, not well 
publicized; but at the time of the Czechoslovak communist coup in 1948, the Army could 
have only deployed one combat-ready division if the Soviets had threatened Western 
Europe. The Navy and the Air Force were in much the same sorry state. In early 1948, 
Secretary Forrestal reported to the President that an "acute personnel shortage . . . 
requires the immobilization of 107 ships."78
Admiral Denfeld recognized the difficult demands his new position would impose, 
but believed that in concert with the able and experienced Secretary of the Navy, John L. 
Sullivan, he could adequately defend the naval services' interests in the inter-service power 
struggles and promote an effective strategy for national defense. He encouraged his 
subordinates to broaden their experience to include "skills in business organization and
76Haynes, p. 119.
77Ibid.
78Millis, p. 375.
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administration" because he realized that in peacetime, the greatest threat to the Navy was 
in the Nation's capital rather than on the high seas.79 To keep in close contact with the 
other services and the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Denfeld led the January 1948 effort 
to move the Navy's headquarters to the Pentagon from its home in the Main Navy 
Building on Constitution Avenue. Initially, the public feedback he received on his 
performance was very positive. The Cleveland Plain Dealer described the Navy's 
leadership in June 1948 as "a fighting, winning team . . . [who] have been able to infuse 
Congress with some of their Navy enthusiasm."80 But soon his management and 
leadership skills began to be questioned inside and outside the Navy.
The CNO's extensive background in personnel and budgetary matters enabled him 
to feel very comfortable testifying before Congress and arguing with the other service 
chiefs on these issues, but on other matters he routinely delegated the leadership role to 
one of his deputies. Vice Admiral Libby recalled that "Admiral Denfeld never had much 
to say when he was down at Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. . . . He was very much 
interested in being Chief of Naval Operations, but he didn't enjoy being a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. That was his great weakness."81 Vice Admiral Carney, Denfeld's 
DCNO for Logistics and later a CNO himself, echoed this view:
We [Radford, Sherman, and Carney] were doing all the work on the JCS. . . . 
Questions would come up on technical issues, where Raddy and I had lived 
through it and knew what the hell we were talking about. . . and Louie, he 
wouldn't know his ass from third base about it.82
79 Admiral Denfeld's preface to Department of the Navy, The United States Naw. p. v.
80Walker S. Buel, "It's a Great Week for the Navy," Cleveland Plain Dealer. 4 June 1948, in the Denfeld 
Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 6, File "Clippings."
8interview with Ruthven E. Libby, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) by Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen, USN, 
1984, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1984, U. S. Naval Academy Library, 
Special Collections, p. 168.
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Denfeld's habit of routinely delegating many of his duties also frustrated the leaders 
of the other services. Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington recalled that even though 
Admiral Denfeld was CNO, "the real boss" appeared to be Radford.83 General 
Eisenhower privately commented on the JCS' operations at that time:
The situation grows intolerable. Denfeld apparently wants to do right, but he 
practically retires from every discussion in favor of [Vice Admiral Arthur D ] 
Struble [DCNO for Operations], who infuriates everyone with his high, 
strident voice and apparent inability to see any viewpoint except his own.84
Although Denfeld could be an eloquent speaker and was committed to defend the Navy's 
interests, he seemed to lack enthusiasm for fighting in the joint arena. His practice of 
obtaining the advice and aid of experts on technical questions was appropriate for a CNO, 
but he delegated so many tasks to his subordinates that he did not establish himself as the 
primary spokesman for the Navy. Professor Isenberg has concluded that Denfeld held 
"the leading reins very loosely - if he had quite grasped them at all."85 Later, when 
circumstances and conscience pushed Admiral Denfeld into taking a public stand as the 
Navy's primary spokesman, he vacillated and procrastinated until his leadership had little 
influence on his subordinates and Congress. His inability to maintain control over his 
service and serve as its public leader eventually cost him his job.
Denfeld proved to be a successful CNO in other arenas. His Congressional 
contacts were well developed by the time he assumed this office. As one of the few 
Republicans in the Truman administration, he cultivated good relations with G. O. P. 
leaders. At the same time, he understood that every high-ranking military officer was 
obliged to avoid publicly making partisan political statements. He made "a very favorable
83Interview with W. Stuart Symington by James R. Fuchs, 1981, Washington, D.C., Transcript, 1983, 
Truman Library, p. 78.
84Eisenhower statement of 19 March 1949, quoted in Rearden, p. 366.
85Isenberg, p. 146.
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impression" on Senator Robert Taft of Ohio in December 1947. In discussions with 
Republican Party officials, he even explored whether or not to reserve a room for him at 
the 1948 Republican National Convention, but eventually declined to do so: "As you 
know, I would be delighted to be there . . . but I think I might be criticized in my position 
if I were."86 During the summer of 1948, while President Truman campaigned for 
reelection in a contest few expected him to win, Denfeld admitted privately to having been 
approached "by a number of Republican leaders asking me who I wanted as Secretary of 
Defense and Secretary of the Navy."87 No wonder Forrestal had been concerned about 
the Admiral's "political activity" when recommending his selection as CNO.88
President Truman never indicated that his support for Admiral Denfeld was ever 
adversely affected by the CNO's political activities. Both men appeared to maintain good 
relations throughout 1948 and 1949 until the last days of the "Revolt of the Admirals."
On 12 April 1948, Denfeld sent the President a hearty congratulatory note on the third 
anniversary of his inauguration. "It has been both an honor and a pleasure to serve you as 
Chief of Naval Operations. I am confident that I speak for all the officers and men of the 
Naval Establishment in assuring you of our continued support in these most trying 
times."89 After Truman upset Governor Dewey in November to win a second term, 
Denfeld extended his "sincere and hearty congratulations," and asserted that "the country 
is fortunate in having your firm guidance during the difficult years ahead." He also offered 
Truman use of the CNO's quarters at the Naval Observatory during the upcoming White
86Letter from Senator Robert Taft to Dudley White, publisher of the Sandusky, Ohio Register-Star-News. 
31 December 1947, and letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 20 February 1948, in Denfeld 
Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 6, File " W."
87Ibid., Letter from Admiral Denfeld to John P, Marquand of Newburyport, Massachusetts, 12 August 
1948, in Denfeld Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 4, File "M."
88Millis, p. 325.
89Letter from Admiral Denfeld to President Truman, 12 April 1948, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
White House Central Files, Presidential Personal Correspondence Files, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
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House renovations.90 The President gratefully acknowledged this "generous expression of 
confidence in my leadership," and stated how "characteristically thoughtful" was Denfeld's 
offer of his "own quarters."91 Despite continuing inter-service battles and acknowledged 
political differences, the President and his CNO remained on good terms.
Secretary Forrestal also seemed to maintain a friendly and respectful relationship 
with the Admiral despite the Secretary's intense frustration with the interminable inter­
service squabbling. In March 1948, Forrestal described his service chiefs (Bradley,
Spaatz, and Denfeld) as "broad-minded and patriotic men."92 Admiral Denfeld always 
valued his relationship with Forrestal and, after his removal as CNO in 1949, proudly 
referred Congressional investigators to letters in which the late Secretary had attested to 
Denfeld's support for unification.93 Despite this cordiality, Forrestal seems privately to 
have had reservations about the admiral. In early 1949, General Eisenhower recorded that 
the Secretary expressed trust in many Army officers, but of those in the Navy, thought "of 
only Sherman and Blandy among the higher ones, [and] possibly Connoly also."94 
Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, in their Forrestal biography, observed that the 
Navy's refusal to compromise and "its stiff-necked resistance to any cuts distressed him" 
to the extent that Forrestal "grew more disenchanted with the self-righteous arrogance of 
senior naval officers and their rigid peddling of the party line. "95 Given Denfeld's generally 
good relations with Forrestal, one wonders whether some effort on Denfeld's part to
90Ibid., Letter from Admiral Denfeld to President Truman, 10 November 1948.
91Ibid., Letter from President Truman to Admiral Denfeld, 13 November 1948.
92Letter from Secretary Forrestal to the Honorable E. V. Robertson, 30 March 1948, quoted in Millis, p. 
404.
93Letter from Admiral Denfeid to Senator William F. Knowland, 9 February 1950, p. 5, in Matthews 
Papers, Correspondence files, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
94Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure - America's Armed Forces, (New York: 
Random House, 1971), p. 95, and Isenberg, p. 147.
95Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), pp. 412-13.
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mediate between the Secretary and the Navy's hard-liners might have eased the growing 
tensions. But, if such an opportunity ever existed, it was lost.
The Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan was an intelligent and experienced 
administrator and no relation to the former heavyweight champ. He had served in the 
Executive Branch since 1939, holding positions in the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Treasury Department and the Navy Department, and rising to Navy Secretary when 
Forrestal assumed the leadership of the National Military Establishment in 1947. During 
his treasury service, Sullivan had established excellent ties with Congress and built on this 
strength by serving as the Navy's point man "on the hill" during his tenure in the Navy 
Department. Professors Albion and Connery observed that "he made brilliant appearances 
before Congressional committees," and he was respected throughout the administration 
for his experience and intelligence.96
According to Sullivan's papers in the Truman Library, Admiral Denfeld maintained 
a good but stiff relationship with the Secretary. Their telephone conversations were 
always respectful and professional, and with the exception of occasional luncheon 
meetings, they engaged in little social contact or other pleasantries.97 One indicator that 
the Secretary did not have complete confidence in the Admiral was that during a crisis 
involving the new flush-deck aircraft carrier, Sullivan called Radford back from California 
rather than rely on the advice of his CNO.98
In this somewhat ambiguous position, Admiral Denfeld strove to develop plans 
and policies to ensure national security and protect the Navy's interests. Even before his 
selection as CNO, he had testified against proposed cuts in the Navy's budget. In March
96Albion and Connery, pp. 211 and 301.
97Sullivan Papers, Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar and correspondence files, Truman Library.
98Ibid., 24 April 1949 transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Sullivan and Vice Admiral 
Radford.
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1946, he had claimed that proposed reductions would make it impossible for the Navy to 
defend many of its Pacific bases against enemy attack. This charge elicited the following 
note to President Truman from budget director Harold Smith: "This is an extraordinary 
statement. Nimitz, in his testimony, at least says one cannot be dogmatic. Denfeld has no 
hesitancy, apparently, about being dogmatic." "  Regardless of the political fallout,
Admiral Denfeld consistently reiterated this view throughout his tenure. His opposition to 
budgetary reductions was certainly based on personal conviction rather than any parochial 
Navy "party line."
Denfeld was strongly committed to maintaining a balanced defense structure and 
consistently opposed excessively relying on any one weapons system or theory of warfare. 
He testified before Congress in April 1948 that "the three armed services must be kept in 
balance . . . [and that] it is even more important than before that the United States have 
the naval means to control the oceans between North America and Europe and North 
America and Asia."100 In testimony on the following year's budget, Denfeld reiterated this 
position more explicitly:
We [the Navy] believe that only by maintaining a balanced composition, under 
the requirements of a sound strategic concept, can the National Military 
Establishment possess the necessary flexibility to meet and counter not only the 
most probable enemy action, but unexpected and unforeseen turns of events. . .
The unpredictable fortunes of war make it very unwise to be committed in 
advance to any single plan of action.101
"Letter from Harold Smith to President Truman, 21 March 1946, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, White 
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Denfeld's statement seems very clear and correct in retrospect, but in the charged 
atmosphere of 1948, with defense budgets being drastically cut and many Americans 
believing in the omnipotence of the Air Force's strategic atomic bombing forces, few 
wanted to listen to an admiral who tried to justify the maintenance of a large fleet and 
other costly forces.
The inter-service battles of the late 1940s have often been interpreted as almost 
exclusively concerned with the distribution of funds, yet there was a more fundamental 
cause of disagreement. The JCS has responsibility for preparing the Nation's strategic 
defense plans and for recommending the military forces required to implement these plans. 
This task was greatly complicated by the lack of any clear, authoritative statement of 
objectives from the National Security Council, a body created by the 1947 National 
Security Act for just this purpose. President Truman appeared to illogically give priority 
to developing "a firm military policy" before attempting to formulate a national security 
strategy. That is to say he seemed to allow the capabilities of the armed services to 
determine the national security goals of the Nation. Although Secretaries Forrestal and 
Sullivan seemed to accept this procedure, Admiral Denfeld and Air Force Secretary 
Symington, in rare agreement, objected to this process as inverted.102 As the temperature 
of the Cold War gradually rose, the Joint Chiefs attempted to formulate strategic plans 
which could protect the Country and its allies while remaining under President Truman's 
very low budgetary ceilings. General Marshall accurately described the Joint Chiefs as
102Letter from Secretary Sullivan to Secretary Forrestal, 9 July 1946, in the Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File 
"Unification," Truman Library, and W. Stuart Symington, "Our Air Force Policy," Vital Speeches of the 
Day. 1 July 1949, p. 567.
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being obliged to craft grand strategic plans without adequate resources and contended that 
we are "playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out."103
The Chief of Naval Operations offered some constructive original ideas on the best 
strategies for national defense, yet was consistently outvoted by the advocates of strategic 
air power. There was consensus that the only potential enemy was the Soviet Union, but 
how the U. S. might oppose the envisioned Red Army offensive across the North German 
plain was the subject of interminable debate. Secretary Forrestal succinctly captured this 
argument over strategy in a December 1947 letter:
There are really four outstanding military facts in the world at this time. They 
are: (1) The predominance of Russian land power in Europe and Asia. (2)
The predominance of American sea power. (3) Our exclusive possession of 
the atomic bomb, and (4) American productive capability. As long as we 
can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the 
atomic bomb, we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort 
to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power - military power - and 
to eliminate some of the conditions which breed war.104
Admiral Denfeld would have agreed with this summation with its emphasis on several 
aspects of American national power.105
In JCS sessions as early as April 1948, Denfeld opposed the prevailing 
Administration inclination to rely on an atomic retaliatory offensive by suggesting 
alternative plans to defend America's European allies on the ground while striking at the 
invading Soviet forces from their Mediterranean and Northern flanks.106 Another key
103Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume II, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy. 1947-1949, (Washington: The Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1978), p. 18.
104Letter from Secretary Forrestal to Chan Gurney, 8 December 1947, quoted in Millis, pp. 350-51.
105 Admiral Denfeld offered several similar statements before Congress during his term as CNO. See 
Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN, Statement to the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, United States Senate, on the Navy Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, 18 June 1949, Contained 
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106Ibid„ p. 278.
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issue on which Admiral Denfeld and the President disagreed was the Administration's 
assumption that the budget only fund a military nucleus which could always be built up 
when additional force was required. In early 1949, the CNO pointed out in Senate 
testimony that although this strategy had worked in past crises, "it is unlikely that our 
allies will ever again absorb the brunt of an enemy's initial attack. "1UV Any shift from either 
of these Administration strategies would have required both the maintenance of a strong 
fleet of aircraft carriers and much greater expenditures on the military in general, options 
which few voters or legislators were willing to accept.
Regardless of the opposition they encountered, the CNO and his fellow naval 
officers continued to criticize the Air Force's proposed "atomic blitz" strategy and 
recommend improvements in overall readiness. In a "spirited defense of the Navy's 
position" on 4 October 1948, Admiral Denfeld broadly criticized the Air Force's plans.
The unpleasant fact remains that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as 
to the ability of the Air Force successfully to deliver the [atomic] weapon by 
means of unescorted missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy 
territory in the face of strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets 
whose locations are not accurately known.108
This basic theme was to be reiterated in ever-increasing volume and frequency throughout 
the remainder of Denfeld's term as CNO.
Secretary Forrestal kept the President informed of the disagreements over strategic 
concepts within the JCS. In October 1948, Truman and Forrestal discussed the inability of 
American forces to operate in the Mediterranean theater in wartime under the current 
budget. The President authorized his Defense Secretary to prepare a "supplemental, back­
up budget" that would fund operations in the Mediterranean, but Forrestal observed that he
107Denfeld statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 18 June 1949.
108Ibid., pp. 231-32, and Rearden, pp. 344-45.
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did not seem overly concerned.109 The only war plan the JCS could develop within existing 
budgetary constraints was one which called for a quick atomic strike by long-range 
bombers on the Soviet Union's centers of industrial production from bases in Great Britain 
and the United States while the American and allied armies gave ground in Western Europe 
and waited for the anticipated crippling of the enemy's industrial base to slow down his 
advance. Senior naval officers continued to oppose this atomic strike option, but the 
Administration considered the expense of preparing for other defensive measures to be 
unacceptably high.110
In 1948, American military leaders brought up an additional significant misgiving 
about the desirability of this atomic strategy. Given the decision to make the delivery of 
nuclear weapons the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression, it would have seemed logical 
to give the Defense Department control over those weapons to ensure their readiness for 
prompt use in event of a crisis. The leaders of the Defense Department discussed this 
proposal with President Truman on 21 July 1948. He rejected Secretary Forrestal's 
proposal on the grounds that the atomic bomb was not "a military weapon" and must be 
treated "differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that."111 The Joint 
Chiefs had thereby based their only affordable retaliatory strategy on the use of a weapon 
which they did not control and which might be denied to them in time of national 
emergency.
Because almost all of the JCS' strategic planning efforts were classified, public 
debate over the competing doctrines of strategic bombing and control o f the seas found 
their best forum in the inter-service discussion about assignment of roles and missions to 
each armed service. Debates concerning the creation of a separate Air Force had not
109Rearden, p. 345.
110Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 504.
11 McCullough, p. 650.
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clearly defined the division of responsibilities within the NME between the three services, 
especially regarding aviation. When the President had signed the National Security Act of 
1947, he had also approved Executive Order 9877 which specified the duties of the three 
services. The Air Force was assigned the primary responsibility of conducting strategic 
bombing operations, but the Navy also retained the responsibility to operate aircraft in 
pursuit o f naval objectives, including the attack of inland targets as required to support the 
conduct of naval campaigns. These two services could not agree on how to differentiate 
between their missions and continued the public debates which had raged since the end of 
the war. Although a full examination of the nuances of the roles and missions debate is 
beyond the scope of this study, a brief survey of the major events and principal issues in 
this evolving argument is essential to understanding the eventual removal of Admiral 
Denfeld.112
Secretary Forrestal had become so exasperated by the ongoing bickering between 
his service chiefs that in early 1948 he decided that a four-day meeting of the Joint Chiefs 
away from Washington might facilitate these officers detaching themselves from their 
parochial service concerns and coming to some agreement on roles and missions. Forrestal 
restricted the attendees at this 11 -14 March 1948 JCS conference at Key West, Florida to 
only two officers per service plus the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General 
Gruenther, and the President’s Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy. Representing the Navy were 
Admirals Denfeld and Radford. Generals Bradley and Wedemeyer attended for the Army, 
and Generals Spaatz and Norstadt were the Air Force's delegates.113 This dedicated, 
private session helped to settle some of the details. The various missions were divided into 
primary and secondary categories. The Air Force was given the primary mission of
112The best examinations of the struggles over roles and missions during this period are found in 
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," and Jeffrey Barlow’s The Revolt of the Admirals.
113Millis, p. 390.
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conducting strategic bombing campaigns while the Navy was placed in a secondary, 
supporting position in this area. Denfeld gained the other services' acquiescence on the 
construction of the Navy's flush-deck carrier, but this agreement was actually illusory, 
because several of the delegates later claimed that their approval had either been 
conditional or merely acknowledging the fact that the President had already approved the 
carrier in the latest defense budget.114 These second thoughts were encouraged by the fact 
that no notes were taken during any of the sessions. Forrestal saw this conference as "the 
beginning of the effort to rebuild the Armed Forces of the United States," but few other 
participants thought as highly of the event.115
The inadequacy of the Key West agreements was best revealed by Forrestal's 
having again to sequester his Joint Chiefs in August 1948 at Newport, Rhode Island, to 
insist that they clarify the meaning of their earlier agreement. At this session, a 
stenographer was present to contribute some order and accountability to the 
deliberations.116 The concepts of "primary" and "secondary" mission areas were clarified 
and a special board, the Weapons System Evaluation Group, was created to independently 
assess the performance and suitability of weapons systems being developed by the 
services.117 Admiral Denfeld confidently issued a press release:
The words of our understanding are clear and to my mind unequivocal. They 
will serve if they are interpreted properly - in the spirit of "all for one and one 
for all." Any agreement will work only if the personnel of each service work
114Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 474 - 76 provides a good summary of the Key 
West Agreements and their impact on the Navy's carrier program. The theory that Denfeld traded the 
strategic bombing mission for approval of the carrier can be found in Mark Perry, Four Stars. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pp. 10 - 24.
115Millis, p. 390.
116Jurika, p. 124.
117Rearden, p. 401.
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together with sympathy and understanding and really desire to make it 
work.118
His assessment was overly optimistic. Either the other chiefs did not share his desire to 
make the Newport agreement work or the inertia of continuing struggle and budgetary 
pressures were too much for the two agreements to overcome. The squabbling and public 
affairs wars continued unabated.
The struggles for defense dollars were hardly unnecessary during this period. In 
the absence of any agreed upon strategic concept, each service prudently sought to retain 
as much "muscle" as possible to ensure it could meet its responsibilities. The funding 
allocated for the entire defense establishment in Fiscal Year (FY) 1946 (1 October 1945 
through 30 September 1946) was $45 billion, or over two thirds of the total government 
budget.119 In FY 1947, the first true post-war budget, the military's allocation dropped to 
$14.26 billion and fell to its post-war low of $11.9 billion the following year.120 After 
having led their services to victory in a war during which projects were usually funded 
with little discussion, the admirals and generals adjusted with difficulty to the lean years of 
peace. President Truman believed that "Army and Navy professionals seldom had any 
idea of the value of money. They did not seem to care what the cost was."121
Secretary Forrestal disagreed with the Chief Executive by giving the admirals a 
back-handed compliment, "even naval officers were not economic fools . . . [and] 
recognized . . . that by forfeiting a sound economy at home we could stumble into state 
socialism just as successfully as if we had marked our course for that harbor."122 Even
118Admiral Denfeld's statement following the conference was included in an Office of the Secretary of 
Defense press release and is quoted in Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 487.
119Millis, p. 352.
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with this understanding, the Joint Chiefs agreed in 1948 that the ceilings imposed by the 
President were too low "to implement national policy in any probable war situation that 
can be seen."123 Nevertheless, the ceilings remained and Forrestal's protests to the 
President contributed to Truman's growing dissatisfaction with his Defense Secretary.
The President continued to view the military leaders' claims as "excessive,1 and 
considered Denfeld and the Navy to be the "worst offenders."124 Truman assessed what 
might be required for military sufficiency in light of all civil and military needs, and gave a 
priority to balancing the budget over funding the latest weapons upgrades. Essentially 
what occurred was Truman funded all other programs and gave the military the remainder 
as its budget ceiling. He firmly believed that war was not imminent and that short-term 
defense cuts to improve the economy would be a good investment.125 In 1948, when 
Congress overwhelmingly approved a supplement of $822 million for additional Air Force 
groups above the President's request, Truman impounded the funds and would not allow 
the Air Force to spend them.126 Although Congress did support this particular Air Force 
request, both political parties sought to reduce defense spending. Republican Senator 
Robert Taft, a committed isolationist, advocated cutting an additional $6 billion from the 
existing $11.9 billion FY 1948 military budget. Even without Senator Taft's cuts, the 
federal government concluded FY 1948 with a cash surplus of $8.4 billion.127 Denfeld 
strongly opposed the general policy of seeking ever deeper reductions. In his testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee on 19 May 1948, he stated: "It is axiomatic
123 JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 8 November 1948, quoted in Condit, p. 241.
124Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II, p. 34.
125President Truman was quoted in 4 May 1950's New York Times as asserting "repeatedly that he saw 
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126Haynes, p. 124. The Congressional votes were House: 343-3, Senate: 74-2.
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43
that military strength insufficient to support national policy is dangerous to national 
security and ineffective as a means of preserving the peace."128 One weakness in Admiral 
Denfeld's argument was that the only existing "national policy" was that supporting fiscal 
restraint.
These dramatic fiscal restrictions and the ongoing roles and missions debate 
provided more than enough fuel to keep the inter-service arguments flaming during 
Admiral Denfeld's term as CNO. Despite clear and repeated direction from the President 
and the Secretary of Defense, military officers and their civilian supporters continued to 
take their cases to the public in one sensational series of accusations after another. While 
Vice Admiral Carney urged naval officers to "subordinate your Navy partisanship to the 
laws, rules, and regulations of unification in furtherance of the goal of an American 
military team," other officers like Rear Admiral Gallery and General Spaatz used the media 
to vent their frustrations and tout their points of view.129 Although this behavior was not 
limited to naval officers, the sea service took the lion's share of the blame for these 
activities, apparently only because their publicity efforts were uncoordinated and clumsy 
when compared to the Air Force's polished campaign.
The Navy's public relations office reported to the Secretary of the Navy rather than 
to the CNO, and it received little support or emphasis during this period. In his 1947 
report to the Secretary of Defense and the President, Secretary Sullivan devoted less than 
one page to public affairs in his 83-page submission. In the following year's report
128U. S. Congress. House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Naw  
Appropriation Bill. 1949. 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, (Washington: United States Government Printing 
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Sullivan did not even mention the activities of his public relations office.130 In his Revolt 
of the Admirals. Jeffrey Barlow concludes that:
the Navy seemed to view public relations as something of a necessary evil.
The service's senior leadership had little understanding of the importance of 
getting their message across to the public until it was far too late to do much 
about it.131
Not until late in 1949 was the Navy's Office of Public Relations shifted to Admiral 
Denfeld's control in the Office of the CNO.
The Air Force consistently and effectively used its Congressional supporters and 
the press first to gain its independence from the Army, and then to promote its 70-group 
Air Force program. The Finletter and Brewster Boards, two studies of the Nation's 
military aviation policy commissioned in 1947 by Congress and the Executive Branch, 
generally supported the Air Force's positions. The Finletter Board's report showed 
especial partiality to the Air Force in advocating a large build up of that service and a 
deemphasis of Army and Navy responsibilities.132 The aggressive public relations 
campaign of the Air Force in 1947 masked what was actually a paper tiger. The longest 
range bombers in its strategic retaliatory force could not reach the Soviet Union from the 
United States, and other serious shortcomings plagued the "junior service." Kenneth Moll 
has argued that in 1947, the Air Force's "intelligence was poor [and] its readiness
130John L. Sullivan, Annual Report of the Secretary of the N aw  for the Fiscal Year 1947. (Washington: 
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marginal. Its long-range capabilities were nonexistent, and [the low level of] the A-bomb 
stockpile was shocking."133 But by listening to the claims of Air Force officers and their 
supporters, an uninformed observer might have concluded that the Air Force was all that 
the United States needed to ensure its national security.
The extended public brawling over roles, missions and funds angered the civilian 
heads o f the NME and the Government. Secretary Forrestal and President Truman 
attempted to restrict the public statements by military leaders but were unable to muzzle 
them effectively. The most difficult type of statement to restrict was the officers' 
testimony to Congress. Because as witnesses, they were under oath and were routinely 
asked for their personal opinions, there was no way the Chief Executive could order them 
to advocate policies they did not agree with. As early as 1945, President Truman's 
position was explained by Clark Clifford as follows.
The President felt that civil and naval personnel o f the Navy Department 
should no longer publicly attack unification, since it was administration policy. 
However, if called to testify before Congress, these individuals should feel 
free to express their opinions, after first explaining to the Committee that they 
were expressing personal views under leave to do so granted by the 
commander in chief.134
In mid-1946, Truman modified this seemingly fair policy as propagandists continued to 
embarrass the Administration with their inability to "toe the party line." He directed that 
the services support the new unification measure once it was officially submitted to 
Congress, because it would by that time have "become administration doctrine and he
133Kenneth L. Moll, "Nuclear Strategy, 1945 - 1949: America's First Four Years," Master's thesis, 
University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1965, p. 158. Robert F. Futrell's Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: Basic 
Thinking in the United States Air Force. 1907 - 1960. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 
1989), pages 237 - 59 provides an excellent overview of the Air Force's doctrinal and strategic thought 
during this period.
134Haynes, pp. 98 - 99.
46
would expect complete support for it in Congress."135 These presidential views on what 
was and was not permissible in Congressional testimony would become especially 
pertinent during the debates over the late 1949 removal of Admiral Denfeld. Many 
contended that his removal was a reprisal for his frank testimony, which he had identified 
as his personal opinion in accordance with this administration policy.
Between 1946 and 1949, the civilian leaders of the NME were forced repeatedly to 
clarify their policies on the expression of dissent and the promotion of individual service 
virtues. Assistant Secretary of Defense William Frye was probably stating the obvious 
when he declared that "discipline and authority . . .  are the inescapable methods of control. 
Without them, a military organization is useless in war and a menace in peace."136 
Nevertheless, a firm hand was often lacking in the Defense Department during the 
Forrestal years. Dr. Hammond noted that while the Secretary personally preferred to 
settle contentious issues through private discussion, he "seemed to uphold as a matter of 
principle the right of his own subordinates to dissent in public."137 Truman tried to 
reiterate his ground rules in May 1948 by directing the service Secretaries and Chiefs to 
"subordinate their private and service biases to the established national policies."138 But 
Air Force Secretary Symington continued to make so many inflammatory and partisan 
public statements that Forrestal finally began to consider removing him in July 1948.139
General Bradley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, acknowledged that his Air Force 
step-children were "in open defiance of Truman" and that their actions were "vastly 
complicating the JCS'job of producing unified war plans and budgets," yet he was unable
135President Truman in September 1946, quoted in Haynes, p. 103.
136Frye, p. 544.
137Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers,1' p. 478.
138Memorandum from President Truman to the Air Force Chief of Staff, et al., 13 May 1948, quoted in 
Haynes, p. 124.
139Millis, pp. 463 - 64, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 480.
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to exert any influence to put an end to the campaigns. Bradley observed that General 
Eisenhower shared his dismay, characterizing the activities of the leaders of the Navy and 
Air Force as "near insubordination."140 Returning to the Congressional testimony 
problem, Secretary Forrestal issued guidance to his service leaders in November 1948, 
encouraging them to defend their services' capabilities to the best o f their abilities but 
stated that he thought inappropriate and certainly not "conducive to the spirit of 
unification," any attack or criticism of the competence of another service.141 Despite these 
warnings, the "mud slinging" continued. A self-proclaimed aviation expert, William 
Bradford Huie, launched the next salvo by publishing a series of articles in the popular 
Readers' Digest "wholly critical of naval aviation. Many Navy leaders believed that he had 
been paid by the Air Force."142 Secretary Forrestal discussed this problem with the 
President in January 1949 and forwarded a draft speech to him to use to direct the service 
Secretaries and military chiefs to "keep their differences within military circles or resign," 
but this shot was never fired.143
Probably the most effective weapon in the Air Force's publicity arsenal was its 
ability to take its weapons platforms almost anywhere in the country and display their 
glamorous and awesome power. On the first Air Force Day, 18 September 1948, the Air 
Force staged "massive flights of B-29s over some of the major American cities [and] 
flights of five B-36s over 103 separate cities in the United States."144 Record breaking 
feats and air shows converted many citizens to the Air Force's way of thinking. In March 
1949 an Air Force B-50 bomber, using new aerial refueling techniques, completed a non­
140Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, U.S. Army, (Ret) and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An 
Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.
491.
141Millis, p. 516.
142Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 489.
143Millis, p. 545.
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stop flight around the world, making front pages across the land. Shortly thereafter the 
new B-36 bomber made a widely publicized 5,000 mile flight carrying a simulated atomic 
bomb.145 To further amplify the importance of this feat, someone leaked to the press an 
account of a secret Air Force briefing to the JCS that highlighted 70 strategic Russian 
targets now within the range of the B-36. This leak caused Congressman Carl Vinson, the 
powerful Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, to declare that further 
indiscretions would lead to a full Congressional investigation.146 Several months later, 
Secretary Forrestal's funeral was the scene of one of the most unusual of the inter-service 
snubs. In a final act of partisan defiance, all service Secretaries except the Air Force's 
Symington were chosen to serve as pall bearers.147 There was no way to prevent 
bitterness of this depth from being revealed.
The essential question raised in all attempts to limit public statements by Service 
Chiefs was: "What were the rights and status of military officials regarding freedom of 
expression?" Political appointees clearly served at the pleasure of the President and could 
be expected to support his policies until they found themselves in a situation where their 
integrity might be in jeopardy, such as being asked for their personal views while testifying 
under oath, or in purely individual matters like funerals. Military officers, on the other 
hand, were appointed to positions of authority in order to provide unbiased advice and 
guidance on military matters to the President and Congress. Although they received their 
commissions from the President and served at his pleasure, they were expected to be less 
politically-constrained, and consequently of value to Congress and the Executive Branch 
as neutral technical advisers. A Joint Chiefs of Staff filled with "yes men" would not serve 
the needs of the Nation. Conversely, Joint Chiefs who could not follow orders or accept
145Ibid., p. 491.
146Ibid.
147Boettcher, p. 171.
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direction from the President in matters which did not compromise their personal honor 
also threatened the very fabric of the government. Commitment to a common goal and 
mutual respect was required to make this arrangement work. In the late 1940s, these 
preconditions were often missing, as senior officers were politicized by the Administration.
Admiral Denfeld actively participated in these bitter exchanges and deserves at 
least as much blame as any other member of the NME's leadership for this group's 
unseemly behavior. As CNO he was charged with establishing and enforcing standards of 
conduct for his subordinates. Even though most of Denfeld's public statements were 
professional and responsible, as the uniformed leader of the Navy, he was accountable to 
the Commander in Chief for any rash or intemperate actions or statements by his 
subordinates. The 1924 Guide to Naval Leadership, a standard text during Denfeld's early 
career, offered 20 "points of the naval profession" to guide naval leaders. Among those 
were number 18 - "before you take any action . . . consider carefully its effect upon the 
discipline of the organization," and number 20 - "avoid, as you would the plague, hostile 
criticism of authority."148 Admiral Denfeld understood principle 20 and did restrain his 
growing frustration with his superiors, but he failed to take into account the effect his 
passive leadership had on the discipline of the Navy. His lack of assertiveness actually 
encouraged other naval officers to speak out, thereby diminishing his authority within the 
Navy and contributing to the growing public perception that he was losing control over his 
immediate subordinates. The Navy appeared rebellious and out of control in contrast to 
the single-minded Air Force, which despite occasional brash and insubordinate outbursts, 
maintained a unified front before the public. There is no indication that the Secretary of 
the Navy, the President, or anyone else drew this conclusion in time to counsel Denfeld
148Leo H. Thebaud, comp., Naval Leadership With Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others. (Annapolis, 
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about his leadership deficiencies, but it seems obvious that the inability of the CNO to 
keep his subordinates in line contributed to his eventual fall from favor.
51
LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE 
CANCELLATION OF THE 'SUPERCARRIER ("MARCH THROUGH MAY 19491
"Owing to the cancellation of the supercarrier, there was a vicious mutiny 
afoot in the Navy. With his crazy bull-in-the-china-shop approach, Johnson 
was in no way fitted to deal with it. Nor was his decent but weak and 
inexperienced Navy Secretary, Frank Matthews. A Navy mutiny could 
conceivably tear apart the Department of Defense, possibly tempting the 
Kremlin to capitalize on our military disarray." (1949 - General Bradley)149
"The better I got to know Mr. Matthews the more certain I became that his 
appointment as Secretary of the Navy verged on a national catastrophe." 
(1949 - Admiral Radford)150
James Forrestal, the Nation's first Secretary of Defense, had served the Roosevelt 
administration since June 1940. President Roosevelt had recruited him from the most 
experienced leaders of the business community to help improve the organization and 
efficiency of the Executive Branch. His naval service in World War I led him to gravitate 
to the military Departments, and he became Under Secretary of the Navy before Pearl 
Harbor.151 Forrestal's natural tendency was to go slowly and study every issue fully before 
coming to any decision. He believed that one risked damaging morale and the service's 
cohesion through rapid and ill-conceived changes and therefore often delayed 
implementing seemingly obvious improvements in the Department's organization to allow 
the dust to settle from previous efforts. This slowness and apparent indecisiveness 
eventually contributed to Truman's growing disenchantment with his Defense Secretary
149Bradley and Blair, p. 505.
150Jurika, p. 176.
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during 1948 and 1949.152 Additionally, the Secretary's firm stands in opposition to the 
recognition of Israel, in favor of military control over the Country's atomic arsenal, and 
especially, his insistent demands for more money frustrated the President. For his part, 
Forrestal "found himself thinking less and less of a President who seemed so willing to 
cave in to cheap political expediency."153 Shortly after Truman began his second term, he 
decided to replace Forrestal, who he believed "had worked himself to a state of near 
collapse."154 Soon after his being relieved by Louis Johnson on 28 March 1949, James 
Forrestal experienced a mental breakdown. He was admitted to a hospital for observation, 
but there was to be no recovery. Forrestal jumped to his death from an unguarded 
window less than two months after leaving office, becoming the first casualty o f military 
unification. More casualties were soon to follow.
In Louis Johnson, Truman found the solution to his frustrations with an indecisive 
Defense Secretary who was not supportive of his economy programs. Johnson, a wealthy 
lawyer from West Virginia, had a reputation for getting quick results through aggressive 
leadership. He was not afraid to make decisions and, right or wrong, he was rarely at a 
loss for a course of action. As early as February 1948, Admiral Denfeld anticipated that 
Johnson would succeed Forrestal. The CNO wrote to a friend that he had met Johnson in 
1948 and believed that this personal relationship "may enable us to do something to keep 
the Navy where it should be."155 Still unclear is why Denfeld thought that this one brief 
meeting had enabled him to convert Johnson from his strong commitment to air power and 
firm allegiance to the Army. The CNO was in for a great disappointment. The worst of 
the inter-service struggles were yet to come.
152McCullough, pp. 736 - 37.
153Ibid., p. 599.
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Washington press correspondents remembered Johnson from his term as Assistant 
Secretary of War in the late 1930s and described him as "cold, self-seeking, and hard- 
driving, . . .  He is iron-willed, self-confident, and self-sufficient."156 Johnson was born in 
Roanoke, Virginia, the son of a grocer.157 He worked his way through law school and 
was elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1917, serving as Speaker of that 
body during his first term. Johnson served in the Army during the First World War, rising 
to the rank of Captain before returning home after the Armistice. Even at this early 
juncture, Johnson did not hesitate to make waves when he thought something needed to 
be done. On his return voyage from Europe, Johnson drafted a 67-page ietter to the 
Secretary of War, setting forth "cogent ideas he had thought up for improving the 
Army."158 Following the War he became the leading partner in the law firm of Steptoe 
and Johnson and helped found the American Legion, serving as its national commander 
from 1932 through 1933. This service, and his aggressive campaign support for President 
Roosevelt, led to his 1937 selection as Assistant Secretary of War. In this position, 
Johnson vocally supported universal military training, rearmament, and an expansion of 
military aviation, but he was eased out when Secretary Stimson took over the Department 
in 1940.159
Louis Johnson was an impressive individual who stood over six feet tall and 
weighed over 250 pounds. His bald head and booming voice added to his powerful image. 
He had been out of government for eight years when President Truman called on him for 
help in managing the finances of his foundering reelection campaign in mid-1948.
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Johnson's connections, forceful personality, and loyalty to his Party helped raise millions 
for the President and helped him upset Governor Dewey in the November election. This 
yeoman work certainly merited a reward, and Johnson and Truman decided that the 
Defense Department would be the right place for Johnson to exercise his dynamic 
qualities.160 Jack Alexander observed that unlike Forrestal, Johnson was "not much 
concerned with diplomatic niceties."161 He charged into his new duties and rapidly 
changed the entire atmosphere in the National Military Establishment. David McCullough 
reported that "he hit the Pentagon like a cyclone."162
Truman felt confident his new Secretary of Defense could force the Joint Chiefs to 
agree on budgets within the Administration's ceilings and put a stop to the incessant 
bickering within the Pentagon. Johnson was able to force through budgets even below the 
President's goals, yet even he could not suppress disagreements between the professional 
officers under his command. In fact, his hard-fisted methods actually exacerbated some of 
the issues, adding fuel to the fire and sparking the "revolt of the admirals" in 1949. 
Johnson's personal ambition of succeeding Truman as President in 1952 motivated him to 
try to make a distinctive mark, and his lack of restraint made his mark much more a crater 
than a footprint. General Bradley later remarked that Johnson "was probably the worst 
appointment Truman had made." In light of Johnson's aggressive and seemingly irrational 
behavior, Bradley further commented that Truman had in fact "replaced one mental case 
with another." Eventually Johnson was found to have developed a brain tumor, but no 
evidence indicates that this adversely affected his personality in the late 1940s.163 Louis 
Johnson was by nature an aggressive man.
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The new Secretary of Defense relieved Forrestal on 28 March 1949, the same day 
the North Atlantic Alliance was formed. At his first press conference, Johnson promised 
the President his support and stated that "to the limit the present law allows, I promise you 
there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it."164 Johnson 
was determined to centralize the Defense Department as much as possible and consolidate 
his power over the services to avoid the frustrations experienced by Forrestal.165 He had 
enormous confidence in his ability to get quick results on all problems facing the 
Department. Admiral Radford observed that Johnson "had not the slightest doubt of his 
ability to fairly settle any question, military or otherwise."166 Johnson saw his position as 
the President's point man in the Defense Department who would enforce the President's 
will on this bureaucracy and its avaricious generals and admirals.167 Johnson had no 
intention of weighing complex variables or developing various options before making any 
hard and fast decisions. He believed his imposition of firm budgetary limits would force 
the military establishment to become more efficient in its use of personnel and resources.
With regard to the festering service rivalries, the new Secretary had a plan to 
resolve them promptly. At his first press conference, Johnson asserted that anyone who 
objected to his program to settle inter-service disputes "would have a chance to argue me 
out of that conclusion in the next couple of days." Thereafter anyone who still disagreed 
would be forced out of the organization; "there will just not be room for them around the 
Pentagon and I told the three Secretaries that."168 To make it clear who was in charge,
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Johnson ousted the Secretary of the Army from the best office in the Pentagon, and settled 
in himself. He also had General Pershing's impressive wooden desk moved into his new 
office, thereby creating quite a stir in the five-sided building. Despite Admiral Denfeld's 
earlier impression that Johnson would be objective, General Bradley quickly recognized 
Johnson as "an unstinting airpower advocate."169 Secretary Johnson had served as a 
director of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the B-36 
bomber, before returning to government service in 1949 and had come to believe in the 
economic virtues of airpower over the more costly sea and land forces. The inter-service 
rivalry and especially its public manifestations had also instilled in Johnson a particular 
dislike for the Navy .170
Robert Allen and William Shannon provided a humorous and perceptive anecdote 
concerning the Navy and the new Secretary in their 1950 book, The Washington 
MERRY-GO-ROUND that clearly illustrates the relationship between the Navy and the 
new Defense Secretary:
A young [Navy] Lieutenant did not show up at his Pentagon desk one day, 
and his colleagues became concerned. One recalled that the Lieutenant had 
expressed the intention to stand outside the Russian Embassy and tell the 
Soviet Ambassador to go to hell and take Joe Stalin with him. "If he really 
did that, it could be serious," an officer said. A hurried check disclosed that, 
sure enough, the young Lieutenant was in the hospital. His friends rushed 
over to see him. They asked if he had gone through with his daring plan. "I 
sure did," he replied. "I waited till the Ambassador came out and then I 
yelled, "to hell with Stalin," and the Ambassador shouted, "to hell with Louis 
Johnson." We were embracing each other in the middle of the street when a 
taxi hit me."171
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Few in the Navy Department were surprised when Secretary Johnson quickly trained his 
sights on the sea services.
In keeping with his reputation, Johnson instituted dramatic changes within the first 
few weeks of taking over. In an effort to strengthen his hand over the service propaganda 
machines, he ordered all public affairs matters centralized in his office and that all 
proposed public statements by military officers and civilian employees first be routed 
through his staff "for security review" before being released.172 This move did not single 
out any service, yet Navy advocates quickly became frustrated as this centralization policy 
was rescinded and then reimposed with no apparent rationale.
Admiral Denfeld found himself in opposition to the new Secretary almost 
immediately. Secretary Forrestal, before his tragic breakdown, had submitted a proposal 
to Congress to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's control over his Department. In 
Senatorial debate on an amendment to Forrestal's proposal which was supported by the 
Administration and Secretary Johnson, the CNO spoke on behalf of the JCS against the 
amendment in testimony on 7 April 1949. The Administration's amendment aimed to 
remove the specific statutory duties of the JCS from the unification law and permit the 
Defense Secretary more organizational flexibility. In this case Denfeld's logical argument 
was persuasive and helped defeat the new Secretary's proposal.173 But this victory was 
short-lived. On the same day, in another move to assert his control over the Department, 
Johnson abolished the annual celebrations of the three military departments and 
consolidated the three service holidays into Armed Forces Day, to be celebrated on the 
third Saturday in May starting in 1950.174
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The most spectacular action during Johnson's first month in office came on 23 
April 1949 when the Secretary precipitously canceled the construction of the Navy's new 
flush-deck carrier in the interest of economy. This vessel's keel had been laid thirteen days 
earlier, and millions of dollars had already been spent in equipment procurement and 
obligated contracts, dollars which had been painfully saved through the cancellation of 
other Navy construction programs over the previous several years.175 The Navy had 
mortgaged its future for this ship, intending it as a prototype to demonstrate the ability of 
aircraft carriers to carry the latest military aircraft whose weight and size made them 
unable to operate from the existing ships. This new carrier, to be named the U.S.S.
United States, would be unique in that it would not have a superstructure, or "island," 
protruding above its flight deck. An artist's drawing of the proposed design in relation to 
other classes of aircraft carriers is attached at Appendix II. Although the U.S. S. United 
States was to be only 100 feet longer than the Navy's biggest existing carriers, its 
capabilities and radical appearance, exaggerated in no little measure by the Air Force's 
spectacular charges, became known publicly as a "supercarrier."176
By adding this new carrier to the fleet, the Navy expected to extend the range of 
offensive strikes and even operate aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, an 
option which incensed the Air Force's leaders. They strongly objected to the Navy's 
development of a costly, mobile, nuclear launching platform which could compete with 
their bombers in carrying out one of their primary missions, strategic bombing. Denfeld
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and the other admirals claimed that the capabilities of this new ship were required to 
ensure that the Navy maintained its ability to control the seas, its primary mission. The 
Air Force leaders did not accept this argument and consistently objected to the proposed 
vessel. In all JCS discussions since the Key West Conference where the carrier had been 
mentioned, Generals Spaatz and Vandenberg voted against its construction on the grounds 
that it was an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of the Air Force's capabilities.
The cancellation of this vital Navy project may be likened to a breeze which fanned 
the smoldering Navy rebellion into flames. How and why this cancellation occurred is 
examined in Paul Hammond's "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers" and Jeffrey Barlow's 
The Revolt of the Admirals. They adequately analyze this decision, whose understanding 
is necessary to comprehend the events of late 1949 which cost Admiral Denfeld his 
position. Consequently, this thesis provides only a brief overview of Admiral Denfeld's 
involvement in the cancellation controversy in order to facilitate understanding the later 
stages of the "revolt" and the CNO's removal.
The initial idea for a flush-deck carrier capable of carrying large jet aircraft has 
been credited to Admiral Marc Mitscher, one of the Navy's ablest World War II carrier 
commanders. His 1946 proposal to Admiral Nimitz started the planning for such a ship. 
Funding for its construction was allocated by Congress and approved by the President in 
fiscal years 1947, 1948, and 1949. Mitscher had calculated that a flush-deck carrier would 
be required in order to operate the larger, modem jet aircraft. Moreover, the 1946 atomic 
tests against anchored ships in the Bikini Atoll also indicated another advantage to 
reducing the ship's cross section by removing the superstructure. A flush-deck carrier 
would be much less susceptible to damage than a conventional carrier from the powerful 
shock waves produced by a nuclear explosion.177 To allow the continued allocation of
177Rearden, pp. 389 - 90.
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funds for the new carrier, in 1948 the Navy decided to stop the construction of thirteen 
ships, including the battleships Kentucky and Hawaii which were to be converted into 
prototype rocket-launching vessels. The United States was the only naval vessel above 
destroyer-size under construction during 1948 and 1949.178
The Joint Chiefs of Staff' were not asked to approve the new carrier in 1947, 
because its construction had been authorized before the military unification law was 
enacted. Only at Key West did Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Denfeld seek the Chiefs' 
approval of this project. Later, the Army and Air Force Chiefs claimed that the carrier 
project was not presented to them for consideration but was described to them as a project 
already approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President and funded by 
Congress.179 Later JCS discussions of the flush-deck carrier project were similarly 
ambiguous. Admiral Denfeld testified to Congress in early 1949 that the JCS had 
"approved" the carrier project on three separate occasions in 1948, but Bradley and 
Vandenberg never agreed to having voted on it except when it had been presented as a fa it  
accompli,180 In preparing the fiscal year 1950 defense budget, Forrestal was eventually 
able to get the Service Chiefs to agree on all issues except funding construction of the new 
carrier. He wrote to Charles Wilson that this was a "question I had to resolve myself. "181 
Despite the carrier's inclusion in the budget, Bradley noted in his memoirs that he sensed 
Truman had lost enthusiasm for the project by December 1948 .182 In one of its few 
publicity victories the Navy obtained the President's permission on 2 February 1949 to
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name the new carrier the United States, giving it added patriotic stature.183 Nonetheless, 
the carrier's $189 million price tag in a defense budget of $11 billion made it one of the 
most expensive new weapons systems and an attractive target for the budget cutters.
Admiral Denfeld was convinced that the flush-deck carrier was the most important 
new project being developed by the Navy. Aircraft carrier operations had proved essential 
to victory in the Pacific theater, and were expected to be equally essential in future efforts 
by the U. S. Navy to control the sea lines of communication between North America and 
any area of military operations. Although the United States would be capable of operating 
nuclear-capable bombers, the CNO asserted that strategic bombing was never considered 
to be a primary responsibility of the carrier. He said that it had more than enough naval 
missions to carry out without adding any responsibilities assigned to the Air Force.184 On 
15 April 1949, shortly after Johnson became Secretary of Defense, the keel of the new 
carrier was laid in a Virginia drydock, but this ship was not to experience any smooth 
sailing.
At a news conference on the twelfth of April, Johnson replied to a querry about 
the future of the Navy's carrier project by stating that his opinion would be forthcoming.
On the fifteenth, he asked General Eisenhower to obtain the Joint Chiefs' current views on 
the project.185 Navy Secretary Sullivan approached Johnson on the twenty-first and asked 
to discuss the carrier. The Secretary of Defense was too busy to see him, but did promise 
that he would confer with Sullivan before making any decision about the ship. The Joint 
Chiefs' opinions were predictable. Admiral Denfeld strongly supported the construction of 
the United States while both Generals Bradley and Vandenberg opposed its continuation.
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Admiral Denfeld, as the senior member of the Joint Chiefs (the Joint Chiefs did not have a 
Chairman yet), delivered the three written opinions to the Secretary of Defense on 
Saturday, 23 April 1949. Johnson, who had expected this verdict, called General 
Eisenhower at Key West where he was recuperating from an illness. Eisenhower also 
opposed the new ship's construction. To ensure Congressional support for cancellation of 
the project, Johnson received concurrence from the Chairmen of the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees, Representative Vinson and Senator Tydings, and then 
notified the President o f his decision. Secretary Sullivan was then in Texas delivering a 
speech to the Reserve Officers' Association. Neither he nor Denfeld were given an 
opportunity to discuss the decision. In fact Admiral Denfeld was still in the Secretary's 
offices 45 minutes after delivering the JCS' memos when the already mimeographed press 
release announcing the cancellation of the carrier was passed out.
The CNO was very upset, but Secretary Sullivan, who heard about Johnson's 
action on the radio, was absolutely livid. Sullivan believed that Johnson had broken his 
promise to wait until he had discussed the carrier with the Defense Secretary before taking 
any action.186 He also objected to the method of the cancellation and Johnson's disregard 
for his advice and opinion. Sullivan initially intended to protest to President Truman, but, 
when he found out that Johnson had obtained the President's concurrence, scrapped his 
plans for an appeal and instead drafted a fiery letter of resignation.187 He met with 
Truman on Monday, 25 April and delivered his letter to Johnson on the next day.
Secretary Sullivan's anger at the cancellation was aimed at Johnson and not the 
President. Sullivan felt that Johnson's economy program was the Defense Secretary's own 
creation and that Johnson's "unannounced candidacy" for the Presidency in 1952 was the
186Sullivan interview, p. 59.
187Ibid., and Sullivan appointment calendar, 24 April 1949, Sullivan Papers, Box 9, Truman Library.
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motivation for the dramatic action and newsworthy cutbacks.188 The President had been 
placed in the position of either supporting the Defense Secretary he had just installed, or 
increasing the confusion in the Defense Department by countermanding the direction of 
the Secretary. Although Sullivan felt that the President did not want to cancel the carrier, 
Johnson had put him in a position where he could not reasonably object.189 Sullivan's 
violent protest and resignation made him a hero with the Navy.
Admiral Denfeld had the same opportunity to go out in a blaze of glory over the 
cancellation of the carrier. He had been committed to the project and had opposed its 
termination. In September 1949 he wrote that "I fought for the big carrier from the day I 
took office until it was canceled and at no time did I give an inch in my fighting for it."190 
Now, the Navy's future was in doubt. Both Denfeld's staff and the departing Secretary 
recommended that the CNO support Sullivan's action by also resigning. But Denfeld 
"thought he would help the Navy better by staying" and remained at his post. Sullivan 
"always regretted that Denfeld didn't resign" and Vice Admiral Libby rightly concluded 
that Denfeld "would have been better off had he done so."191 Nevertheless, Denfeld's 
choice was difficult and courageous. He knew what he was fighting against and placed 
the good of his service ahead of his own personal concerns. Denfeld was not interested in 
the easy way out. At this juncture, the CNO probably saw himself as a modem day John 
Paul Jones, just beginning to fight while the masts tumbled down around his head. But 
Johnson and Denfeld's Air Force and Army opponents likely saw the CNO as a captain 
who had now chosen to go down with his sinking ship. The ongoing inter-service struggle 
was now clearly Denfeld's battle to win or lose.
188Sullivan interview, p. 59.
189Ibid., p. 74.
190Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times military correspondent, 7 
September 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 2, File "Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
191 Sullivan interview, pp. 64 - 5, and Vice Admiral Libby interview, pp. 167 - 68.
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Cancellation of the flush-deck carrier strained the relationship between Secretary 
Johnson and the President. David McCullough wrote that Truman liked Sullivan and "did 
not blame him for resigning." He also stated that "Johnson's manner troubled [Truman] 
greatly."192 Robert Donovan confirmed this assessment in his review of the Truman 
Administration, citing a diary entry of White House Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers 
which described the President as "very displeased" with Johnson.193 Now that the 
President had chosen an aggressive man with a firm hand as his Defense Secretary, he 
seemed to miss Forrestal's thoughtful and deliberate manner.
The press responded vigorously to the cancellation of the United States and 
Sullivan's resignation. Two syndicated writers who were known for their support o f the 
Navy's positions, the New York Times' Hanson W. Baldwin and U. S. News and World 
Report's David Lawrence, recognized that Johnson's action set a dangerous precedent by 
"allowing two services to pair off against the other" and believed that this would "lead to 
explosive events in the National Military Establishment."194 The San Francisco Chronicle's 
editor observed that "the morale of the Navy was better the day after Pearl Harbor than it 
is today as a result o f . . . the scuttling of the supercarrier."195 Not all of the press reacted 
so negatively to this event, but there was clearly a sense that this battle was not over.
More fireworks were yet to come.
192McCullough, p. 741.
193Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. 1949 - 1953. (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1982), p. 65.
194David Lawrence, Washington Star. 25 April 1949 and Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times. 29 April 
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Denfeld's view of the events surrounding the death of the carrier were 
understandably negative. He later questioned the right of Secretary Johnson to cancel the 
United States, but during his tenure as CNO, kept his charges within the Department and 
worked to improve the situation.196 Admiral Radford, now serving as the Commander in 
Chief o f the Pacific Fleet, wrote to Denfeld that the news from Washington was "certainly 
disturbing." He reported that "the cancellation of the CVX [flush-deck carrier] has had a 
tremendous and very bad effect on the Navy as a whole," and went on to observe that 
"our friend in the front office [Johnson] must be nuts. The only consoling thought I have 
is that he is going so far so fast that he is going to trip himself up."197 This hopeful 
assessment was eventually to prove correct, but not before many more painful episodes in 
the unification war had to be endured.
Also with a view toward the future, the San Francisco Chronicle's editor wrote 
about the important decision now before Secretary Johnson and the President - the 
selection of Sullivan's replacement:
The obligation now rests heavily upon President Truman and Defense 
Secretary Johnson to produce a new Secretary of the Navy with the zeal and 
aggressiveness to give the Navy fair representation in the defense councils. . .
The situation calls for a prompt and intelligently selected replacement, and 
beyond that it demands that his views be given a fair reception by his 
superiors.198
196In Admiral Denfeld's article about the cancellation of the carrier, published in Colliers' magazine in 
early 1950 following his removal, the ex-CNO stated that the cancellation "injected into our democratic 
process of representative government the application of dictatorial ukase. There was no authority to halt 
the building of a weapon decreed by experts to be necessary and authorized by Congress." ("The ONLY 
Carrier the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier's. 25 March 1950, p. 46).
197Letter from Admiral Radford to Admiral Denfeld, 18 May 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 5, File 
"Correspondence - R," Naval Historical Center.
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The choice was indeed important, yet if the Navy had fallen totally out of the 
Administration's favor there was no reason to select a strong replacement for Sullivan. A 
figurehead Navy Secretary who would follow Johnson's lead could keep the Navy in a 
subordinate role. This was exactly the situation the Navy saw itself in when Secretary 
Johnson and President Truman selected Francis P. Matthews, a distinguished lawyer from 
Omaha, Nebraska, with no experience in naval affairs or national service, to lead the Navy.
Matthews was nearly unknown in Washington when Johnson chose him to join the 
Defense team in early May 1949. His most significant national-level service had been as 
the Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus from 1939 through 1945. He had ably 
led this Catholic lay organization of 425,000 members in support o f the war effort, even 
making two trips to European battlefields as a representative of the Catholic Bishops of 
America to assess the religious needs of the American servicemen.199 Elis first trip was 
made on a British bomber, flying 12 hours over the North Atlantic in a temperature of 50 
degrees below zero, demonstrating his firm commitment to do the job he was asked to 
perform.200 On his second visit to the war zone he traveled to the front in Italy in late 
1944, actually coming under enemy fire on several occasions. After leaving Italy, he 
stopped in Greece and witnessed the beginnings of the Communist insurrection, being 
forced from his hotel by a grenade attack.201 Matthews' courage and dedication were 
traits few were counting on as he entered into the Washington unification struggles.
The new Secretary had deep roots in Nebraska soil. He was born in Albion, 
Nebraska in 1887, the son of a harness maker. When Francis was nine years old his father
199H. W. Becker, "St. Pat Was His Patron Saint," Dundee (Omaha. Nebraska) Sun. 11 March 1976, p. 15- 
A.
200Omaha World Herald. 20 February 1943, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
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201 Omaha World Herald. 26 December 1944, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
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died, leaving his mother to raise eight children on her own. In an initiative characteristic 
of the Matthews family, she used her husband's insurance money to purchase a farm and 
settled the family down to a regimen of hard work, discipline and faith in their God.202 
Eventually all eight children attended college and prospered. Francis scrubbed floors, 
waited tables, sold men's furnishings, and tutored his classmates to work his way through 
Omaha's Creighton University, earning his law degree in 1913. He excelled in school, 
winning the University's law prize three years in a row and graduating high in his class.203
After being admitted to the Nebraska bar in 1913, Matthews married and raised 
seven children of his own. He formed his own law firm in 1929 and pursued a career of 
community service typical of a prominent mid-Western businessman. The future Navy 
Secretary served on the local utilities board, rose to head the State's Knights of Columbus 
organization in 1924, became a member of Omaha's Chamber o f Commerce, and served 
on the Board of Directors of Boy's Town.204 A devout Catholic, he was knighted by the 
Pope in 1924 for his services in the Knights o f Columbus. Matthews did some 
government work in the 1930s, serving as Omaha's attorney for the Reconstruction 
Finance Commission. He also headed the Omaha Chamber o f Commerce's military affairs 
committee in 1934, working with the local military bases of Fort Omaha and Fort Crook 
(later OffUtt Air Force Base, the home of the Strategic Air Command). His business and 
legal ventures prospered, enabling him to become a millionaire in the early 1940s.
Matthews was an active Democrat in a predominantly Republican region. He 
chaired his county's Democratic Central Committee from 1932 through 1936 and was 
elected President of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce in 1938. His service in this
202Omaha World Herald. 8 February 1942, p. 7-C, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
203Ibid., and Becker, "St. Pat Was His Patron Saint," p. 15-A.
204Omaha World Herald. 8 February 1942, p. 7-C, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
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position and on the bi-partisan Metropolitan Utilities Board earned him a reputation as a 
fair man to whom principles were more important than party politics.205 One 
disagreement over contract negotiations in 1943 did result in Matthews having been 
criticized by a local editor "as one who plays his politics, by preference, in the gutter."206 
But this was the one exception in a long series of glowing testimonials found in his 
personal papers at the Truman Library and in the records of the Omaha World Herald, a 
Republican paper during this period.
By the end of World War II, Matthews had become involved in national affairs. 
When President Roosevelt died in 1945, Matthews issued a statement characterizing the 
Nation's loss as "tragic" and expressing "confidence in the ability o f President Truman to 
carry on."207 In a speech one week later to the Concord Club of Massachusetts, Matthews 
supported a strong post-war defense posture: "We must preserve what we have if it takes 
the largest Army, Navy, and Air Force in the world."208 President Truman began to take 
note of this mid-Western leader in 1946, presenting him with the Medal of Merit for his 
war work, praising his "selfless and courageous and wholly objective contribution to the 
welfare of the Nation" in his citation.209
Truman selected Matthews as a member o f his Commission on Civil Rights in 
1947. The Nebraskan became convinced that the Nation's freedoms were not being 
equitably shared and made some powerful enemies in the South with his statements on
205Becker, "St. Pat Was His Patron Saint," p. 15-A, and various clippings from the Omaha World Herald 
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human rights. He also led the U. S. Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Socialism and 
Communism from 1946 through 1951. Matthews made sincere and powerful statements 
on communist influence in government, declaring Communism to be a "powerful and 
persuasive" force in America.210 In probably his most significant political effort, he headed 
the Nebraska delegation to the 1948 Democratic National Convention and was credited 
with holding the group in Truman's camp despite the preferences of the State's Party 
Chairman for Senator Pepper of Florida.211 Matthews' experiences, although by no means 
high profile, did give him a limited familiarity with national affairs before Truman selected 
him as Secretary of the Navy in 1949.
The new Secretary of the Navy was also not ignorant of the battles for military 
unity being waged in the Nation's capital. In November 1946, he had presided at a dinner 
where then-Under Secretary Sullivan presented an award to National Catholic Community 
Service for its U.S.O. work. Sullivan joked about the progress of unification and the joys 
o f serving in the military establishment.212 Matthews had also called Sullivan in 1947 to 
ask for help for a friend's nephew who was in trouble in the Navy. The conversation was 
polite and impersonal with Matthews seeming very unprepared and uncomfortable dealing 
with such an important government official.213 In 1949, Matthews was aware of the 
Navy's problems and the difficult job he was accepting. Henry Doorly, the publisher of the 
Omaha World Herald, sent Matthews a congratulatory note on his nomination for the new 
position:
210Omaha World Herald, miscellaneous clippings from 1945 through 1947, in the Douglas County 
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My hearty good wishes to you in your new job as Secretary of the Navy. I 
don't know why you want it, or why you would take it, but if you do, God 
bless you, and I hope you enjoy it. I congratulate Truman more that I do 
you.214
Francis Matthews went into his new assignment with his eyes open.
When the announcement was made that Matthews was to be the new Secretary of 
the Navy, those who knew him were effusive in their praise. Omaha's Catholic 
Archbishop G. T. Bergen wrote President Truman, declaring that "you can trust him 
[Matthews] absolutely, and I am certain there will be no regrets on the part o f anyone over 
his selection."215 J. Francis McDermott, a prominent Nebraska Republican and former 
Commander of the State's American Legion, also praised Matthews' selection in the 
Omaha World Herald, doubting "if there is another man in the United States with the 
moral, professional, and business qualifications of Mr. Matthews." He went on to predict 
that "while alert to protect the proper interests of the Navy he will be scrupulously fair to 
the Air Force and the Army."216 Admiral Radford wrote to Admiral Denfeld that although 
he did not know Matthews, the Navy's "head Catholic," Father Maurice Sheehy "gave him 
a good mark."217 Sheehy, who was to play a prominent role in the events surrounding 
Denfeld's removal later in the year, had served as a Navy chaplain during the war and was 
currently the head of religious education at the Catholic University in Washington. He 
maintained a good friendship with all the Navy's leaders, both in uniform and mufti.
214Letter from Henry Doorly to Matthews, 14 May 1949, in Matthews Papers, Correspondence files, File 
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There was speculation concerning why Matthews, from land-locked Nebraska, was 
the President's choice to lead the sea services. The most credible opinion is that of 
Secretary Sullivan, who felt that Johnson, having just lost an Irish-Catholic Navy 
Secretary, sought to placate the Catholic voters whom he might depend on in 1952 by 
choosing another prominent Catholic to fill the position.218 Although there were other 
Nebraskans in the top ranks of the Pentagon, they were all Army officers.219 The most 
damaging observation made in this connection was Matthews' own statement in a news 
conference that the largest waterborne craft he had ever been in was a rowboat.220 To his 
chagrin, the new Secretary quickly picked up the nickname "Rowboat Matthews." The 
Navy's uniformed leaders were hesitant to place their trust in a man with no naval 
experience, especially since he was the hated Johnson's choice for the position.
Matthews accepted the job not because of its prestige or for any potential personal 
gain, but with a legitimate desire to serve his Country in any way the President asked. 
Contrary to popular accusations, Matthews had not been a heavy contributor to Truman's 
campaign and had not even met Louis Johnson before he assumed his new position.221 His 
confirmation hearings were smooth, the only opposition to his nomination coming from 
Southern Senators who objected to his earlier efforts in the President's Civil Rights 
Commission and from liberals who brought up his staunch anti-Communist
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pronouncements for the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. Even with these objections, he was 
confirmed unanimously by the Senate on 18 May 1949.222
History's depiction of Secretary Matthews is evolving based on recent research. 
Paul Hammond's 1963 article on the controversy portrays the "soft-spoken lawyer from 
Omaha" as "a Johnson man" who was ineffective in the Pentagon.223 Paolo Coletta 
describes Matthews as "another Democratic party fund-raiser . . . [and a] friend of the 
defense secretary" in his articles on Matthews and Denfeld.224 E. B. Potter, one of the 
Country's foremost naval writers, stated that Matthews was "less a Navy advocate than 
Johnson's loyal lackey."225 General Bradley's memoirs give a more charitable view of the 
Secretary: "He was a sincere, devout and decent man who could not have taken over the 
Navy at a worse time."226 But Michael Isenberg's 1993 history of the U. S. Navy in the 
Cold War continues the denigration of Matthews. His only characterization of the 
Secretary portrays him as "a man of such cartoonish demeanor that he once sent part of 
the nation's secret war plans to the cleaners in his jacket pocket."227 Isenberg provides no 
documentation for this incident or his characterization of the man.
Recent scholarly efforts should improve the Secretary's reputation. Jeffrey 
Barlow's The Revolt of the Admirals credits Matthews with being "a cautious and astute 
lawyer," and depicts his role in the "revolt" as that of an intelligent and dedicated public
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servant.228 Barlow's view is much more consonant with the impression this writer gained 
from a review of the Matthews Papers and other primary sources. The older historical 
treatments all seem to have been biased by the two major events of Matthews' term of 
service, the "revolt" and the outbreak of the Korean War. These occurrences certainly 
should continue to tarnish his credentials as a successful Secretary of the Navy, but give 
no grounds for attempts to fault his character or intelligence.
Just before heading to Washington to assume his new responsibilities, Matthews 
told an interviewer that his task would be "to see that the Navy co-operates with the other 
divisions of the armed forces to accomplish the very obvious desire of the American 
people [unification]." He also professed a full awareness of the "sublime traditions of the 
Navy," and contended that unification could be achieved without sacrificing the Navy's 
proud heritage. Matthews echoed Johnson's views when he stated that he planned to 
pursue economy in government "to the greatest degree that it can be accomplished," and 
he agreed with the President in assessing that war was not "probable in the near future."229 
Possessing this focused approach, Francis Matthews was sworn in as Secretary of the 
Navy on 25 May 1949. Despite his clarity of purpose and commitment to his duties, 
Matthews demonstrated how much he still had to learn about Washington when he 
became lost in the Pentagon on the way to his swearing-in ceremony.230
Admiral Denfeld spoke positively about Secretary Matthews' selection as his new 
boss, and promptly sent a congratulatory letter to the nominee:
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I am happy to know you will soon be our next Secretary. . . .  I am certain that 
we will enjoy the close associations that we will soon have and you may rest 
assured that, we in the Navy, will support you completely and 
wholeheartedly.231
The CNO also mentioned their mutual friend, Father Sheehy, and noted that he had 
spoken well of the Secretary-nominee. Admiral Denfeld needed to cultivate a good 
relationship with Matthews. Given Denfeld's intention to help the Navy out of its current 
predicament and his recognition that the danger came from the civilian leadership o f the 
Defense Department, he hoped Matthews would help convince Johnson that 
dissatisfaction in the Navy was not confined to old admirals opposed to unification. If 
Matthews lacked an understanding of naval matters, it would fall to Denfeld and his staff 
to provide him with the information he needed to assess the situation intelligently and 
convince the President and Congress of the national need for a strong Navy.
The first few months o f Matthews' term were generally harmonious. The new 
Secretary delivered the commencement address at Annapolis on 2 June 1949, telling the 
graduating Midshipmen that "the Navy has become for me the highest obligation in life" 
and that the American people continued to recognize "the fundamental necessity for 
American superiority on the seven seas."232 The Naval Academy Alumni Association's 
magazine, Shipmate, quoted Matthews as having stated that "the slogan for all Americans 
today and from this day forward must be: one for all and all for one."233 The new 
Secretary was doing his best to reduce the Navy's tensions about unification. More 
concretely during June 1949, he and Admiral Denfeld fought for the Navy's position on
23 better from Admiral Denfeld to Matthews, 13 May 1949, in Matthews Papers, Correspondence files, 
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modifications to two Essex class aircraft carriers and convinced Johnson that these 
improvements were needed.
Omaha expressed its pride in the Secretary by declaring 13 June 1949 to be 
"Francis P. Matthews Day." Admiral Denfeld was to be in town to serve as the graduation 
speaker at Boys' Town, and because the Secretary was a member of the Boys' Town 
Board, this occasion served well to get the two leaders of the Navy together. The 
celebration took on a very conciliatory inter-service flavor when the local Strategic Air 
Command staged a fly-over where its planes dipped their wings in salute to the Navy's 
leadership.234 Despite a heavy rain, the day of unity went off well.
Denfeld and Matthews seemed to make a good team, and relations between the 
services appeared to be on the mend. The new Secretary of the Navy was very impressed 
with Johnson and President Truman and also with the men in the Navy and Marine 
Corps.235 During his first two months on the job, Matthews developed a great deal of 
respect for the admirals. In a 29 July 1949 interview, he asserted that there was no other 
group of Americans "among whom the average of ability, personality, integrity and 
education is higher than it is among the high-ranking officers of the Navy. "236 But the 
improved cooperation and harmony Matthews had observed within the defense 
establishment was only surface deep. Within the same week, he said that "the three 
service secretaries are in perfect mutual understanding," and that "the Air Force was
234Omaha World Herald, 8 June 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
235An Omaha World Herald article of 29 July 1949 quoted Matthews describing Johnson as "one of the 
ablest men in public lile." Rear Admiral Dennison, Truman's Naval Aide, recalled that Matthews "Stood 
in absolute awe of the President." Interview with Robert L. Dennison, Admiral, USN (Ret.) by John T. 
Mason, 1972 - 73, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1975, U. S. Naval Academy 
Library, Special Collections.
236Omaha World Herald. 29 July 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
76
unbalanced in favor of strategic bombing."237 The fundamental disagreements between the 
services could not be glossed over or repaired simply by changing civilian leaders.
237Ibid., and Letter from Secretary Matthews to Congressman Vinson, 20 July 1949, quoted in Robert F. 
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ADMIRAL DENFELD ON THE DEFENSIVE OUNE - OCTOBER 1949)
"As you can well appreciate, it is going to be tough sledding for the Navy 
from now on and all I can do is to fight in an effort to save as much as I can." 
(1949 - Admiral Denfeld)238
I am so weary of this inter-service struggle for position, prestige and power 
that this morning I practically 'blew my top." . . . I've seriously considered 
resigning my commission, so that I could say what I pleased publicly.
(1949 - General Eisenhower)239
Denfeld, ever the optimist, consistently sought to establish a good working 
relationship with the Navy's civilian leaders and the other services and to resolve their 
differences through discussion and compromise. Captain Arleigh Burke, then an officer 
on Denfeld's staff and later one of the Navy's best CNOs, observed that while Admiral 
Radford and the senior aviators were "very concerned," Matthews' and Denfeld's offices 
"were more sanguine. . . . They did not want to rock the boat. . . . They were still reluctant 
to emphasize the views of the Navy and did not, at first, place the unification controversy 
high enough on the priority list of Navy problems."240 Vice Admiral Wellborne, DCNO 
for Administration under Denfeld, agreed with Burke in thinking that Denfeld "had hoped 
for quite a long while that the matter could be resolved in an amicable way without actual 
confrontation."241
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The Admiral took his hopes into the JCS sessions of mid-1949, but the continuing 
budgetary pressures and the passions unleashed by the cancellation of the United States 
were still the distinguishing features of the period. Denfeld continued to criticize the Air 
Force's belief in the omnipotence of strategic bombing, contending that no such claim 
could be made, at least not until the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet air 
defense system were better understood. A report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 3 
March 1949, appeared to confirm most o f Denfeld's misgivings concerning the lack of 
reliable intelligence data.242 The Admiral also continued to encourage JCS planning for 
the defense of Western Europe and the Mediterranean following a Soviet attack rather 
than placing total reliance on an atomic counter-offensive. He pointed out that the use of 
the atomic bomb might not be authorized by the President, that allies like France and 
Great Britain might not approve the use of their territory to launch atomic strikes while 
they were within the range of Soviet retaliatory strikes, and that the B-36 was not capable 
of getting the job done.243 Denfeld also correctly observed that the spirit o f the JCS was 
wrong, noting that "we have been meeting as Service Chiefs, not as Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. "244 Despite the logic in these arguments and observations, the other representatives 
were not interested in compromise. Their views had been validated by Johnson's 
cancellation of the carrier earlier in the year. Strategic airpower was in favor, and the 
Navy's budget was going to be cut to pay for it.
The fact that the other Chiefs acted like vultures circling a dying animal frustrated 
Denfeld to no end. Johnson ordered deep cuts in the supporting civilian manpower of the 
services and insisted that the Navy make more than half of all reductions. Negotiations for
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and August 1949, in Symington Papers, File "Navy Department," Truman Library.
244Ibid.
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the fiscal year 1951 defense budget were in their final stages with the Navy's share falling 
to third place for the first time.245 The Army and the Air Force proposed even more 
dramatic cuts in the Navy and Marine Corps, including doing away with the Marines' air 
capabilities and cutting the number of active fleet aircraft carriers from eight to four 
(Army) or zero (Air Force).246 Denfeld thought that the final numbers "were picked out 
of a hat."247 Vice Admiral Wellborne observed that the CNO
felt that his advice was not being accepted a t . . . full value . . .  in the councils 
of the Joint Chiefs and his reaction to this whole disagreement was one o f . . . 
frustration. . . . He simply was very unhappy about the situation as it existed.248
Admiral Denfeld was in a losing position. Even if he convinced his new Secretary to 
support the Navy's position, he would still be consistently outvoted in the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and had no influence with the Secretary of Defense.
Compounding Denfeld's difficulties, the DCNO noted that there were problems of 
"envy and distrust" developing between Denfeld and the other officers in the Navy due to 
his apparent good relations with the NME's civilian leaders.249 Some historical accounts 
of this period have asserted that this disenchantment within the Navy was a significant 
contributing factor in his eventual replacement.250 Burke confirmed the presence of 
internal tensions but understood that Denfeld was only trying to follow orders to the best
245Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 490.
246Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume II, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy. 1947-1949. (Washington: The Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1978), p. 254.
247Johnson's proposed FY-1951 budget authorized only four active carriers. Denfeld, "The ONLY 
CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier's. 25 March 1950, p. 47.
248Wellborne interview, p. 287.
249Ibid.
250Mark Perry, Four Stars. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 19.
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of his ability and striving to promote improved relations.251 What was actually occurring 
was Denfeld's increasing isolation from both his superiors and subordinates.
The economy program of Secretary Johnson and President Truman squeezed all 
the armed services. Edward Kolodziej concluded that "each of the services was 
approaching a breaking point where any additional budgetary restrictions would threaten 
its very survival as a viable military instrument."252 In reducing the defense budget from 
$45 billion to $11 billion in three years, the President had helped the economy in the short 
term and balanced the budget, but the cuts being made in 1949 were clearly coming at the 
cost of actual readiness and capabilities. Johnson's report to the President at the end of 
1949 stated that "the economy program of the Department of Defense aims at achieving a 
maximum of national security at a minimum cost. Our watchword is and must be 
economy in every activity."253 Given the fact that there existed no agreed upon national 
security strategy at the time, the ability of the armed services to provide what Johnson 
defined as "national security" was highly debatable.
Admiral Denfeld, as the most consistent critic of the economy program, fell further 
out of favor. General Bradley, as Army Chief of Staff and later Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, supported the Secretary in his efforts to save money. He thereby retained 
his influence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff but cost his service and the Nation dearly. Thirty- 
four years later he remarked that
from this distance, I must say that this decision was a mistake, perhaps the 
greatest of Truman's presidency. My support of his decision . . . was likewise
251Burke interview, p. 531.
252Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress. 1945 - 1963. (Columbus, Ohio. Ohio 
State University Press, 1966), p. 95.
253Louis A. Johnson, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense. July 1 to Dec 31. 1949. 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 6.
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a mistake, perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my postwar years in
Washington.254
Admiral Denfeld rarely criticized the economy program in general but rather vocally 
opposed its implementation^ He objected to the "practice of the Secretary of Defense and 
the JCS in telling each service what it could do with its money," not the overall limits.255 
A good example of this distinction was the case of the U. S. S. United States. The Navy 
had previously reprioritized within its budget to continue the carrier program by canceling 
other funded construction projects. This flexibility allowed the service's leaders to 
prioritize their own programs, an ability Johnson had firmly removed with the cancellation 
of the carrier.
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 18 June, the CNO 
highlighted the Navy's weaknesses in aircraft procurement, modernization programs for 
the active fleet, electronics development programs, and maintenance of the reserve fleet 
under the fiscal year 1950 budget which was soon to go into effect.256 He pointed out that 
the Navy was receiving delivery of "far fewer" aircraft in 1949 than "at the time Pearl 
Harbor was attacked," and that combat ships were manned "at about 67% of war 
complement. "25V He concluded his statement by stating that "the Navy will discharge its 
responsibilities throughout the coming year to the utmost of our ability, but not without a 
considerable degree of risk."258 This was as close as he could come to opposing the 
President's budget under the Defense Department's rules on public statements.
254Bradley and Blair, p. 487.
255Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier’s. 1 April 1950, p. 44.
256Denfeld, Statement to the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United 
States Senate, on the Navy Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, 18 June 1949, pp. 10 - 12, in the White House 
Official Files, File "Department of the Navy Correspondence - 1949," Truman Library.
257Ibid., p. 7, and Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier’s. 25 March 1950, 
p. 47.
258Ibid„ p. 12.
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The entire defense budgetary process from 1945 through 1950 was inherently 
flawed. The absence of a strategic plan to prioritize force structure decisions and 
President Truman's philosophy of allocating defense funds based on arbitrary ceilings 
rather than actual needs caused the military establishment to atrophy and forced the 
Service Chiefs to compete for every dollar. The CNO understood this problem but was 
unable to develop a solution or convince anyone else to do so. Admiral Denfeld, an 
adequate, but by no means brilliant strategist, did not have the influence to make a 
difference.
Congress also deserves a share of the blame for this budgetary arrangement as 
Edward Kolodziej points out in The Uncommon Defense and Congress. 1945 - 1963:
[Congress] interested itself essentially in the how, and not the why, of military 
spending. Largely ignored were the many interacting and seemingly 
intractable relations between the nation's actual and potential military power, 
and, correspondingly, its subtly shaded spectrum of foreign policy goals that, 
to be supported, required different kinds of military power for varying 
political contingencies.259
Kolodziej concluded that only two things could break the cycle of defense reductions and 
internal competition - war or forward, strategic thinking, noting that Korea ultimately 
came first.
Each service's publicity machine continued to attempt to persuade Congress and 
the public that its service needed a greater budgetary priority. Thomas Boettcher noted 
that "during the summer of 1949, the Navy League and the Air Force Association each 
appropriated $500,000 for promotion campaigns to support their favored service."260 
Secretary Matthews continued to try to downplay the dissension: "1 can find no evidence
259Kolodziej, p. 36.
260Boettcher, p. 179.
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among my associates in the top ranks of the three services of a spirit to do anything but 
work for our country first, rather than for any single department of the military 
establishment."261 Nevertheless, the attacks continued. Secretary Symington, in a private 
letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, a member of the Hoover Commission assessing the 
Executive Branch's organization, complained that "action must be taken to resolve the 
present conflict resulting from the Navy's continuous attacks." He went on to state that 
"unless somebody can stop these attacks . . . efficient functioning of the military 
establishment is impossible; therefore the security of our country is seriously 
jeopardized."262 Not surprisingly, this private letter was leaked to the press. There 
seemed to be no end to the infighting.
The Hoover Commission's charter was to examine the "operation and organization 
of the executive functions and activities" in response to Secretary Forrestal's early 1949 
recommendations for greater centralization in the Military Establishment and concerns 
expressed by other cabinet members. Its membership included former President Hoover, 
Dean Acheson, James Forrestal (until early 1949), and Joseph P. Kennedy.263 Its study, 
completed just as Johnson took over, delved into the procedures of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and found that the Chiefs, "like the rest of the National Military Establishment, are 
not firmly under civilian control." The "divided loyalties" of the JCS members were also 
highlighted as was the Commission's assessment that each Chief "will tend to answer much 
more to the service secretary who is his direct superior than to the single policies of a 
unified Establishment." The Commission concluded that "under these circumstances
261Letter from Secretary Matthews to Judge Frank E. Day of Oregon, 10 June 1949, in Matthews Papers, 
File "Correspondence - D," Truman Library.
262Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 489.
263Chairman., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The National 
Security Organization. (The Hoover Commission Report), H. Doc. No. 86, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1.
84
centralized civilian control scarcely exists," a fact that was patently obvious to 
Forrestal.264
Given the clear-cut results of this study, Congress rapidly processed an amendment 
to the National Security Act to give the Secretary of Defense much greater control over 
his subordinates. Johnson touted the legislation as a means of preventing the sort of 
frustration that might drive future Defense Secretaries to suicide and thereby transformed 
the bill into a personal memorial to Forrestal. At the time of the carrier cancellation, the 
Senate had already passed its version of the new National Security Act. A brief attempt to 
delay the House's consideration of the Bill was proposed due to the outcry over Johnson's 
abrupt action, but, given the popular and Congressional sentiment generated by Forrestal's 
suicide, there was no stopping this initiative.265 On 10 August the National Security Act 
o f 1949 was signed into law, providing Johnson with just the authority he needed to 
implement fully his concept of defense unification.
The new National Security Act officially changed the title of the military 
department from the NME to the Defense Department, a term that was already in common 
usage. The Act removed the Service Secretaries from the National Security Council and 
left the Secretary of Defense as the sole spokesman for the armed services. Another 
change which significantly affected Admiral Denfeld was the creation of the position of 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), thereby raising the body's membership from 
three to four. When Secretary Johnson elevated General Bradley from Army Chief of 
Staff to CJCS and replaced him with General J. Lawton Collins, the CNO found himself 
outnumbered three-to-one in the JCS. His difficult position had now become nearly 
impossible.
264Ibid., pp. 7 and 11.
265Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 501.
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Regardless of these difficulties, Denfeld was committed to continuing his fight for 
improvements in national security and for the Navy. He had now completed, some would 
say endured, most of his two-year term as CNO and was willing to continue for another 
term. As early as May 1949, Admiral Radford had urged him to "get your extension 
nailed down" to enable the CNO to make some personnel moves and eliminate some of 
the dissension in the service.266 Because Denfeld's initial assignment as CNO was due to 
expire in December and Secretary Johnson normally desired a three month turnover 
process between his JCS members and their reliefs, Secretary Matthews needed to make a 
decision on Denfeld's reappointment by early September.267 On this very important 
choice, Secretary Matthews made his wishes known well ahead of the deadline.
Admiral Denfeld and the Secretary of the Navy had remained on good terms 
during the first months of Matthews' service. In statements made in Omaha on "Matthews 
Day" in June, Denfeld praised his boss as "one of the ablest people we've had in public 
office in some time," and as a man "of integrity . . . and unquestioned patriotism." These 
sentiments were reciprocated by Matthews.268 In July the two presented a united front 
before Congress, testifying in opposition to the President's proposed budget and additional 
cuts introduced in the House.269 Although they were fighting an uphill battle, it seemed 
that Matthews and Denfeld made a good team and were comfortable with each other.
266Letter from Radford to Denfeld, 18 May 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 5, File "Correspondence - R," 
Naval Historical Center. The letter was particularly focused on Radford's annoyance with Admiral 
Blandy, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, who Radford wanted Denfeld to "send to the 
showers."
267Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," Collier's. 18 March 1950, p. 15.
268"Unification Plan Gaining, Matthews, Denfeld Report Here," Omaha World Herald. 11 June 1949, and 
"Honor is Paid to Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 14 June 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
269Their unity was noted in "Matthews and Denfeld," D. C. Times Herald. 8 July 1949, in Matthews 
Papers, File "Miscellaneous Clippings," Truman Library.
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Despite this harmony between the two Navy leaders, rumors had circulated early in 
1949 that Denfeld was to be fired.270 The Admiral was aware that some persons inside 
and outside the Navy were unhappy with his performance and point of view, but he felt 
confident that at least the President held him in high regard. Later he wrote that "several 
people told me the President was very much pleased with my selection and had said I was 
the best CNO the Navy had had since he had been in Washington."271 Even Secretary 
Johnson said good things about his CNO:
May I say that since I have been in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Admiral Denfeld has done an outstanding service and has rendered loyal 
support to the program I am endeavoring to carry out as laid down by the 
Congress.272
Sensing that his superiors were satisfied in his performance and knowing that he still had 
much work to do, Denfeld let it be known that he would accept a nomination for an 
additional two-year term. Because the National Security Act limited JCS members to a 
maximum tenure of four years except in wartime, one two-year extension was all that 
Denfeld could expect.
Matthews submitted his recommendation to reappoint Admiral Denfeld on 12 July 
1949 and enthusiastically endorsed his subordinate:
[He] has worked with me in fullest harmony and cooperation from the day I 
was honored with this office. His experience as Chief of Naval Operations, 
coupled with his outstanding administrative abilities, makes him most valuable 
to me, the Navy, and the National Defense Establishment. The wisdom of his 
reappointment is emphasized by the importance of the continuity of the 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which Admiral Denfeld is the senior
270Barlow, p. 269, quoting a member of Denfeld's staff.
271Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, 18 March 1950, p. 15.
272Letter from Secretary Johnson to Edward C. Holden, a New York American Legion official, 27 July 
1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
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member, in dealing with the numerous long range problems with which that 
body has been laboring.273
Matthews had served only 47 days as Secretary of the Navy when he forwarded this 
recommendation to Secretary Johnson. Although the Washington neophyte Matthews 
was certainly impressed by Denfeld, a 40 year Navy veteran who had spent most of the 
last 15 years in the Washington corridors of power, an authentic mutual respect had 
already developed between himself and Denfeld over this short period. This appreciation 
of their shared values and goals was to last through even the darkest days of 1949. 
Matthews' renomination of Denfeld was a very conscious decision.
Johnson considered Matthews' letter for over three weeks before forwarding it to 
the President on 2 August 1949 with the following brief endorsement: "I concur in this 
nomination."274 Truman took less time to evaluate the recommendation and sent it to the 
Senate for confirmation on 11 August 1949 with his blessing. In his news conference the 
same day he announced that he had appointed General Bradley as Chairman o f the Joint 
Chiefs o f Staff and had appointed Admiral Denfeld to another two-year term as CNO 
beginning on 15 December.275 Hanson W. Baldwin, the New York Times' military 
correspondent sent a telegram to the Denfelds with his "congratulations, but also 
condolence" and his "hope" that "the next two years [would be] easier."276 Despite 
Baldwin's hope, Denfeld's Senate confirmation was practically the only event in 1949 that 
went easily for the CNO. On the 15th the Senate completed its consideration of his 
reappointment and approved his second term.
273Letter from Matthews to President Truman, 12 July 1949, in Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman 
Library.
274Memorandum from Johnson to President Truman, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, White House 
Official Files, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
275Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1949. (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 419.
276Telegram from Hanson W. Baldwin to Admiral Denfeld, 12 August 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 2, 
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Some of the more radical Navy partisans imagined there must have been some sort 
o f secret agreement behind Denfeld's reappointment. Rumors circulated in the press and 
in naval circles that Denfeld had secured his extension by agreeing to support Matthews 
and Johnson in the destruction of the Navy and the Marine Corps.277 Denfeld objected 
strongly to these anonymous accusations as he explained to his friend Hanson W. Baldwin 
of the New York Times:
I want you to know that I did not seek reappointment and that I have made no 
commitments conditioned on such a reappointment. I want you to further 
know that when I find that I can be of no further use to the Navy, I will be the 
first one to get out.278
The Admiral received the signed official commission for his second term in mid-September 
from Rear Admiral Dennison, Truman's Naval Aide and a close friend of Denfeld's. The 
CNO later reported that "shortly after I got it, I called on Secretary Matthews to thank 
him for the commission. . . . 'There's nothing I have done since I have been Secretary,' he 
[Matthews] said, 'that has given me more pleasure than getting you reappointed.’"279 The 
Navy's leadership appeared ready to move in a positive direction and put some of their 
disagreements behind them.
Probably the most pressing weapons procurement issue facing the Department of 
Defense in 1949 after the cancellation of the "supercarrier" was the acquisition of the Air 
Force's giant strategic bomber, the B-36. This decision involved the dedication of 
hundreds of millions of scarce defense dollars for the purchase of enough B-3 6s to carry 
out the atomic retaliatory strikes projected by the JCS in the event of war. Denfeld had
277See New York Times. 14 September 1949, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 507.
278Letter from Denfeld to Hanson W. Baldwin, 7 September 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 2, File 
"Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
279Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," Collier's. 18 March 1950, p. 15.
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gone on record in JCS meetings and in Congressional testimony opposing "excessive 
reliance" on strategic bombing, and he continued to oppose procurement of the B-36 in 
quantity until its performance had been fully evaluated and the Russian air defensive 
capabilities were better understood. But as a JCS member, he was tied to the corporate 
position. When he lost a private vote he normally signed up to the majority opinion, at 
least in public statements designed to give the impression of unity.280
Such was the case when a 1949 Congressional investigation sought to evaluate the 
JCS' logic in committing the Armed Forces to follow a strategic bombing strategy in the 
event o f global war. In an effort to keep the investigation from delving into classified 
plans and information, Admiral Denfeld signed a JCS statement to Congress which was 
characterized as "a ringing endorsement of the strategic concept in the current war 
plan."281 The CNO's subordinates perceived his endorsement of this agreement to be a 
betrayal of the Navy's interests and became even more disenchanted with his leadership. 
Denfeld, for his part, continued to believe firmly in the futility of the strategic bombing 
plans as he explained after he was fired later in the year.
Suppose we do manage to transport concentrated explosives in $5,000,000 
airplanes across the polar icecap. We can't win a war by terror. The Russians 
die readily, but they don't scare readily. To defeat the Soviet Union, if it brings 
war on us, we shall have to overcome the will o f the Russian people - to 
convince them that they would be better off in a world where our ideas prevail 
than in one ruled by the Kremlin philosophy. We shall not do that merely by 
obliterating their chief cities and killing their people. Nor can we protect our 
friends in Europe solely by dropping bombs, no matter how awful their 
effect.282
280Arthur A. Ageton, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," Shipmate. July 1951, p. 3ff 
provides a good overview of JCS operations and the process used when there were dissenting views.
281Condit, pp. 326 - 27.
282Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's. 1 April 1950, p. 37.
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Meanwhile, as Denfeld proved unable to articulate his objections to the existing 
plans, the Air Force ordered hundreds o f B-36 bombers. The B-36 was the world's largest 
bomber in 1949. It weighed over 278,000 lbs., was 163 feet long, and had a wingspan of 
230 feet. It was designed to fly 10,000 miles carrying 10,000 lbs. of bombs, the weight of 
an atomic bomb in the late 1940s.283 The B-36 was driven by the unusual arrangement of 
six "pusher-type, propeller-driven engines," which appear to the untrained observer to be 
mounted backwards.284 The original design specifications for the bomber had been 
developed in 1940 when it seemed possible that Hitler would gain control o f all o f Europe 
and that eventually the United States would have to fight Germany at intercontinental 
ranges. Because the eventual war was fought under different conditions, priorities were 
shifted to shorter-range bombers, and the B-36 design sat on a shelf.
After the war the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation completed the design 
contract and by 1948 had a B-36 ready for its initial testing. The Air Force held a public 
competition to name the new, giant bomber and, instead of martial-sounding submissions 
like "Conqueror" and "Earthshaker," the name "Peacemaker" was selected.285 The Navy 
found this name more than slightly ironic, since the "Peacemaker" became a central figure 
in the budget and mission battles between the services. The huge aircraft acquired several 
unofficial nicknames during its ten-year career, including "Magnesium Monster," 
"Aluminum Overcast," "Flying Apartment House," and "Ramp Rooster," the latter due to
283Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 486. The best source of detailed technical and 
historical design information on the B-36 is a series of articles by Meyers Jacobsen in the American 
Aviation Historical Society Journal between 1970 and 1974.
284Gregory S. Byard, Technical Sergeant, USAF, "7th Bombardment Wing - B-36 Chronology," 
unpublished manuscript, 1959, USSTRATCOM Archives, "B-36 File," Bellevue, Nebraska.
285Meyers K. Jacobsen, "Names and the B-36," American Aviation Historical Society Journal. Fall 1971, 
pp. 186-188. Another good overview of the development of the B-36 can be found in Kenneth L. Moll, 
"Nuclear Strategy, 1945 - 1949: America's First Four Years," Master's thesis, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, 1965, pp. 146 - 50.
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early maintenance problems.286 Regardless of its name, the B-36 became the standard 
bearer of the Air Force's strategic bombing strategy and a magnet for intense Navy 
criticism in 1949.
The 7th Bomb Wing at Carswell Air Force Base near Fort Worth, Texas was the 
first Air Force unit to operate the B-36 after taking delivery of its first one in June 1948. 
By the spring of 1949 this Wing had grown to 36 operational bombers. Secretary 
Forrestal approved the initial orders for B-36s, and due to Johnson's business connections 
with Consolidated Vultee, was asked to finalize the decision on the purchase of auxiliary 
jet engines for the aircraft before the new Secretary took over to avoid any perceived 
impropriety.287 Johnson resigned his position as a director o f the aircraft manufacturing 
company before assuming his new duties, but he recognized his vulnerability to charges of 
conflict of interest. The Air Force, with the approval o f the JCS and both Secretaries of 
Defense, placed orders for a total of 170 B-36s in 1949 at a cost o f $5.8 million each - a 
commitment of nearly $1 billion.288
Naval aviators, still smarting from the cancellation of their new carrier, saw this 
vast outlay as a bad investment and raised such a storm about the B-36's vulnerability to 
their fighters that Congress presented Secretary Johnson with a resolution requesting a 
public test between the new bomber and the Navy's best fighter, the Banshee.289 Admiral 
Denfeld and the other members of the JCS evaluated this request on 27 May 1949 but 
rejected the proposal, noting that secret aircraft performance data would then be available 
to both the public and the Russians. Although Denfeld supported a classified test to assess
286Ibid.
287Millis, p. 551.
288Moll, p. 200, and Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's, 1 April 1950, p. 42.
289U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st 
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 7.
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the vulnerability of the B-36 to enemy fighter defenses, this position was never publicized 
and the CNO's reputation as "the Quisling of the Navy" was strengthened.290
The B-36 survived the Navy's criticism and served as the Air Force's primary 
strategic bomber until the B-52 assumed this role in 1958. The "Peacemaker" never 
dropped a bomb in anger and was held in nuclear reserve throughout the Korean conflict. 
One Air Force epitaph for the "massive, rumbling B-36" contends that it "single-handedly 
protected an entire nation while preserving the American way of life."291 Admiral 
Denfeld's and the Navy's memories o f this massive symbol of American strategic 
deterrence were not hardly as generous.
The conflict between the Navy and the Air Force continued to make headlines 
during the summer of 1949. One tactic which had proven successful in generating 
negative publicity was to distribute to newspapers across the country propaganda 
denigrating the capabilities of the opposing service. The Navy's supporters, following this 
recipe, sent copies of a lengthy pamphlet, titled "The Strategic Bombing Myth" to over 
200 editors across the country.292 This document took portions of the report of the 
Strategic Bombing Survey which had analyzed the effectiveness of strategic bombing 
during World War II, and presented them out of context to convey the impression that the 
Survey had found strategic bombing to be ineffective. The Air Force countered with a 33- 
page essay of their own, refuting the earlier piece of propaganda charge by charge.293 The 
effort involved in these anonymous attacks and the inter-service rivalry was enormous, and 
largely unproductive.
290Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's. 1 April 1950, p. 42.
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Admiral Denfeld continued to defend the capabilities of aircraft carriers and naval 
aviation, but his well-reasoned arguments were not newsworthy compared to the 
flamboyant charges o f the anonymous pamphlets.294 Secretary Johnson blasted the 
propagandists, and particularly the Navy's "partisans," in a speech at the Naval War 
College on 21 June 1949 by charging that they "had twisted the facts" about the carrier 
cancellation and were waging "a campaign of terror against further unification of the 
armed forces."295 As Professor Isenberg has observed, "the Pentagon was sliding into 
anarchy," and tensions in this inter-service war were building toward a climax.296
294A good example of Denfeld's rationale can be seen in his statement in U. S. Congress, House, 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of the N aw  Appropriation Bill. 1949. 
80th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 134.
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THE B-36 INVESTIGATION AND "THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS"
"Nearly all dedicated military men are able to persuade themselves that what is 
good for their service is good for the country." (1965 - Rear Admiral D. V. 
Gallery, USN (Ret.))297
"True loyalty is loyalty not to men, but to principles." (1949 - Captain John G. 
Crommelin, USN, to Secretary Matthews)298
The most famous of the many "anonymous documents" circulated in the publicity 
war between the Air Force and the Navy was placed in the hands of several Congressmen 
and newsmen sympathetic to the Navy in May 1949. It made over thirty specific charges 
of corruption and malfeasance in the procurement of the B-36 bomber and in the resulting 
decisions of the JCS to feature this aircraft in the Nation's contingency war plans. One of 
these accusations claimed that Secretary Johnson had gained financially from the decision 
to buy large quantities of B-36s and that Air Force Secretary Symington had made a deal 
with Consolidated Vultee guaranteeing the Air Force's purchases of the B-36 in return for 
future employment with the company. If the allegations in this document were true, the 
United States had been cheated of millions of dollars and was relying on an inferior 
weapon for its security.
James Van Zandt, a Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced these 
charges and the document into the House record and called for a thorough 
investigation.299 The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Carl
297Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), Eight Bells and All's Well, (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 221.
298Captain Crommelin statement to Secretary Matthews, quoted in Omaha World Herald. 9 October 1949, 
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Vinson of Georgia, had been trying to avoid adding fuel to the fire by providing a 
Congressional forum for the inter-service accusations, but he realized that these new 
charges were too significant to ignore. He also recognized that if Van Zandt, a junior 
Representative and a Captain in the Naval Reserve, was allowed to conduct his own 
investigation there would be little restraint imposed on the presentations. Therefore 
Vinson chose to take the matter under the auspices of the House Armed Services 
Committee and begin hearings in early August.300
The Committee met to plan these hearings on 9 June 1949 and unanimously 
adopted eight agenda items. They decided to address the first two items in August before 
holding a second session in early October to deal with the rest of the list.301 The eight 
agenda items aimed to:
1) Establish the truth or falsity o f the "Anonymous Document's" charges,
2) Determine the source of these charges,
3) Evaluate the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the B-36,
4) Assess the roles and missions of the Navy and the Air Force, paying particular
attention to the cancellation of the U. S. S. United States,
5) See if the Air Force is imbalanced in favor of strategic bombing,
6) Assess the JCS procedures concerning weapons procurement,
7) Evaluate strategic bombing, and
8) Consider all other pertinent matters.302
300Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, p. 200. A good biographical sketch of Chairman Vinson and an 
account of his role in this controversy can be found in John F. Tarpey, Captain, USN, "Uncle Carl," U. S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1982, pp. 38-45.
30LU. S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st 
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 7 - 8 .  (Hereinafter 
cited as "House Unification and Strategy Report")
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The Committee chose these topics in order to try to bring all accusations and arguments 
before the public and thereby possibly settle the dispute once and for all. Obviously, some 
disagreements could not be aired in an open forum, but Congressman Vinson decided that 
as many of the sessions as possible should be unrestricted. The American people had been 
ted a nearly daily diet of newspaper articles and anonymous charges for several years.
Now they could see whatever truth lay behind the allegations.
The armed services now set out to prepare their cases for presentation. The Air 
Force brought in Barton Leach, a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve and a Harvard Law 
Professor, to arrange its response to the anonymous charges and the Committee's agenda. 
A dedicated team of four investigators compiled a comprehensive document, "History of 
the B-36 Procurement," to serve as the basis for the service's presentation. Not neglecting 
its public relations opportunities, the Air Force invited the House investigating team to 
take up offices in the Pentagon adjacent to Colonel Leach's staff, and, by the start of the 
official hearings, the House team had "reached the tentative conclusion that there was no 
substance" to the charges.303
The Navy, in a fatal mistake, did not approach the preparation of its testimony in 
such a disciplined manner. In June, Under Secretary Dan Kimball initially attempted to 
coordinate the service's efforts.304 He assembled a team of nine officers and one civilian, 
his assistant Cedric Worth, to oversee the development of the Navy's official positions.
He gave leadership of the team to Rear Admiral Brown, the President of the Naval War 
College. Captain Arleigh Burke, the head of the Navy's OP-23, the "Organizational Policy 
and Research Division," and Rear Admiral Ofstie, a member of the Military Liaison
303Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 498.
304The best examination of the Navy's efforts in these hearings is found in a 42-page document prepared 
by the Navy's "OP-23" in late 1949, entitled "A History of the Investigation of the B-36." It can be found 
in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36 Investigation," Naval Historical Center. The best published 
sources are Barlow's The Revolt of the Admirals, and Hammond's case study.
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Committee to the Atomic Energy Committee, were also on this team, and both eventually 
played important parts in the hearings.305
The Navy's team assembled appropriate records and assessed all the Committee's 
issues. The staff members prepared position papers on all the topics and then presented 
their efforts to Under Secretary Kimball on 19 July 1949. He found the positions 
recommended by the team "too extreme," directed Rear Admiral Brown to return to the 
War College, and disbanded the team. Captain Burke and the OP-23 staff were left to 
"pick up the pieces" because no one had been directed to rework the papers for 
Kimball.306 Burke's staff was already busy supporting requests from Admiral Denfeld's 
office for additional research and assistance, and consequently, according to OP-23's 
historical piece, the Navy's preparation "came to a virtual halt." No directives came from 
the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief o f Naval Operations to indicate their desires. "This 
amorphous situation prevailed until . . .  10 August."307 Through disinterest or 
procrastination, the Navy's leaders missed an excellent opportunity to focus their 
arguments and possibly convince Congress that their point of view was more than the 
whining of spoiled and disenchanted aviators.308 Admiral Denfeld clearly bears the 
majority o f the blame in this case, since Burke's OP-23 was part of his staff, and his 
position as the senior uniformed leader of the Navy made him responsible to provide 
advice to the Congress based on the service's input.
305"OP-23" played an important part in support of the Navy's official positions on unification and the 
B-36 controversy. Its history can be found in Potter's biography of Burke, pages 317-319, and in Burke's 
oral history transcript.
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308The OP-23 account of these events is the most detailed available. Several other sources confirm its 
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The first set o f hearings were held between 9 and 25 August and dealt only with 
the specific charges in the anonymous document. The Committee called its primary 
witnesses from the Air Force in order to investigate the B-36 procurement process and 
found not "one iota, one scintilla of evidence" to back up the charges.309 Secretary 
Symington and General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff, made convincing 
presentations and cleared the B-36 program. After the document and Representative Van 
Zandt had been fully discredited, Cedric Worth, of Navy Under Secretary Kimball's office, 
came forward and admitted compiling and circulating the document. Matthews was 
scandalized and referred to Worth's actions as "dastardly."310 $16,300 had been expended 
by Congress to investigate the anonymous charges, identify Worth as the anonymous 
source, and provide the Air Force with a public podium to present its side of the 
controversy.311
The Committee recessed until early October and the second phase of the hearings. 
Burke later observed that "after the Air Force testimony, it was evident that the Navy's 
senior officers would have to speak for the Navy, that just a factual presentation for the 
Record would not be enough."312 The Air Force had acquitted itself so well that 
Matthews and Denfeld believed they needed to unify the Navy and make substantial 
improvements in its case or cancel the hearings and let the Navy's embarrassing defeat 
stand.
Rumors that Matthews and Denfeld were going to cancel the second set of 
hearings galvanized the agitated naval officers into action, precipitating the "revolt." The
309House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 8.
310Transcript of a telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and John Giles, a reporter for the 
Washington Star. 1 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 
Truman Library.
311U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program. H. 
Rept. 1470, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 34.
312"OP-23 Disbanded," Army and N aw  Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 251.
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Air Force had softened its publicity campaign during the summer while it developed its 
case for the B-36 investigation. Naval officers, sensing their opportunity to finally get 
their "day in court," increased the volume and emotion of their public statements. Rear 
Admiral Gallery's "An Admiral Talks Back to the Airmen" was only one of the articles to 
hit the presses during this period.313 Admiral Radford later observed that the events of 
1949 had "convinced some of this group [naval officers] that the time had come for drastic 
and public reaction."314 The Admiral went on to assert that:
Many of these young men were good friends of mine, and some had asked for 
my blessing in their efforts. In every case I tried to stop them, feeling that 
theirs was a hazardous and insubordinate course.315
Needless to say, Radford failed in his attempts to calm the rebels.
History's view of their actions has not been kind. Air Force Colonel Meilinger, a 
leader of the Air War College and the biographer of General Vandenberg, writes that these 
officers "engineered a scandal" to allow their voices to be heard.316 Hammond 
summarizes the ensuing situation quite well:
The Navy, having lost its confidence in the Office of the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy, had maneuvered the 
Committee into accepting this task [the second phase of the hearings], as a 
kind of court of appeal from its own Secretary, from the Department of 
Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the President.317
313Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN, "An Admiral Talks Back to the Airmen," Saturday Evening 
Post. 25 June 1949, pp. 25ff, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 505.
314Jurika, p. 148.
315Ibid„ p. 160.
316Phillip S. Meilinger, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," 
Parameters. September 1989, p. 82.
317Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 552.
100
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was not included in this list of officials 
in which the Navy had lost faith because the CNO was expected to personify "the Navy." 
The rebellious officers had come to ignore Denfeld's half-hearted efforts to direct the Navy 
but retained their allegiance to his office as the true head of the Navy. They intended to 
either take Denfeld with them or work around him, but they wanted to get the opportunity 
to state their case. Denfeld had not yet made up his mind how he was going to approach 
the hearings. In a 7 September letter to Hanson W. Baldwin, the CNO wrote:
What will happen in the House Armed Services Committee when they 
reconvene on October 5th is anybody's guess. But the Navy is going to have 
its day in court at that time and I feel sure that the officers who testify will 
give a good account of themselves.318
Now, at the eleventh hour, a Navy presentation was being put together more under the 
direction of Admiral Radford than Admiral Denfeld. Committee Chairman Vinson had 
recalled Radford from the Pacific to serve as a Navy witness during the first phase of 
hearings. Radford now collected the remnants of Under Secretary Kimball's earlier effort 
and began to put together a presentation strategy and a witness list.319
Admiral Radford constructed the Navy's presentation to provide authoritative 
answers to the five remaining issues on the Committee's agenda. These topics included 
evaluating the B-36, assessing the Air Force's strategic bombing plans, examining the 
division of roles and missions between the services, and reviewing the implementation of 
military unification procedures. Congressman Vinson's Committee selected the senior 
Naval officers who were to present their views on the agenda, but the Navy was allowed
318Letter from Denfeld to Hanson W. Baldwin, 7 September 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 2, File 
"Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
319See pages 25 and 26 of OP-23's "A History of the Investigation of the B-36," Denfeld Papers, Box 10, 
File "B-36 Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
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to choose additional witnesses to clarify its position and supply technical details, just as 
the Air Force had done during the first phase of the hearings.320 The majority of the 
Navy's active, senior admirals and some retired four and five-star officers were lined up to 
provide the Navy's views on the implementation of unification and the operation of the 
JCS. Other admirals and captains were scheduled to testify concerning the Defense 
Department's budgetary and procurement procedures and to discuss the roles and missions 
issues relating to the cancellation of the U. S. S. United States. An additional group of 
naval officers with specific technical expertise was added to address the B-36's 
performance, the capability of Navy fighters to intercept the giant bomber, and the 
feasibility and practicality of the strategic atomic bombing campaign envisioned by the Air 
Force.
The Navy's two most important witnesses were the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Chief of Naval Operations. No matter how well Radford orchestrated the other 
statements, the testimony of the Navy's uniformed and civilian chiefs would either 
undermine or amplify the entire presentation. The Air Force's statements in the August 
hearings had demonstrated that service's solidarity and ability to appear as a disciplined 
and single-minded organization. If Matthews and Denfeld supported Radford's team, the 
Navy would likewise appear to have its house in order and present its case credibly. But if 
the Secretary or the CNO testified in opposition to the Navy's witnesses, the latter would 
continue to be portrayed as undisciplined rebels who opposed civilian control and their 
duly appointed superiors. Matthews and Denfeld had recently shown a united front in 
statements to Congress in opposition to the President's recommended budget, and they 
had convinced Secretary Johnson to upgrade the two Essex class carriers earlier in the 
summer. Nevertheless, neither Matthews nor Denfeld was firmly convinced that the
320Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," p. 63.
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October hearings should be held. Consequently, the October hearings on unification and 
strategy were certain to be filled with drama and suspense.
OP-23, the organization which Secretary Matthews eventually made to serve as 
the Navy's scapegoat, actually had little to do with the testimony. This small group on the 
CNO's staff had evolved from an organization created in 1947 to assist Secretary Forrestal 
in research related to the unification proposals. In this capacity it presented the Secretary 
with important data and views which would have been difficult to obtain by an 
organization outside the Navy. The head of Forrestal's organization, Captain Thackrey, 
was eventually removed by Secretary Sullivan in January 1949 when Thackrey unwittingly 
leaked material to the press which was embarrassing to the Navy. Vice Admiral Radford, 
then the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, chose Captain Arleigh Burke to replace him, and 
Burke quickly took charge and established a coherent and reasonable policy concerning 
contacts with the press.321 His organization only provided clerical support to witnesses in 
the Unification and Strategy Hearings, and reviewed their draft statements to "eliminate 
slaps at personalities, innuendoes, and misrepresentations." Captain Burke later 
mentioned that his organization prepared Fleet Admiral Halsey's first draft at his request, 
but Halsey significantly rewrote the piece for presentation.322
Neither Secretary Matthews nor Admiral Denfeld, the Navy's chief spokesmen, 
were deeply involved in the preparation of the Navy's Congressional testimony. For 
different reasons, the Admiral and the Secretary chose to distance themselves from 
Radford's preparations. Some historians have claimed that Denfeld did not lead the Navy's 
efforts because he spent much of the summer of 1949 in Europe implementing the naval
32 hotter, Burke, pp. 318 - 21.
322"OP-23 Disbanded," Army and Naw  Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 251.
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arrangements for the new NATO alliance.323 This explanation is not plausible because 
Denfeld made only one brief trip to Europe from 29 July through 9 August 1949, in 
company with the other JCS members and well before the hearings were to commence.324
Hammond and Coletta attribute the Admiral's reticence to his non-combative, 
"conciliatory" nature and his inability to articulate his beliefs.325 But Denfeld was by no 
means inarticulate and had testified regularly and well before Congress. I f  he had decided 
to actively guide the development of the Navy's presentation, he certainly would have been 
up to the task. Although Admiral Denfeld was generally a tolerant compromiser who 
disliked confrontations, he understood that, short of canceling the hearings, the Navy's 
presentation could not be avoided. The best explanation for his having played such a small 
role in this process was his general pattern o f leadership through delegation and the fact 
that he still had not made up his mind on the theme o f his own testimony. Denfeld 
understood Admiral Radford's views on all issues under discussion and allowed him to 
marshal the Navy's forces in support o f his position. Radford was the Navy's senior 
aviator and had a long history o f dealing with Congress on unification and aviation issues. 
As the concluding witness, the CNO could either continue to play the conciliator or 
emphasize the Navy's points through a dramatic and assertive statement. What Denfeld 
ultimately decided to do would depend on the presentation's reception in Congress and on 
the attitude of Secretary Matthews. He therefore had to delay this decision until just 
before he had to present his testimony.
323Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 505, Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, p. 200, 
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The Secretary also faced a dilemma. His legal background led him to approach the 
hearings "with great care," as if he were presenting a brief before the Supreme Court.326 
Although he understood the need for a strong and capable Navy, he also was convinced 
that the inter-service arguments of the previous two years had been both undignified and 
counterproductive. He wanted the Navy's witnesses to explain their service's capabilities 
"and not discuss the B-36 or the Air Force unless we have to do it in answering 
questions," but he did not impose these restrictions for fear o f impinging on the witnesses' 
freedom to testify.327 Matthews' sensitivity to this concern was pointed out in his opening 
remarks during the hearings: "There has been no censorship. There will be none."328
Perhaps a greater concern to Secretary Matthews was his commitment to the 
President to support unification and to Secretary Johnson to support his programs outside 
the councils of the Defense Department. Admiral Radford claimed that Matthews believed 
"he had to give Mr. Johnson his complete loyalty and was inclined to suspect the loyalty of 
his immediate subordinates in the Navy. "329 This mindset made his role in the 
development of the Navy's case more like that of an outsider than that of the Navy's 
leader. The essence of the testimony being orchestrated by Radford's team was in 
opposition to Secretary Johnson's policies. Therefore Matthews could not reconcile his 
obligation to his superior with the positions being advocated by the Navy's witnesses. 
Admiral Radford suggested that the Secretary conclude the Navy's presentation, thinking 
that, seeing a unified Navy position, the Secretary would realize the depth of feeling in the
326Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Admiral Radford, 24 September 1949, Denfeld Papers, Box 5, File 
"Correspondence - R," Naval Historical Center.
327Ibid.
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Navy and support their position, but Matthews felt he needed to be the first witness.330 
The Secretary was clearly uncomfortable with the entire process and was very interested 
in postponing or canceling the October hearings.
Matthews and Denfeld continued to maintain good relations during this period.
On the first o f October the Secretary informed John Giles o f the Washington Star that he 
and the Admiral had been "working in perfect harmony" on the preparations for the Navy's 
testimony. Matthews also told Giles that there had been no "pressure from above" on 
their presentation.331 During September, the Navy Secretary had traveled to Hawaii on an 
inspection trip and had made a good impression on Admiral Radford, who wrote to 
Denfeld:
I feel that Mr. Matthews is the kind of man who will stand up for what he 
thinks is right against any opposition, and therefore, if he is given a good basic 
understanding of naval problems, will represent us in a way that we have not 
been represented in some time. He is a man you can certainly talk to and trust; 
who certainly likes you personally and who, I am sure, wants to establish a 
very close and personal liaison with you.332
Although the fact that the Navy's two leaders had not already "established a close liaison" 
after working together for four months may indicate that there were some difficulties, it 
does not appear that there were any severe tensions in their relationship.
As Admiral Radford began to build the Navy's presentation, Secretary Johnson 
announced an additional $353 million cut in the Navy's budget for the current fiscal year. 
This reduction would cut deeply into the Navy's aircraft procurement allowances and
330Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 513.
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incensed many naval aviators already up in arms over previous restrictions. One such 
pilot, Captain John G. Crommelin, elected to take his concerns outside the Pentagon, and 
on 10 September 1949, called a press conference at his home to present his views on 
unification and the budget cuts. Captain Crommelin was one of five brothers who had 
fought in the Navy against Japan. Two of the five had given their lives for their country 
and all had distinguished themselves.333 Captain John Crommelin claimed that unification 
had been "a terrible mistake" and that the Navy was being eliminated by the Secretary of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His reputation and his position as a member of the 
Pentagon's Joint Staff gave his statements credibility, and the sensational nature of the 
charges ensured that they received wide publicity. He openly stated that he intended to 
"blow the whole thing open," understanding that he would probably be court-martialed for 
his actions.334 In short order, retired Fleet Admiral Halsey and other senior officers issued 
statements supporting Crommelin's assertions. A full-fledged public brawl had now 
begun, not between the services, but between the Navy and its civilian leadership.
Admiral Denfeld did not respond directly to Captain Crommelin's brazen violation 
of military procedures and protocol. In fact, the CNO agreed with Under Secretary 
Kimball's position that Captain Crommelin was free to state his personal views at any time 
and that no disciplinary action should be taken. As Paul Hammond notes, "Denfeld's 
reaction was to ignore the unpleasant affair. "335 Secretary Matthews issued a statement 
that Crommelin's actions indicated he was not qualified to serve on the Joint Staff and that 
he would be transferred from that position. On 15 September, in what appeared to be 
another slap at civilian control, the offending aviator was given a Rear Admiral's position 
on the Navy Staff. The press quickly noted this move and hailed it as a promotion for the
333Ibid., p. 507.
334Crommelin statement of 10 September 1949, quoted in Ibid., p. 508.
335Ibid., p. 508.
107
outspoken Captain. Secretary Matthews was furious. Denfeld disavowed any knowledge 
of the move and quickly shifted Crommelin to a different staff job under a Rear 
Admiral.336 Although Captain Crommelin was now in a position where he was not 
required to deal with officers from the other services, the Navy had not addressed his 
complaints and its leadership had been exposed as confused and divided.
Captain Crommelin had stirred up a hornet's nest by obliging the Secretary and the 
CNO to issue promptly to their subordinates a "guidance" memorandum on public 
statements. This memo stated that all speeches and articles intended for public release 
must be transmitted through proper channels to the Secretary of the Navy for 
prepublication review. The Navy's leaders were careful to issue this new policy as 
guidance and not as an order. They understood that emotions were running high and that 
any official "gag orders" would be severely criticized.337 Matthews and Denfeld were also 
concerned that Captain Crommelin would not retire from the public scene quietly. In 
order to prevent a recurrence of his impromptu press conference, Admiral Denfeld issued 
a direct, written order to the Captain prohibiting him from discussing "matters pertaining 
to relations between the military departments . . .  in public speech or by publication" until 
otherwise directed.338 The CNO also enlisted the aid of Rear Admiral Clark, a close friend 
of Crommelin's brother Charles, in pacifying the recalcitrant aviator.339 The Secretary's
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108
Public Relations Officer, Captain Karig, added his efforts to prevent Crommelin "from 
going off the rails once more, . . . making a damn fool martyr of himself."340 With the 
Congressional hearings on unification and strategy scheduled to begin in two weeks, it 
was imperative that the Navy keep its discipline if it held any hopes of convincing not only 
the House, but also its own Secretary o f the merits of its case.
Secretary Matthews successfully headed off a Navy protest to Congress on the 
additional budget cut by convincing the Navy's staff that any objections must be discussed 
with Secretary Johnson before the Navy Secretary would bring them to Congress' 
attention. Matthews understood the Department's civilian chain of command well and was 
not about to make a habit of running to Congress rather than his boss with every 
problem.341 While the Secretary was dealing with his service's internal conflicts, Chairman 
Vinson was working to cancel the October hearings. As a preliminary step, two members 
of the House investigating team met with Matthews on 27 September and convinced him 
to direct Navy witnesses not to mention the B-36 in their statements unless directly 
questioned about it.342 This order would hamstring the case that Radford had been 
building, eliminating all arguments about the inability of the Air Force to accomplish its 
strategic bombing mission, one of the group's key points. Ultimately, this direction was 
rescinded, and even Secretary Matthews' own statement discussed the B-36.
Admiral Denfeld's position in September was very shaky. Secretary Matthews had 
at least a desire to work with the CNO in running the Department, but the Navy's other 
senior officers were following Radford's lead rather than the CNO's. The main reason for 
this was that Denfeld was not leading at all. He had no announced position, "holding
340Memorandum from Captain Karig to Admiral Denfeld, 4 October 1949, in the Chief of Naval 
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himself aloof in his chosen role as conciliator."343 The Admiral had already lost a great 
deal o f respect in the eyes of his subordinates for not resigning over Johnson's carrier 
cancellation and for opposing the test proposed between the B-36 and the Navy fighter. 
Now, by having Radford direct the Navy's preparations for the Congressional hearings, he 
was almost abdicating his responsibilities. Admiral Conolly, the Navy's European 
Commander, recalled that "everybody knew Louis Denfeld was skating on thin ice except 
Louis. Denfeld thought he was going to get the support of Mr. Vinson and the people up 
on the Hill, and they'd keep the political scene in check, but he underestimated Louis 
Johnson."344 Even Admiral Denfeld was beginning to realize that if he wanted to help the 
Navy and earn the loyalty of his men, he needed to stand up for his beliefs and rally the 
Navy around him. That was, after all, the CNO's job.
The Navy's case was taking its final shape in the last days of September. Admiral 
Radford staged a practice session for the senior admirals, most of whom afterward 
endorsed his approach. But Admiral Conolly strongly objected and denounced the 
presentation as "an animal act," and "too aviation-oriented." He and Admiral Denfeld 
discussed these objections with Secretary Matthews who gave Conolly the impression that 
he agreed with his position and would work to reorganize the presentation.345 Denfeld 
noted that the Secretary was "very much disturbed about this B-36 investigation, . . . and 
is taking a great interest in the presentations."346 Matthews himself remarked to a reporter 
on 1 October that "we've been in [practice] session for four or five days, so much so that
343Potter, Burke, p. 324.
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I'm beginning to get a little bit weary."347 Despite all this work, there were reports that 
Johnson had directed Matthews to "suppress the whole thing," and Chairman Vinson's 
thinly veiled intention to cancel the October hearings was an ever-present concern to the 
Navy partisans.348 Something certainly seemed wrong when Secretary Matthews, who 
had earlier told Denfeld that he planned to sit through the presentation's final diy run on 
the fourth and fifth of October, skipped the sessions entirely.349
Just as Admiral Radford was planning his final practice sessions, another public 
storm hit the Navy and the CNO. Secretary Matthews had asked that all officers route 
any opinions on unification and the B-36 through his office before releasing them to the 
media. He also requested opinions and advice from naval personnel on the major issues 
facing the Department to use in preparing for the upcoming hearings. Vice Admiral 
Bogan, the Commander of the First Task Fleet in the Pacific, in compliance with this 
guidance wrote the Secretary a short letter on 20 September to tell him of the state of 
Navy morale and the fleet's continuing fears regarding the Navy's position relative to the 
other services. Bogan stated that "the morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time 
since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916. . . .In  my opinion this descent, almost to 
despondency, stems from complete confusion as to the future role of the Navy." He went 
on to describe the members of his fleet's concerns about national security given the current 
size of the Navy and he voiced his whole-hearted support for Crommelin's views on
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unification.350 As a confidential memorandum, this letter was not open to the public and 
was of little significance.
Vice Admiral Bogan routed his letter through official channels in accordance with 
Matthews' "guidance." Therefore Admiral Radford, as the Commander of the Pacific 
Fleet, and Admiral Denfeld reviewed his submittal and attached forwarding endorsements 
before it reached the Secretary's office. Radford agreed with Bogan's views and asserted 
that "rightly or wrongly, the majority of officers in the Pacific Fleet concur with Captain 
Crommelin. . . .  It would be a grave mistake to underestimate the depth and sincerity of 
their feelings."351 Denfeld, in his attachment to this correspondence, stated that
I concur in the endorsement of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Naval 
Officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge of the aggressive role it plays 
in the defense of the country. They are convinced that a Navy stripped of its 
offensive power means a nation stripped of its offensive power.352
He went on to add a quote from Fleet Admiral King, the CNO during World War II, 
supporting this view: "Any step that is not good for the Navy is not good for the 
nation."353 At the time, this endorsement seemed inconsequential. Admiral Bogan's letter 
and the attachments reached the Secretary's office by 29 September. Denfeld later 
recorded that "the Secretary did not show any concern over the letter when it was an 
internal matter," but, of course in the Navy of 1949, very little stayed out o f the public
350Letter from Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan to Secretary Matthews, 20 September 1949, reprinted in 
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 510.
35indorsem ent of Admiral Radford on Vice Admiral Bogan's letter to Secretary Matthews, 22 September 
1949, reprinted in Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
352Endorsement of Admiral Denfeld on Vice Admiral Bogan's letter to Secretary Matthews, 28 September 
1949, reprinted in Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
353Ibid.
354Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 15.
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Saturday and Sunday, October first and second, were the last days of the Navy’s 
semi-orderly approach to the hearings on unification and strategy. On the first, Secretary 
Matthews discussed the proposed $353 million spending cut with Secretary Johnson and 
was granted a formal hearing to be held in the near future to assess other options. 
Matthews' strategy of working through the Defense Secretary seemed to be the correct 
one after all. On that same day, Captain Crommelin appeared on "Meet the Press." This 
opportunity for disaster was avoided through the CNO's recent order to Crommelin not to 
discuss unification or any inter-service issues.355 The Navy and the Defense Department 
appeared to be returning to at least a civil relationship.
The highlight of Sunday, October second was a dinner party held at the Denfeld's 
residence at the Naval Observatory. The guests of honor were Secretary and Mrs. 
Matthews and their mutual friend, Monsignor Maurice Sheehy of Catholic University. In 
discussing the upcoming dinner, Matthews told Sheehy that he expected "it'll be a very 
enjoyable evening. I've been very anxious to have Mrs. Matthews get closer acquainted 
with Mrs. Denfeld . . ,"356 Later in his conversation with Father Sheehy, the Secretary 
praised his working relations with the CNO:
There's no, absolutely no cramping of any Admiral's style. We're working 
together in the most beautiful harmony and I think as constructively as ever, as 
there's ever been any work done for the Navy. There's strong opinions of 
course but I wouldn't want these men around me if they didn't have strong 
opinions. They'd be no good to me [as "yes men"] . . . because they know 
more about the Navy than I do.357
355Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
356Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and Father Maurice Sheehy,
1 October 1949, in Matthews Papers, Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, Truman Library.
357Ibid.
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After the dinner party Denfeld commented that the Secretary "gave no indication then that 
he had any but the highest regard for me."358 These records indicate that the 
Matthews/Denfeld team was solid and ready to face the upcoming hearings, but other 
signs did not support this optimistic outlook.
Denfeld had been nominated for a second term by Secretary Matthews earlier in 
the year, but he had not been the only candidate for the position. According to Matthews, 
Admiral Blandy had nearly demanded to be made CNO during the Secretary's first few 
weeks in office.359 Admiral Conolly also had a claim to the Navy's "throne" as Denfeld's 
successor based on promises by Secretary Sullivan and Denfeld himself. Conolly recalled 
that after Secretary Matthews took office, Admiral Denfeld had told him that he was still 
slated to relieve Denfeld as the next CNO.360 And Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, the 
Commander of the Fifth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean, was frequently mentioned by 
Secretary Matthews as an officer he admired and respected.361 Johnson also expressed 
some interest in these officers, stating in September 1949 that Conolly and Blandy were 
the only admirals of whom he had "a high opinion."362 When the Navy Secretary began to 
develop doubts about the wisdom of retaining Denfeld during the fall of 1949, these three 
officers were the front-runners in his secret search for a new Navy Chief.
Admiral Blandy was the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and next in 
seniority behind Denfeld. He was a "battleship admiral" who had distinguished himself in 
combat and never hesitated to take on difficult problems. His strong views had cost him 
his chance for the CNO position in 1947 and they continued to keep him from it in
358Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 15.
359John A. Giles, "The Navy's Secretary Walks Alone," Washington Star. 23 October 1949, p. C-l.
360Conolly interview, p. 392.
361Martin S. Hayden, "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949.
362Conolly interview, p. 398.
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1949.363 When Matthews sat in on the practice sessions for the Congressional hearings, 
Blandy's statement was as aggressive and anti-establishment as the rebellious aviators'. 
Matthews knew that replacing Denfeld with a dogmatic fighter was not a viable option.
According to Admiral Richard Conolly, Matthews knew that Conolly was also 
very interested in being the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary seemed to think 
that he would be more flexible than Blandy. Matthews approached Admiral Conolly 
during the preparation of the Navy's presentation and told him "that things were not going 
right between him and Denfeld, and he wanted my [Conolly's] support."364 When Conolly 
seemed to respond positively, Matthews went on to tender what Conolly immediately 
perceived as an amazing bribe.
I was Mr. Matthews' choice to succeed Denfeld. He practically told me so. If 
Denfeld couldn't stay, he'd like to rely on me. . . . He gave me to understand 
unmistakably that what I said in testimony would have a great deal to do with 
my future career.365
Although Conolly felt that "Denfeld was completely under the control of Radford," and 
was leading the Navy in a direction Conolly thought was hazardous, he eventually decided 
that he wanted no part in this type of political game.366 His statement on 12 October 
before the House Armed Services Committee pulled no punches and lost him his chance to 
lead the Navy. Conolly's recollections placed Matthews' veiled offer about one week 
before the hearings began, clearly indicating that the Secretary was at least leaving his
363Blandy and Denfeld had been Forrestal's final two candidates in 1947. The Secretary's opinion that the 
President would find Denfeld easier to work with apparently decided the issue.
364Conolly interview, p. 395.
365Ibid., p. 396.
366Ibid., pp. 393 and 397. Conolly repeatedly met with the Secretary during the first days of the hearings, 
spending more time in his office than Denfeld did. (Secretary Matthews' appointment calendar, Truman 
Library)
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options open while he worked with Admiral Denfeld to control the dissension within the 
Navy.
The third officer on Matthews' rapidly shrinking list was Vice Admiral Forrest 
Sherman. Although he was only tenth in seniority on the Navy list, his previous 
experience as DCNO for Operations under Nimitz during the unification debates had built 
this naval aviator a strong reputation. Matthews stated that even before he became 
Secretary of the Navy, he "had been impressed with Sherman." As Truman's nominee for 
the Navy position, Matthews had read the record of the 1947 Congressional hearings on 
unification in which Sherman had testified eloquently. Regarding this testimony,
Matthews asserted:
As a lawyer . . .  I was impressed by Sherman as the most intellectual witness 
to appear for either side. When I came to Washington I asked where he was.
. . .  I found that those whom I had begun to feel opposed unification regarded 
him with great bitterness.367
In Forrest Sherman, Matthews had found an ideal choice for CNO. He was an aviator 
with a brilliant war record who had maintained a low profile during the acrimonious public 
debates of the previous year. Over the course of several meetings during the summer of 
1949, the two had built a good relationship.
With Secretary Matthews still undecided about replacing Admiral Denfeld and the 
scheduled start of the hearings only two days away, Congressman Vinson renewed his 
attempts to at least delay, if not cancel, the testimony before his Committee. On 3 
October he called a meeting between the Navy's leaders and selected members of his 
Committee to discuss their options. Secretary Matthews supported Vinson's request to
367Martin S. Hayden, "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald, 8 November 1949, and Omaha 
World Herald. 1 December 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
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delay the start of the Navy's presentation until after Congress' Christmas break because he 
wished to present the Navy's case to Secretary Johnson before public hearings began. 
Admiral Denfeld agreed, believing that the delay would give him ''the chance, which he 
had not yet had, to study the material prepared in the Navy for presentation."368 After his 
removal, Denfeld gave a different rationale for this decision, contending that he was 
willing to defer the hearings to allow the Navy to make "a studied and orderly 
presentation. "369 Paul Hammond states that some naval officers, led by Vice Admiral 
Price, Denfeld's Vice Chief of Naval Operations, did not support the group's decision to 
delay the hearings, and called Admiral Radford to Vinson's meeting. Hammond credits 
Radford with persuading Vinson that the hearings should be held as scheduled.370 But, 
this explanation hardly seems plausible. A more credible explanation can be found in the 
record of an interview given by Matthews on 8 November in which he reported that the 3 
October meeting adjourned with an agreement to delay the hearings but that Captain 
Crommelin's actions later the same night forced Congressman Vinson to return to the 
initial plan.371
Captain Crommelin, in his new position on the Navy's staff, was able to keep close 
watch on the Navy's preparations for the Congressional hearings and the maneuverings of 
the senior leadership. After hearing of the decision to delay the Navy's "day in court," the 
Captain obtained copies o f Vice Admiral Bogan's letter to Secretary Matthews and the 
endorsements of Admirals Radford and Denfeld and distributed them to several local 
newsmen with the understanding that he not be identified as the source. The headlines the 
next morning were full of references to the poor state of Navy morale and the breadth of
368Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
369Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," p. 63.
370Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
371Hayden, Martin S., "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949.
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Navy opposition to unification. Matthews and Vinson quickly realized that this new storm 
had forced their hand and returned the hearings on unification and strategy to their original 
schedule. This and anything else which could end the embarrassing intra-Navy and inter­
service conflicts had to be tried.
Secretary Matthews later stated that he believed it was "more than coincidental" 
that the leak occurred on the night he and Chairman Vinson decided to delay the 
hearings.372 The first person Matthews suspected of having distributed the Bogan 
correspondence was Vice Admiral Price, the most outspoken officer on 3 October against 
delay of the hearings. Matthews told Denfeld that he suspected the VCNO to be the 
culprit and asked the CNO to "give some thought to taking Admiral Sherman as your 
Vice-CNO."373 While this suggestion was offered for future consideration, the Secretary 
ordered an immediate investigation to locate the source of the leak. Captain Crommelin, 
realizing that his object had been achieved, quickly admitted to distributing the copies in 
order to ensure the Navy's case would be heard.
Although most citizens, and even most naval officers, deplored Crommelin's 
methods, he certainly achieved his immediate objective, but there was a high price to be 
paid for this success.374 With the hearings opening on the following day, the Secretary of 
the Navy and the CNO were sharply divided in their views of the Navy's case. Matthews 
had had enough of the bickering and intended to pull no punches in his opening statement. 
Crommelin's actions had convinced him that the most outspoken of his subordinates did 
not merit his support. Denfeld was unable to abandon ship so easily. The CNO
372Ibid.
373Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63,
374Edward P. Stafford, Commander USN (Ret.), "Saving Carrier Aviation - 1949 Style," U. S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. January 1990, pp. 44-51 provides a good view of this incident from Captain 
Crommelin's perspective. Commander Stafford based his article on an interview with Crommelin over 40 
years after the episode.
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understood the gravity of the issues involved and realized that persevering in his attempts 
at compromise would be fruitless. His careful consideration of his options was perceived 
by his subordinates as a lack of leadership and disinclination to stand up for the Navy's 
interests. This amplified their growing disenchantment with the CNO.375
After the leak Secretary Matthews set up a meeting with Captain Crommelin to 
discuss loyalty and discipline. The Secretary, having only been in a military structure for 
five months was in a difficult position trying to convince a twenty-five year battle- 
hardened veteran that he did not understand loyalty, but Matthews made a valiant attempt. 
What ensued turned out to be a leadership lesson for the lawyer from Omaha. The Omaha 
World Herald reported that:
quietly Captain Crommelin explained to the Secretary that the Naval Academy 
had taught him, and life had confirmed, that true loyalty is loyalty not to men, 
but to principles. "Experience has convinced me," Captain Crommelin told Mr. 
Matthews, "that you can't get loyalty from the men beneath you by demanding 
it. What you get is counterfeit loyalty - not worth a damn when the shooting 
begins. There's only one way to get loyalty, and that's to be lucky enough to 
inspire it."376
If  anything was missing from the Navy's leadership it was "inspiration." If  Captain 
Crommelin's words and not his actions had been followed by more naval officers, much of 
the problems which followed could have been avoided. After the meeting, Crommelin 
described the Secretary as "a good Joe; a fine chap, trying to do a job under impossible 
circumstances. "377 Matthews probably wished that it was as easy to win over the 
President and Congress.
375Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512.
376Omaha World Herald. 9 October 1949, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
377Ibid.
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Public opinion also strongly objected to the tactics used by the Navy. One 
example of public reaction is a letter from Francis D. Felps o f St. Louis to the President. 
"Concerning the current mutiny in the Navy, I have not the faintest notion about the merits 
o f the Navy's case, but their methods stink."378 Despite this negative public reaction, 
Admiral Denfeld discerned a bright side to the affair. Captain Karig, the Navy's Public 
Affairs Officer, immediately wrote to the CNO: "Publication of your Bogan endorsement 
has done more to raise your prestige with the fleet than anything you have yet done and it 
was needed."379 Despite his best efforts, Denfeld had become recognized as just another 
"revolting admiral."
The story of Admiral Denfeld's endorsement o f Vice Admiral Bogan's letter and its 
impact on his relationship with Secretary Matthews goes much deeper than these surface 
manifestations. Secretary Matthews saw Bogan's submission as more than just a note to 
the boss informing him of the author's thoughts and perceptions. Although the Secretary 
received several similar letters from other senior officers, he believed that Bogan had 
intended all along to publish his views and wanted to see the Secretary's response.380 
Bogan had testified against the unification proposals o f 1947 and was known to Matthews 
as an opponent of his policies. Matthews also found that Bogan's letter had been 
"circulated among various widely-scattered commands before it ever reached my desk," 
leading him to believe that the letter had not been "originally prepared just to inform
378Letter from Francis D. Felps to President Truman, 8 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library.
379Letter from Captain Karig to Admiral Denfeld, 4 October 1949, Chief of Naval Operations Papers, 
"Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval Historical Center.
38°paoio Coletta's The United States N aw  and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: 
University of Delaware Press, 1981), p. 204 lists several other letters to the Secretary during this period 
which are filed in the Chief of Naval Operations Papers.
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me."381 When it found its way to the media in early October, Matthews was angered but 
not surprised.
The circumstance that upset Matthews the most was the airing of Admiral 
Denfeld's outspoken views. The Secretary was surprised that Admiral Denfeld's 
endorsement read as strongly as it did. Radford's endorsement was brief and restrained 
and similar to many statements he had made in Congressional testimony. Its only 
noteworthy aspect was Radford's agreement with Vice Admiral Bogan that the majority of 
the officers in the Pacific Fleet shared Captain Crommelin's concerns. Denfeld had 
previously exercised great care in avoiding being perceived as one of the Navy's radicals 
and had downplayed the scope of the unrest in the service. His endorsement to the Bogan 
letter was significantly more emotional and partisan than anything else he had written. It 
also differs from his other public statements in containing very little o f Denfeld's own 
words. The endorsement centered around a lengthy quote from Fleet Admiral King, the 
Navy's World War II CNO. What especially got Denfeld in trouble was his opening 
statement of agreement with Radford's endorsement. This made it seem that Denfeld had 
joined the camp of the Navy's radicals. Transmitting Admiral King's fiery words (which 
included the phrase "any step that is not good for the Navy is not good for the nation") 
added to the endorsement's vehemence. In this sense, too, Denfeld's endorsement was 
very much out of character.
Matthews observed that "such an opinion was completely contrary to what he [the 
CNO] had told me he believed when, just a few weeks before, I had recommended his 
reappointment."382 Denfeld informed Senator Knowland in February 1950 that "since it 
[the endorsement] was a confidential letter and an internal matter within the Department, I
381Martin S. Hayden, '"Inside1 Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949.
382Ibid.
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felt I should give him the benefit of my views." The Admiral went on to state that he had 
told Matthews the morning after the correspondence was published that "had I known it 
was going to be made public, I would not have written the endorsement in the way I did, 
as I felt it might have been misinterpreted."383 It remains a mystery why Denfeld had not 
verbally communicated his true feelings to the Secretary during their daily meetings if he 
had actually felt this strongly at any time.
An even more disturbing revelation about the Admiral's endorsement quickly came 
to light. Secretary Matthews may have noted how uncharacteristic Denfeld's submission 
was and asked Vice Admiral Sherman about it. Although it will probably never be known 
for certain what actually prompted the discussion of the matter between Sherman and 
Matthews, the Secretary informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that it was 
Sherman who effectively sunk Denfeld by explaining that Denfeld had not actually written 
the endorsement. Matthews testified that Admiral Sherman "told me that a rough draft 
was prepared, that that draft was put on after the signature was signed. Now, how 
thoroughly, if at all, Admiral Denfeld examined that draft, I do not know."384 Matthews 
concluded that his CNO was irresponsibly administering his office if he would sign a 
"blank check" and allow some staff member to write what purported to be Denfeld's 
personal views about a critical issue for transmission to the Secretary.
383Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
384Excerpt from Secretary Matthews' testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 30 
January 1950 contained in Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in the 
Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library. Secretary Matthews' testimony was given to explain 
his rationale for removing Admiral Denfeld. This lengthy discussion was held in executive session and 
the transcript is unavailable, but some excerpts from the Secretary's statement and Admiral Denfeld's 
rebuttal are available in the Matthews Papers.
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Denfeld presented his side of this story in detail in his letter to Senator 
Knowland.385 The CNO admitted to having signed the endorsement before it was typed, 
but explained his reasons for this procedure. His Executive Assistant"normally would 
have prepared the endorsement," but since he was out of town, Denfeld's Aide for JCS 
matters, Captain Woodyard drafted the note. Denfeld was eager to get the Bogan 
correspondence to the Secretary "without delay," since Matthews had previously stated 
that he wanted to use this type of material in the Congressional hearings. Denfeld stated 
that Woodyard
presented his draft endorsement to me and, as I recall it, I changed a few 
words in the text and cut out the last paragraph. I was waiting to sign the 
endorsement when I received word that the Secretary was waiting for me to go 
to the plane which was to take us to New York for the Armed Forces 
Industrial Association dinner that evening. My secretary suggested, in order to 
not delay me, that I sign a blank piece of paper and that she would type the 
endorsement on it and that it would be transmitted to the Secretary's office.
This was not an unusual procedure, and I knew what was to be in the 
endorsement and had complete confidence in Captain Woodyard and my 
secretary, who had been with me approximately 7 years. The letter and the 
endorsement reached the Secretary's office later that day, [28 September] and 
the Secretary did not mention the letter to me until the 4th of October, five 
days later.386
Denfeld's final endorsement ends with the three paragraph quote from Admiral King, an 
unusual procedure in official endorsements. According to standard correspondence 
practice, the concluding paragraph that Denfeld struck out would normally have been 
some type of summation of his personal views. That Denfeld felt uncomfortable providing 
a definitive personal assessment of Bogan's assertions is in character and lends credence to 
his explanation.
385Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library, pp. 3 - 4 .
386Ibid.
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Even though Denfeld did not find this process "unusual," Matthews viewed it in a 
much less favorable light, agreeing with Senator Morse that it was "not customary to good 
management of an officer's affairs."387 Secretary Matthews did not publicly raise this 
aspect of the Bogan incident, only discussing it in Congressional executive session and in 
private conversation with trusted friends. The Secretary's handling of this aspect o f the 
Bogan matter demonstrates that he retained a concern for Admiral Denfeld's reputation. 
Additionally, the fact that Matthews saw this incident as a major problem while Denfeld 
considered it insignificant, indicates the width of the communication gap which existed 
between the Navy's leaders. The interactions involving the Bogan correspondence also 
show that Admiral Sherman may have played an even greater part than previously realized 
in the events leading up to the firing of Admiral Denfeld.
The CNO's investigation into how the Bogan correspondence found its way into 
Captain Crommelin's hands ultimately determined that although Vice Admiral Price had no 
hand in the affair, his office was deeply involved. The CNO and VCNO shared their 
highly classified files to simplify security arrangements. Therefore, the staffs of both 
officers had access to the letters. Admiral Denfeld told Senator Knowland that he 
discovered that "Admiral Price's first assistant had taken the letter out of the files on two 
or three occasions and had made copies of it. . . . The Inspector General found no one in 
my immediate office culpable with regard to the release of this letter. "388 The 
investigation cleared Denfeld of any direct responsibility for the leak, but the CNO's 
excuse seems weak. The VCNO was Admiral Denfeld's primary assistant and they shared 
office areas. A stronger position would have been to accept the blame for this incident as 
the officer responsible for the Navy's performance, and particularly, the performance of
387Ibid., p. 6.
388Ibid., p. 5.
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the Navy Staff. Denfeld's attitude illustrates why he had such a difficult time engendering 
loyalty amongst his subordinates. A leader can have little effective authority unless he 
accepts the accompanying accountability.
Secretary Matthews' morning routine in Washington was to get up early and attend 
the dawn mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral. He then went to his apartment, had breakfast, 
and read the morning papers.389 On Tuesday the fourth of October 1949, the Navy 
Secretary's morning ritual was badly disturbed as he found the Bogan letters splashed 
across the front pages. His position seemed to be worse than ever before as his 
subordinates now publicly bucked his authority and continued to embarrass the 
Department. When he arrived at the Pentagon, he immediately called Admiral Denfeld to 
his office to discuss the situation.390
Matthews recalled that at this meeting he asked Denfeld how the letters had been 
released and then directed him to make an investigation of the matter. Matthews later 
informed the President that he "frankly stated" to Denfeld that "his usefulness as Chief of 
Naval Operations had terminated."391 The Secretary later told Truman that the CNO's 
handling of his endorsement, "coupled with other things that happened," led to his 
decision to replace the Admiral.392 The Omaha World Herald's Washington correspondent 
confirmed Matthews' intent on 6 November 1949 by reporting that "back on October 4,
. . . Mr. Matthews told this reporter confidentially that Admiral Denfeld 'has outlived his 
usefulness in the post of Chief of Naval Operations.'"393
389John A. Giles, "The Navy's Secretary Walks Alone," Washington Star. 23 October 1949, p. C-l.
390Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
391Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman 
Papers, White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library.
392Martin S. Hayden, "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949, and Letter 
from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library, p. 7, quoting from Matthews' testimony, p. 180.
393"Admirals Still are Muttering Among Selves," Omaha World Herald. 6 November 1949, p. 1.
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Matthews' statement, in isolation, seems fairly clear in its implication that Admiral 
Denfeld would be replaced as CNO, but that was far from the reality of the situation. 
Secretary Matthews' session with the CNO lasted about fifteen minutes. He then went to 
see Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Early to discuss the situation with him. These two 
officials met for several hours, but there is no record of their conversation.394 The next 
day, Matthews and Johnson met with President Truman, and the Navy Secretary 
"mentioned the possibility of Admiral Denfeld's replacement" to the President.395 
Truman's reaction is not recorded.
Admiral Denfeld's account of his meeting with Secretary Matthews differs on 
several points and is important in understanding the controversy that later swirled around 
the Secretary's removal of the CNO. Denfeld's confidential letter of 9 February 1950 to 
Senator Knowland described this meeting in detail. He also covered it in more general 
terms in his 18 March 1950 Collier's article, "Why I Was Fired." The Admiral 
remembered that Matthews "was really much disturbed that the letter was published," and 
asked him about his endorsement. When questioned, Denfeld admitted to having not 
written the letter and also to having not read the final copy. He also stated that "I knew 
what was in it."396 Denfeld recalled that the Secretary then told him
that he was sorry I had placed the endorsement on the letter, and was afraid it 
might impair my value as CNO. But he continued, "I have had worse
394Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
395Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman 
Papers, White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library. Hammond, 
"Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512 also discusses this situation and comments on the ambiguity 
of Mr. Matthews' statement.
396Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library, p. 4. Matthews' questions would seem unusual unless he had already been 
told (by Sherman?) that the CNO did not write the endorsement. After all, it did have his signature on it 
and had come from his office.
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situations than this confront me and I am sure that if we work together we can 
overcome this one." (emphasis added)397
Matthews then directed Denfeld to prepare a public statement to clarify the intent and 
circumstances of the Bogan correspondence and to investigate the leak in the 
Department's security. In his Collier's article, the Admiral added that as this session was 
breaking up, "Secretary Matthews said genially, 'I don't like all this formality of titles 
between us. I wish you'd call me Frank and I'll call you Louis.'"398 It is hard to 
understand why, after having worked under great stress and in close quarters for over four 
months, Matthews would choose this opportunity to ask the CNO to be more familiar 
with him. Nevertheless, this was Denfeld's impression of their exchange.
Admiral Denfeld reported that "it was not clear" to him that Matthews intended at 
that moment to replace him.399 Denfeld gave a more detailed description of his 
impressions to Senator Knowland:
I am willing to testify before your Committee under oath that I was never given 
any intimation by the Secretary of the Navy or by anyone else that my services 
as Chief of Naval Operations would be terminated, until the day an 
announcement to that effect was made in the press. . . . On the contrary, when 
through no culpability o f any one in my office, the Bogan letter discussing 
unification policies was released for publication, the Secretary of the Navy told 
me that, much as he regretted the incident, we had weathered worse storms 
than this before and that he and I working together would weather this one.400
On 4 October, the CNO continued with his duties as if nothing extraordinary had 
been said in their meeting. Denfeld claimed that his endorsement of the Bogan 
correspondence had been misunderstood and that he did not approve of the views
397Ibid.
398Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63.
399Ibid.
400Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File 
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expressed by Captain Crommelin or Vice Admiral Bogan. He described this endorsement 
as a required formality and announced his continued support for unification because it is 
"the law of the land, the principles and objectives of which 1 have wholeheartedly 
endorsed and am striving to make effective. In this effort I am fully supported by a large 
majority o f naval personnel."401 The CNO also continued to speak of the importance of 
the Navy to national defense, and told the Navy Supply Corps graduates o f the Harvard 
Business School that "as naval officers your duty to your profession entails a duty toward 
your fellow citizens. A duty to keep them informed of the need - - the absolute necessity - 
- o f a Navy adequate to any emergency."402 Secretary Johnson was aware of Denfeld's 
predicament and was quoted as telling "a friend, 'Denfeld hasn't been disloyal - yet.'"403
401Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512.
402Admiral Denfeld speech to the Supply Corps' graduates of the Harvard Business School in Boston, 4 
October 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "Misc. Correspondence and Speeches, 1948 - 49," Naval 
Historical Center. It is difficult to believe that Denfeld gave this speech since he was in Secretary 
Matthews' office at 1615 on 4 October and the hearings commenced the next day. Regardless of its 
delivery, it is still a good indication of his sentiments.
403"Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27.
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THE HEARINGS ON UNIFICATION AND STRATEGY
"I felt it was about time that the truth be known and that a spade be called a spade 
letting the chips fall where they may. As you know, it has been a difficult problem 
for me but I simply could not continue without letting the public know what was 
happening to the Navy and the National Security. Believe me, I shall continue to 
fight for what I believe is right." (18 October 1949 - Admiral Denfeld)404
"Our military forces are one team - in the game to win regardless of who carries 
the ball. This is no time for "fancy dans" who won't play, unless they can call the 
signals. Each player on this team - whether he shines in the spotlight of the 
backfield or eats dirt on the line - must be an all-American." (19 October 1949 - 
General Bradley)405
Congressman Vinson had set up the hearings on unification and strategy to permit 
the services' leaders to release their pent up frustrations and to serve as a catharsis for the 
defense establishment. His agenda ensured that the majority of issues that divided the 
"unified" Defense Department would at least be aired in an open forum. Passions being 
what they were, few observers believed that the senior officers would all survive the 
hearings with their careers and reputations intact. Unlike August's generally factual 
hearings on the B-36, this session revolved around opinions, not facts: Was the B-36 a 
good airplane? Did strategic bombing make sense? Did Secretary Johnson do the right 
thing when he canceled the "supercarrier"? Was the JCS structure working well? Vinson 
hoped that this public brawl would help settle the debates.
The House Armed Services Committee held hearings from 6 through 21 October 
1949, averaging three and one half hours per day.406 Thirty-nine witnesses testified on the 
remaining six agenda items. The Navy alone sent two civilians, three Fleet Admirals, six
404Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, Ohio newspaper publisher, 18 October 1949, in Denfeld 
Papers, Box 6, File "Correspondence - W," Naval Historical Center.
405House Unification and Strategy Report, pp. 536 - 37.
406Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 514.
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Admirals, and thirteen other officers to the stand. The Marines added three additional 
general officers to the list. In the hearings' concluding phase, former-President Hoover, 
Secretary Johnson, and Generals of the Army Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley all 
testified on the merits and application of military unification.407 The hearings' examination 
o f military strategy was given added urgency by the President's 23 September 
announcement that the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic device, ensuring that the 
House's hearings on unification and strategy made front pages across the country.
Chairman Vinson understood that in order for all opinions to be freely aired, the 
witnesses had to be protected from reprisals, because much of the anticipated objections 
would be directed at the policies and actions of the leaders of the Department of Defense. 
Therefore, in opening the hearings on 6 October, Vinson declared:
It is the intent of the Committee that all testimony given shall be frankly and 
freely given and be given without reprisals in the Department of Defense 
against any individual presenting testimony during the course of these hearings.
. . . We want these witnesses to speak what is in their minds, to put their cards 
on the table and to do so without hesitation or personal concern. We are going 
to the bottom of this unrest and concern in the Navy.408
This warning should have been unnecessary, since it was illegal either to threaten a witness 
before he testified to Congress or to take action against him after he made statements on 
the stand.409 Nevertheless, Vinson properly saw the need to reiterate what the law 
required.
As he had requested, Secretary Matthews led off the Navy's presentation. He had 
declined Admiral Denfeld's offer of help in the preparation of his statement, and, as Paul
407House Unification and Strategy Report, p. iv.
408Statement of Congressman Carl Vinson, 6 October 1949, quoted in Jurika, p. 179.
409In 1949, Title 18 of Section 1505 of the United States Criminal Code was entitled "Influencing or 
Injuring Witness Before Agencies and Committees." Its provisions applied in this situation.
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Hammond observed, "while he did not accept Denfeld's suggestions for changing i t . . 
nevertheless he continued to expect Denfeld to support his position. His refusal to take 
into account Denfeld's suggestions . . . [had] unfortunate consequences."410 The 
Secretary's testimony opened with a pledge echoing Chairman Vinson's caution on 
reprisals. "Let me assure the Committee that any Naval officer or enlisted man or any 
Navy civilian whom your Committee wants to hear, or who desires to be heard by your 
Committee, is completely free to testify. There has been no censorship. There will be 
none."411 He went on to mention a letter which he had previously sent the Committee 
which addressed the six issues under discussion. After this letter was entered into the 
record, the Secretary launched into a heated denunciation of the "guilty" and "disloyal" 
conduct of a few individuals, mostly "in the Naval Aviation section of the service," who 
had engaged in the "indefensible procedure" of passing classified material to the press and 
otherwise improperly addressing their grievances.412 He stated that "the general morale of 
the Navy" was good and that naval officers were not "gagged" in the Defense Department 
but were free to express their views. These points reportedly elicited laughter from the 
naval officers in attendance.413 Matthews made one final attempt to limit the hearings by 
requesting that some testimony, specifically Admiral Radford's statement which was to 
follow the Secretary's, be heard in executive session because of potential security 
concerns. The Committee agreed to hear the statement in executive session, but, if 
nothing improper was heard, the hearings would be reopened and Admiral Radford would
410Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 515.
411 "Statement of Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews Before the Armed Services Committee of the 
House of Representatives, 6 October 1949,"p. 1, in Matthews Papers, Box 57, File "Secretary Matthews, 
10/6/49," Truman Library.
412Ibid., p. 2.
413Ibid., p. 3, arid Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 516.
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repeat his statement. That, in fact, was the course the hearings took. Vinson was 
committed to airing the services' differences in public.
Matthews' testimony pleased hardly anyone. The press criticized the Secretary of 
the Navy for abandoning his subordinates or for allowing the hearings to be held in the 
first place. The Naval Academy Alumni Association's magazine, Shipmate, bluntly 
characterized Matthews as "a Secretary against the Navy, not for it, and certainly not of 
it."414 Admiral Denfeld recorded that "Secretary Matthews . . . was much disturbed at 
press comment on his testimony."415 Now the frustrated Secretary was forced to sit 
through eleven days of Navy and Marine officers' testimony in opposition to much of what 
he had just submitted.
The following days' Navy testimony attempted to build a case that the B-36 was 
not an adequate aircraft, that strategic nuclear bombing was immoral, inefficient, and 
impossible with current aircraft, and that the Department of Defense was not 
implementing unification in a way that recognized the rights and contributions of all four 
services. Admiral Radford was the first naval officer to testify. He opened this phase of 
the hearings with a firm denunciation of the B-36 as "a billion dollar blunder." He asserted 
that it was too big and slow to penetrate enemy air defenses and that naval aircraft could 
shoot it down unless it had fighter escort. These arguments were identical to those he had 
presented during his testimony before the Hoover Commission in October 1948 and to 
Congress during the budget hearings in early 1949.416
Admiral Radford then offered his views on unification of the Armed Forces. 
"Unification requires a sound legislative framework, but the framework by itself will not 
suffice. Real unification must depend, in the ultimate, on leadership, mutual trust,
414"The Navy on Capitol Hill," Shipmate. December 1949, pp. 12 -13.
415Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63.
416Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 488 and 518.
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understanding, and respect."417 This statement was a distinct shift away from his 
testimony on the National Security Act of 1947, when he had said, "I feel that we are not 
ready for one department. I think we have to carry on for another generation and I would 
be hopeful that we could have, eventually, when this new generation grows up, one 
service."418 Despite the differences, Radford still advocated trust, respect, and 
understanding as the keys to implementing the unification laws. In retrospect, Radford's 
1947 statement was probably more accurate, since the Department of Defense continues 
to struggle with unification well into the 1990s. In response to questioning after his 
prepared statement, Admiral Radford listed the "other officers" who supported his views: 
"among others, Denfeld, Blandy, Conolly, Nimitz, King, and Leahy."419 Denfeld now had 
to call Radford's bluff or stand with his fellow admirals in opposition to his civilian 
supervisors.
During the week of testimony before his concluding statement, Denfeld received 
many requests from the Secretary's office for a copy of his proposed statement, but he 
could not give him one because he had not yet prepared his remarks. Secretary Matthews 
maintained a good relationship with his CNO during this period. Denfeld's letter to 
Senator Knowland states that before he testified "there was an intimacy and cordiality 
between the Secretary of the Navy and myself which supports my conviction that what 
happened after October 13 was the direct result of my testimony. "420 Both Navy leaders
417Admiral Radford statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 7 October 1949, p. 2, in "The 
Navy and Marine Corps Presentation Before the Armed Services Committee of the House of 
Representatives, United States Congress," unpublished transcript of the Naval Service testimony in the 
Hearings on Unification and Strategy, microfiche, October 1949. In the files of the U. S. Army Combined 
Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. (Hereinafter referred to as "Navy Testimony 
Transcript.")
418Radford's testimony to Congress, 26 June 1947, in Jurika, p. 106.
419Radford's response is quoted in Coletta, The United States N aw  and Defense Unification, p. 187.
420Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library, p. 1.
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attended the hearings together, but tensions ran so high during the sessions that neither 
man appeared to be enjoying himself.
Admiral Sherman never made a statement before the Committee although he was 
called back from the Mediterranean to Washington to do so. Captain Fitzhugh Lee, a 
member o f Denfeld's staff, stated that Admiral Radford left Sherman off the list o f Navy 
witnesses because Secretary Matthews was opposed to his testifying.421 Admiral Conolly 
had quite different memories of why Sherman did not testify. He recalled that Sherman 
had been in the Capital for about a week before the hearings and had "made out a wishy- 
washy statement that Denfeld and Radford rejected as compromising their position. They 
said it was no good at all, and they weren't going to let him testify."422
The 28 October 1949, Christian Science Monitor presented another view of 
Admiral Sherman's role in the controversy. It cited "Navy sources" as stating that 
Sherman had been ordered to Washington during the hearings at the direction of Secretary 
Johnson and further asserted that Johnson had recalled Sherman at the urging of Air Force 
generals "to have [him] testify in opposition to his brother officers in the Navy." The same 
sources informed the Monitor's reporter that Sherman's immediate superior, Admiral 
Conolly, "intimidated" him into declining to present his testimony.423 This report hardly 
seems credible, yet there is other evidence which strongly supports its interpretation.
The official record of the hearings on unification and strategy does not list 
Sherman as a witness before the Committee.424 The Navy's compilation of the testimony 
o f its uniformed leaders also contains no mention o f any participation by Admiral Sherman
421Letter from Captain Fitzhugh Lee to Davis Merwin, 1 December 1949, quoted in Barlow, p. 364.
422Conolly interview, p. 405.
423"Navy 'Scuttlebutt' Brings Sherman in to Succeed Denfeld," Christian Science Monitor. 28 October 
1949, p. 6.
424House Unification and Strategy Report, p. iv.
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in the affair.425 Nevertheless, included in Secretary Matthews' set of mimeographed copies 
of the Navy witnesses' statements is a seven-page "Statement of Forrest P. Sherman . . . 
Before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives Investigating the 
B-36 and Related Matters." This piece is formatted exactly like all the other witnesses' 
official transcripts. Matthews' staff filed the copies in order o f their presentation, and 
Sherman's is placed, and even dated, on the same day as Secretary Johnson's 21 October 
concluding presentation and one week after Admiral Denfeld concluded the Navy's 
presentation.426 Another copy of Sherman's phantom statement can be found in the Chief 
of Naval Operations' formerly classified "Double Zero" files in the Naval Historical 
Center.427 As described by Conolly, Sherman's statement is very balanced and not nearly 
as emphatic as either Admiral Radford's or Admiral Denfeld's. In it, Sherman supported 
unification, did not attack the B-36, continued the Navy's advocacy for a balanced military 
structure, and stated that morale, at least in the Mediterranean Fleet, was good. A 
statement along these lines could not be reconciled with the remainder of the Navy's 
presentation, and, if given with Secretary Johnson's testimony on the last day of the 
hearings, could only indicate that the Defense Secretary had found a new voice for the 
Navy. Drew Pearson's 31 October 1949 column even mentioned that some Navy sources 
were referring to Sherman as the "Quisling of the Navy" for his support of unification and 
Secretary Johnson.428
Admiral Sherman's role in the hearings, even though he never faced the 
microphones, was certainly greater than any historian has given him credit for. Sherman's 
involvement has never been fully analyzed and, if considered together with his involvement
425"Navy Testimony Transcript."
426Matthews Papers, Box 57, File "Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, 10/21/49," Truman Library.
427Chief of Naval Operations Papers, "Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval 
Historical Center.
428Drew Pearson, "Civilian Rule of Navy Held Basic," Washington Post. 31 October 1949, p. 1.
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in the Bogan matter, reveals a new side to the character of this naval officer. Admiral 
Forrest Sherman has traditionally been listed among the best CNO's o f the twentieth 
century and described as a man of great intellect and integrity, but it seems evident that the 
Admiral prospered from his political machinations as well as his leadership skills.
Admiral Denfeld's testimony has been called "the dramatic focus" o f the 
hearings.429 Up to this point, he had remained Matthews' and Johnson's loyal subordinate, 
issuing his requested clarifying statement after the Bogan correspondence was published, 
accepting Chairman Vinson's offer to delay the hearings, and supporting the Navy 
Secretary's request for the testimony to be heard in executive session. Matthews hoped 
that Denfeld would continue along these lines and "get him off the hook" with the press.430 
According to the New York Herald Tribune. "Louis Johnson was evidently quite free with 
his assurances throughout the hearings that Denfeld would repudiate his Navy colleagues 
and 'toe the Johnson economy line.'"431 Despite the assurances and hopes of the civilians, 
Denfeld ultimately placed his career on the line by siding with his subordinates against the 
leadership of the Department.
The first draft o f Admiral Denfeld's statement was prepared by Captain Charles 
Griffin, a member of the CNO's Office of Special Projects. He delivered the draft to the 
Admiral well before the hearings were to start, but received no feedback for several 
weeks. He recalled that "it soon became quite apparent to me that Admiral Denfeld was 
not going to take any fast action on this because he, himself, was feeling his way along. "432 
As the CNO participated in the practice sessions for the Navy's testimony, he must have
429Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 527.
430Ibid.t p. 528.
431Bert Andrews, 16 October 1949, New York Herald Tribune, p. 1.
432Interview with Charles D. Griffin, Admiral USN (Ret.) by John T. Mason, Volume I, 1970, U. S. 
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1973, U. S. Naval Academy Library, Special 
Collections, p. 187.
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thought often about what effect his testimony would have on the entire case. As the final 
naval witness he could either torpedo the Navy's whole argument and thereby earn the 
enmity of his fellow naval officers, or he could lend his support to those who opposed the 
current implementation of unification and possibly loose his job.
The Navy's public affairs officer, Captain Walter Karig, was a close personal friend 
of Denfeld's. On the day after the Bogan correspondence was published and the same day 
the Secretary had informed the Admiral that "his usefulness as CNO" had been hurt, 
Captain Karig gave Denfeld the results o f a cross-country morale survey his office had 
conducted. He concluded that "the complaint of the Navy and USNR [Reserve] 
personnel, freely volunteered, was that the Navy had no evidence of dynamic leadership." 
Karig encouraged the CNO to "grab the ball and run with it. To put it bluntly and 
impolitically, I think the immediate future of the Navy depends on your actions in the next 
couple of weeks."433 Karig's encouragement certainly added to Admiral Denfeld's internal 
turmoil. In his heart, Denfeld knew that many of the Navy's objections were valid, and he 
could not disagree with Karig's assessment that "morale in the Navy, no matter what 
Secretary Matthews says, is desperately low — due entirely to the lack of internal public 
relations."434 The Navy's personnel did not understand the battles he had been through in 
the JCS over the past two years and the compromises he had had to make to protect as 
much o f the Navy as he could. This was a failure of leadership - his leadership - and he 
must have known it. This might be his best and last opportunity to make both the Navy 
and the American people aware of what had been going on.
433Letter from Captain Karig to Admiral Denfeld, 4 October 1949, in the Chief of Naval Operations 
Papers, "Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval Historical Center.
434Ibid. Another view of this disconnect between what the Navy understood and what Admiral Denfeld 
had been through can be found in Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume II, 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. 1947-1949. (Washington: The Historical Division, Joint 
Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), pp. 335 - 36.
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If the Admiral needed any additional urging, Air Force Secretary Symington's July 
1949 speech to the Air War College would have served this purpose. "When convinced 
that the national interest requires a strong military position we must not permit any fear of 
possible criticism to deflect us from recommending that position."435 The CNO knew 
what the rest o f the naval officers were going to say, and knew that whatever he said, his 
service was still going to be criticized. Only his personal reputation was at risk. Captain 
Griffin recalled that
it took an awful lot of courage for him, the nature of the man, to deliver his 
statement. Because it was a statement in opposition to his own Secretary. . . .
He did it very courageously knowing quite well, full well, that he was laying 
his career on the line. But he did it.436
After hearing Secretary Matthews' and Admiral Radford's testimony, and at the urging of 
his wife and personal staff, Denfeld concluded that he was "serving the Navy ill as a 
would-be conciliator" and would have to take his stand during the hearings.437 Paul 
Hammond states that even Congressman Vinson called the CNO to urge him "to take a 
strong stand alongside his fellow naval officers."438
On Wednesday, 12 October, the CNO called Captain Griffin, Rear Admiral 
Colclough (the Navy's head lawyer), and several other staff members to his office and got 
them started on the revision to his draff statement. Rear Admiral Dennison, at the request 
of Secretary Matthews, also assisted in the process.439 Griffin sensed that the longer the 
CNO had waited to finalize his testimony, the stronger it had become, assessing that "he
435W. Stuart Symington, "Our Air Force Policy,” Vital Speeches of the Day. 1 July 1949, p. 567.
436Griffin interview, p. 193.
437Barlow, p. 252, "Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27, and Potter, Burke. 
p. 325.
438Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 528.
439Griffin interview, p. 189 and Dennison interview, p. 201.
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came under the influence of people such as Radford, Burke, and myself "440 The team 
worked deep into the night, with the final page coming off the typewriter at three in the 
morning. The Admiral did not finish his corrections and additions until eleven o'clock on 
the thirteenth, only two hours before he was to deliver his testimony.441 Therefore he was 
unable to get a copy to the Secretary before he left the Pentagon to go to the hearings, 
ultimately adding to the Secretary's shock at Denfeld's presentation.
The most profound of the changes made by Admiral Denfeld on the morning of his 
testimony was the addition of an opening statement noting his agreement with the 
conclusions of the naval and marine officers who preceded him.442 With this statement, 
the Admiral assumed personal accountability for the words and actions o f his 
subordinates. This seems to have been a very conscious decision on his part to try to lead 
the Navy at the risk of appearing to follow it. Of course, this choice was difficult, and the 
CNO appears to have had some second thoughts about being held responsible for all the 
claims made by naval officers in the hearings. In his verbal presentation of his written 
statement he changed its opening from "I fully support the conclusions presented . . . "  to 
"I fully support the broad conclusions presented . . . "  (emphasis added) Paul Hammond 
notes that this limitation was generally lost on the public, and was "vague" and "feeble."443 
Still, it demonstrates that Denfeld continued to be tom between two loyalties.
Denfeld's lengthy statement was a measured and reasonable summary of the Navy's 
case, concentrating on the areas in which the CNO could add his own experience and 
expertise. He did not attack the B-36 or describe the merits of the flush-deck carrier as
440Griffin interview, p. 193.
441Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63 and Griffin interview, p. 190.
442Dennison interview, p. 201.
443The original language is found in the statement's transcript in the Matthews Papers and in the Navy's 
compilation of the testimony. The minutes of the hearings record the actual testimony before the 
Committee. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 528.
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these subjects had already been covered by the experts brought in for just this purpose. 
Denfeld's testimony focused on unification and the integration of the Navy and naval views 
into the Defense Department's decision-making groups. On some topics he disagreed with 
some o f the aviators, but generally he took his place at the head of the "revolting 
admirals."
Following his introductory statement, the CNO tried to clarify the intent o f his 
testimony, claiming that his words were based on concern for national security rather than 
the parochial interests of his service or his career. He stated that the Navy understood the 
need for economy in defense spending and did not want more money but only the freedom 
to spend what was allocated to it. This point was in reference to the cancellation of the 
United States, where Denfeld believed the Navy should have been allowed to reprioritize 
among its funded programs to build the best weapons possible to meet its assigned 
missions. He had consistently objected to the JCS or the Defense Secretary "arbitrarily" 
intruding into the Navy's weapons programs. Denfeld went on to describe "true 
unification" as "essential," and to assert that the Navy fully supported military unification 
in concept and law.444 In a rare point of agreement with Secretary Matthews, the CNO 
described morale as "high, if by morale you mean enthusiastic loyalty to the nation and the 
service; in other words, the fighting spirit." But his assessment went on to describe a 
"deep apprehension" about the ability of the Navy to carry out its mission with the 
available resources and within the current defense organization. Denfeld stated that naval 
officers were genuinely concerned about the ability of the Navy to defend the United 
States in a future conflict.445
444Admiral Denfeld's statement, in the Matthews Papers, Box 57, File "Admiral Denfeld, 10/13/49," 
Truman Library, pp. 1 - 3 .
445Ibid., pp. 4 - 7 .
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Regarding strategic bombing and the Air Force's capabilities, Admiral Denfeld 
echoed the distinction made by Radford between "strategic bombing," which was long- 
range, high altitude, low accuracy attacks, and "strategic air warfare," which was precisely 
targeted and delivered attacks on targets of strategic value. The CNO strongly advocated 
strategic air warfare as a more effective option and pointed out that naval forces, striking 
from the sea, had an important contribution to make to this type of campaign. He did not 
distinguish between nuclear and conventional attacks, but reiterated his support for the 
evaluations being done by the Weapons System Evaluation Group to determine the effect 
o f an atomic attack and the ability of the Nation's existing assets to deliver the bomb 
accurately and reliably. Regarding the B-36, the Admiral did not pass judgment on the 
aircraft, but firmly stated that it was "illogical, damaging, and dangerous" for anyone to 
move this aircraft beyond the developmental stage without a full evaluation of its 
capabilities to perform its mission. A poor investment made in the production of such an 
untried aircraft could starve the Army and Navy of funds needed for proven weapons 
systems for little return on investment.446
Regarding his own service, the CNO justified the need for a Navy to "exert the 
steady, unrelenting pressure . . . against the homeland of an enemy" regardless o f his naval 
capabilities. "Fleets never in history met opposing fleets for any purpose other than to 
gain control of the sea - not as an end in itself, but so that national power could be exerted 
against the enemy. "447 The Admiral went on to describe the essential place a balanced 
force including aircraft carriers and submarines played in implementing this concept of 
naval power. Additionally, the development of amphibious tactics by the Navy and
446Ibid., pp. 7 -10.
447Ibid., p. 11. This clear and perceptive observation today serves as the basis for the Navy's concept of 
warfare, "From the Sea . . . "
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Marine Corps team was supported, and he asserted that the Nation must maintain a 
’’combined arms" Marine Corps.448
Turning to the administration of unification, the Admiral continued directly to 
attack the procedures and policies of the Defense Department which he believed did not 
improve national security. In the most widely quoted part o f his testimony, Denfeld 
asserted that the Navy was not being treated as a full partner in the unified defense 
establishment. He pointed to the procurement of B-36s during 1949 as a good example of 
how the JCS was not uniformly managing the Defense Department's expenditures. While 
the JCS was allowed to vote to cancel the U. S. S. United States, twice during the year 
the Air Force ordered additional B-36s, doubling their number to 170 and diverting 
millions from other defense programs while the CNO "was under the impression that the 
Air Force planned to cut back the B-36 program."449 The CNO used this issue and the 
cancellation of the flush-deck carrier to reiterate his proposal that each service be allowed 
to manage its own allotted funds in weapons development with the understanding that no 
weapons systems would go into full production without the JCS' approval.
Admiral Denfeld wrapped up his statement by reiterating that the Navy aimed first 
and foremost to improve national defense. Unification was a good concept that was not 
being properly implemented. "Improper operation of unification is more injurious than no 
unification at all."450 The CNO next ventured his opinion on the hearings themselves:
I can understand the view that it is regrettable the basic differences revealed in 
these hearings have been aired in public. I believe, however, it would have been 
immeasurably more regrettable had these issues remained hidden and a false 
sense of security been permitted to prevail.451
448Ibid., pp. 18-21.
449Ibid., p. 25.
450Ibid„ p. 40.
451Ibid.,p. 39.
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To overcome many of the problems identified in his testimony, the Admiral proposed six 
specific actions for the consideration of the Defense Department's leaders. These included 
allowing the Weapons System Evaluation Group to do its job by evaluating the B-36 
before additional aircraft were procured. He also advocated following the National 
Security Act and the Key West Agreement literally rather than continuously pursuing 
changes while the cement of the Pentagon's foundations was still drying. Perhaps his key 
recommendation was to ensure that "the views of a particular service are entitled to 
predominant weight in the determination of the forces needed by that service to fulfill its 
missions."452 This returned everyone's attention to the conflict over the desirability o f the 
"supercarrier" as opposed to the B-36, the former having been scuttled while the latter 
flourished and multiplied.
Denfeld has not been given sufficient credit for the tolerance and factual accuracy 
o f his address. He laid out the Navy's complaints without assigning blame and without 
proposing any solutions not based on the best interests o f the United States.
Unfortunately, the focus o f public attention was on his opening statement by which he 
supported the conclusions of his subordinates. Denfeld had joined the rebels!
Nonetheless, much of his testimony, in fact, echoed statements he had made in Congress 
during the budget debates of the past two years. It was no secret that he objected to the 
carrier's cancellation and to the "arbitrary" reductions in the Navy's allocated funds. At 
least within the JCS it was also well known that he opposed the concentration on strategic 
bombing and the build up of B-36s. Congressman Vinson praised the CNO's statement: 
"Admiral Denfeld, in my judgment you have rendered a great service to the nation by
452Ibid., p. 42.
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making this statement." The Minority Leader, Dewey Short, also complimented the 
Admiral:
"Amen" to your magnificent statement. . . .  I personally appreciate the 
frankness and courage that you have exhibited here. It is something that 
needed to be said and it was forcefully and beautifully said.453
Paul Hammond also gives the CNO credit for his "underlying tone o f self restraint" and 
"real moderation," yet he is in the large minority.454
Secretary Matthews, having had no advance warning that Denfeld was going to 
side with his admirals rather than his civilian superiors, left the session "visibly flushed" 
without speaking to the CNO. Captain Griffin observed that "the Secretary of the Navy 
was just wild."455 Later that day, when newsmen asked the President to comment on 
Denfeld's statements about unification, Truman offered "no comment."456 The 
Washington Post concentrated on Denfeld's opening: "by supporting fully all the 
conclusions in Navy testimony before the House, Admiral Denfeld assumes responsibility 
for statements a good deal more rash than those he himself makes."457 The Washington 
newsmen Robert Allen and William Shannon claimed that "Denfeld, trapped in his own 
tortuous game of pussyfooting, won the resounding applause of his nominal subordinates. 
But that is all he won."458 Air Force Magazine wrote that Denfeld had "rebuffed higher 
authority and by his actions encouraged insubordination within his command."459
453Congressman Vinson's and Congressman Short's statements are quoted in Jurika, p. 206.
454Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 528.
455Griffin interview, p. 191.
456President Truman's 13 October 1949 news conference, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Harry S. Truman 1949. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 231.
457"Navy: Summing Up," Washington Post. 17 October 1949.
458Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman MERRY-GO-ROUND. (New York: The 
Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), p. 457.
459"Revolt of the Admirals," Air Force. December 1949, p. 22.
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In fact, what the Admiral had done was to make the Navy his command again. No 
longer would he remain aloof, attempting to compromise and bargain behind the scenes. 
He had elected to take a firm stand, accept responsibility for his service, and assume the 
leadership position he was assigned to hold. The only question was how long he would be 
allowed to keep his hold on the reins.
On the day after Denfeld spoke, Secretary Matthews told him that he had been 
"stunned" by the CNO's testimony. Denfeld concluded that Matthews would have rather 
had him dissociate his views from the other witnesses and "submerge what he knew from 
my expressions were my true opinions."460 Time magazine wrote that "one thing seemed 
already clear at the end of Denfeld's testimony: either he or Louis Johnson would have to 
step aside: after Denfeld's testimony they could no longer work together."461 Matthews 
had continued to meet with Admirals Conolly and Sherman during the hearings, often for 
over an hour at a time.462 He had several options, but in the charged Washington 
atmosphere, any decision would be fraught with danger.
The CNO's testimony concluded the Navy's presentation. Now it was the turn of 
the other JCS members and the leadership of the Defense Department to answer the 
Navy's charges. Just as they had done during the initial hearings in August, Secretary 
Symington and General Vandenberg presented a well organized and persuasive 
explanation of the Air Force's views on the B-36, strategic bombing, and unification.
They then went on to charge that the Navy's airing of technical details of the B-36 had 
been injurious to national security. Symington thus placed himself in opposition to the 
admirals in taking this "completely uncompromising position."463 Much of the Navy's
460Denfe1d, "Why T Was Fired," p. 63 .
461 "Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27.
462Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 10 - 14 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
463Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 532.
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argument was refuted in these statements, particularly those aspects of the case which 
attacked the efficacy of strategic bombing based on documents of dubious authenticity 
such as "The Strategic Bombing Myth," a pamphlet which had been entered into the 
record by Navy witnesses.
Following the Air Force's devastating rebuttal, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f 
Staff, General of the Army Omar Bradley, took the stand. Bradley had close ties to the 
Air Force and had been viewed as a "sworn enemy" of the Navy following the debates 
over the fiscal year 1950 budget and the decision to cancel the flush-deck carrier.464 
General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief, had provided close air support for Bradley's 
troops during the World War II European campaigns, and the two continued to function 
well as a team. Bradley had moved reluctantly from Army Chief of Staff to CJCS in mid- 
1949, deciding to accept the new position only out of "deep concern about the state of the 
military establishment." He believed that he could serve as a "moderating force" in the 
JCS and "prevent a crippling brawl." Despite these good intentions, he had been 
ineffective in this undertaking, and his testimony now proved that he was hardly a 
"moderating force."465
As the hearings progressed, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs became more and 
more frustrated with the Navy's presentation. He then came to view the naval aviators as 
"insubordinate and mutinous crybabies." Bradley's autobiography records his 
disenchantment at the Navy's criticism of Air Force strategic bombing at a time when the 
admirals were attempting to justify the development of their own capability to deliver 
atomic strikes:
464Bradley and Blair, p. 496.
465Ibid„ p. 505.
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I was profoundly shocked and angered by the Navy's case. The main thrust o f 
it was dishonest. . . For the Navy to raise public doubt about the 
effectiveness - or morality - of atomic bombs was the height of hypocrisy.466
The General also objected to Denfeld's attack on JCS procedures and modified his 
testimony to respond to the CNO's broadsides.467 He felt that "no one had publicly 
censured them [the admirals] for the insubordination, and it did not seem like anyone 
would. I therefore took it upon myself to administer the lash."468 This attack was merely 
the first of many spears to be thrown in Admiral Denfeld's direction now that he had 
publicly sided with the Navy's rebels.
In his very forthright and direct statement, General Bradley placed the blame for 
the Navy's low morale squarely on the shoulders o f Denfeld and the other admirals who 
had not adequately explained to their subordinates the Navy's evolving role in national 
defense: "The esprit of the men is but a mirror of their confidence in their leadership. "469 
He went on to present his famous football analogy comparing the Navy's leaders to "fancy 
dans who won't play, unless they can call the signals."470 The national defense 
organization had evolved from what then-Senator Truman saw in 1944 as "not one team 
and one huddle, but two teams and two huddles," to one team without any unity in 
1949.471 Although the transition to one, fully integrated team had not yet been completed, 
it is difficult to understand why Bradley felt that publicly "administering the lash" was the 
best way to build teamwork.
466Ibid., pp. 508 - 10.
467Barlow, p. 262. Captain Edward Beach, the author of Run Silent Run Deep, was serving as General 
Bradley's naval aide at this time. He recalled that General Bradley put more effort into his speeches than 
most other senior officers, and that this presentation was wholly his own creation. Captain Beach was not 
given a copy of the General's speech until the morning of Bradley's testimony, and was therefore unable to 
warn the General about some of the inflammatory passages in his address.
468Bradley and Blair, p. 510.
469Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 533, and Bradley and Blair, p. 511.
470House Unification and Strategy Report, pp. 536 - 37.
471Truman, "Our Armed Forces MUST be Unified," p. 16.
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The reaction to this latest salvo in the inter-service wars was quick and dramatic. 
The Washington Post wrote that "the top-ranking officer of the armed services accused 
the admirals, in effect, of being prima donnas and sore heads."472 Truman's biographer 
Richard Haynes saw Bradley's "attack on the Navy" as "ill-tempered, not entirely fair, and 
certainly ill-advised."473 The Navy’s OP-23 recorded in its 1950 history of the 
investigation that this statement created a clear impression that "somebody in the Joint 
Chiefs o f Staff had to go."474
Retired Admiral Standiey transmitted his view of the Chairman of the JCS' 
testimony in a 25 October 1949 letter to Congressman Vinson:
To use the expression "fancy dans" in referring to officers who have given their 
lives to the service and are willing to jeopardize their career in giving their 
honest opinion in regard to matters of national security is wholly out o f place 
and unbecoming to a man who occupies the position of chief o f staff of the 
national defense forces.475
Admiral Denfeld objected strongly to some particular items in the General's tongue 
lashing, but was less bristling in his reaction, writing "I do not question that General 
Bradley tries to be fair but he remains an Army officer with a one-service background and 
viewpoint."476 To Chairman Vinson's dismay, the inter-service battle lines had firmed up 
rather than becoming blurred in the hearings.
The Congressional hearings on unification and strategy ended with a fizzle on 21 
October 1949. Secretary Johnson and former-President Hoover presented very low key
472John G. Norris, "Service Chiefs’ Chairman Assails Top Admirals for Hurting Defense," Washington 
Post, 20 October 1949, p. 1.
473Haynes, p. 30.
474"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 38, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36 
Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
475Letter from Admiral W. H. Standley, USN (Ret.) to Representative Carl Vinson, 25 October 1949, in 
the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, File "Correspondence - V," Naval Historical Center.
476Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier's. 25 March 1950, p. 46.
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and non-confrontational statements. Johnson, who certainly could have provided some 
heated exchanges with the Congressional Committee, at times harshly criticized the Navy's 
characterization of JCS procedures and current battle plans, but he made few 
inflammatory statements or accusations to fill the next day's headlines. E. B. Potter wrote 
that Johnson had spoken in a "lofty" and "conciliatory" manner because he felt he had 
already won and should therefore appear statesmanlike to the press.477 President Hoover 
praised the witnesses who had testified before the Committee, calling them "great public 
servants." He noted that "they are all moved by earnest and even emotional interest in our 
national defense. "478
The Navy had tried to convince Congress and the American people that 
maintaining a strong Navy was of vital importance to national security. The sincerity and 
conviction of the admirals came across clearly, but the service's divisions and confused 
priorities also became very evident. Admiral Radford had tried to argue that the Air Force 
was not capable of conducting a strategic bombing campaign, all the while suggesting that 
the Navy could accomplish the same mission with carrier-borne bombers. This 
contradictory assertion gave the entire case a hypocritical appearance and helped the sea 
service's opponents. The internal differences between Secretary Matthews and Admiral 
Denfeld lent an air of personal drama to the hearings which also detracted from the Navy's 
ability to get its message across. The hearings on unification and strategy did little to help 
the Navy in the near term, certainly damaged the service's reputation, and pointed out the 
need for a change in leadership.
477Potter, Burke, p. 326.
478President Hoover's testimony is quoted in the House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 9.
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LOUIS DENFELD GETS "THE AX"
"I feel sure that I have made bitter enemies of Johnson, Symington, and 
Matthews, and that a purge will be in order unless I have the complete backing 
of the Congress and the people." (18 October 1949 - Admiral Denfeld)'179
"A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity of command is 
indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of 
loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official 
ranks. Inability to conform to such requirements for military stability would 
disqualify any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander in Chief."
(27 October 1949 - Secretary Matthews)480
After so many fireworks, it seemed unusual that the hearings ended on such a quiet 
note. Jeffrey Barlow has speculated that Johnson escaped the usually aggressive cross 
examination from pro-Navy Congressmen by reaching a secret agreement in a meeting 
with Vinson and other Committee members the night before his testimony. Johnson was 
accompanied by Matthews, Symington, Admiral Denfeld and General Vandenberg at this 
session, where Barlow believes they worked with Vinson to end the hearings as soon as 
possible.481 There is no transcript of this meeting, but this interpretation seems plausible. 
The cards were already on the table. Congress would have many more opportunities to 
assail Johnson's economy programs. Now was the time to start healing the wounds and 
addressing the problems which had been identified in the three weeks of testimony.
Admiral Denfeld's testimony had offered six steps to take following the hearings, 
but there was no consensus on any course of action after this prolonged public battle. 
OP-23's history stated that "the B-36 hearings closed in an atmosphere of uncertainty with
479Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 18 October 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 6, File 
"Correspondence - W," Naval Historical Center.
480Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in Harry S. Truman, Official 
Files, File "Navy, 1949," Truman Library.
48barlow, p. 363.
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everyone wondering 'Where do we go from here?'"482 Defense Secretary Johnson had 
some definite ideas which he transmitted to the service secretaries on Monday, 24 
October:
There must be no 'reprisals' as a result of the hearings. We must, o f course, 
continue to follow the policy of'selecting the best man for the job,' but no one 
is to be punished for any testimony that he may have given in the past, or that 
he may give in the future, before a Congressional Committee. This is not to 
say, of course, that there will not be some changes in assignments within the 
Department of Defense. Such changes will occur continuously, whenever any 
individuals show themselves to lack the qualifications for jobs to which they 
have been assigned, and as other individuals show themselves to possess the 
necessary qualifications.483
The warning against reprisals was needed, because Johnson knew the Committee would 
react strongly to any indication that its ability to obtain trustworthy testimony from 
military personnel was being hindered. Chairman Vinson had made himself very clear on 
that point. Johnson's letter is therefore worth reading carefully because it provides the 
rationale he wanted the Secretaries to use if they wished to "change any assignments" 
following the hearings.
In Admiral Denfeld's case, it must be remembered that before the hearings began 
Matthews had told the CNO that his usefulness had been hindered by the release of the 
Bogan correspondence and the poor administrative practices revealed by that episode. 
Johnson had been present on 5 October when the Navy Secretary mentioned this matter to 
the President and understood it provided a plausible excuse to "change" the CNO's 
assignment, even if it was Denfeld's testimony which ultimately precipitated his removal.
482"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 39, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36 
Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
483Letter from Secretary Johnson to the Service Secretaries, 24 October 1949, in Louis A. Johnson, 
Statements and Speeches of Louis A. Johnson. Secretary of Defense March 29. 1949 - September 12,
1950. vol. II, p. 517, unpublished mimeographs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian, 
Washington.
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Johnson and Matthews understood Congress' aversion to reprisals against witnesses and 
had already developed a strategy to work around this objection if they decided to fire 
Admiral Denfeld.
Following the conclusion of the bitter hearings, Secretary Johnson set up a 
"friendly golf match" between the members of the JCS to permit them to "shake hands and 
forget" the bitterness. Reportedly a pleasant atmosphere prevailed among the Service 
Chiefs and, true to form, Air Force Generals Vandenberg and Norstadt won the two dollar 
golfing prize.484 The generals and the admirals had proven they could still play together, 
but could they work together following the public bickering?
Admiral Denfeld understood his precarious position, both on and off the golf 
course. His service had "lost" the hearings, and he was at odds with his civilian leader. 
Captain Holden, a reserve lawyer, wrote the CNO on 25 October to explain that he was 
"working for you [Denfeld] through my political contacts."485 Denfeld was grateful, 
definitely recognizing that he needed the help:
I appreciate so much what you are doing and know you will continue to carry 
the banner for me. We cannot let anything happen to any of the people 
participating in the recent hearings because frankly the Navy and its associates 
are hanging in the balance. . . . The situation at the moment is quite delicate. I 
can't tell just what will happen. You may rest assured that with the exception of 
one or two, the navy is completely united.486
Although the CNO did not identify the "one or two" he believed were not united behind 
his banner, Vice Admiral Sherman was surely one of the naval officers Denfeld saw as
484Phillip S. Meilinger, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," 
Parameters. September 1989, p. 95.
485Letter from Captain Edward Holden, Jr., USNR to Admiral Denfeld, 25 October 1949, in the Denfeld 
Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
486Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Captain Edward Holden, Jr., USNR, 26 October 1949, in the Denfeld 
Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
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taking a different course. Sherman had gone back to his fleet in the Mediterranean but 
was on the CNO's mind during this tense period.487 Denfeld certainly had the time to 
speculate on the possibilities, since he was practically shunned by Matthews following his 
testimony, only spending a total of 52 minutes with the Secretary between 21 and 28 
October.488
Many sources reported that rumors of the CNO's impending removal were 
circulating in Washington during the weeks following his testimony and the end of the 
hearings. The Christian Science Monitor noted that these rumblings were "originating in 
Pentagon corridors adjacent to Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson's office."489 The 
Washington Star's John Giles attributed a statement placing Denfeld's removal in the near 
future to "one high official in the Pentagon," and interviewed Denfeld's aides who insisted 
that the Admiral had no intention o f stepping down voluntarily and was unaware o f any 
plans to fire him.490 OP-23's history of the investigation noted that "it looked as if the 
Administration were sending up trial ballons [sic] to test public sentiment about the Navy 
and particularly about Admiral Denfeld."491 The 22 October Omaha World Herald even 
went as far as to predict that Forrest Sherman would be Denfeld's successor.492
487Barlow cites Lieutenant Commander Frank Manson, one of the CNO's personal staff assistants, as 
remembering Denfeld being "incensed" at Sherman's presence in Washington during the hearings. 
Manson felt that Denfeld "had a pretty good notion of what the call [Sherman's visit] was all about."
(p. 271.)
488Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 2 1 - 2 8  October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
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491"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 39, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36 
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The CNO recognized that his position was tenuous, but even after testifying in 
opposition to Matthews, Denfeld did not believe that he would be fired.493 After all, he 
had just been nominated and confirmed for a second term beginning in December. He had 
many influential friends on Capitol Hill, and the Committee's warnings against reprisals 
seemed to provide him with some job security. The politically astute Admiral hoped that 
the Republicans would not make the Navy's case into a partisan issue. In an 18 October 
letter to Dudley White, Denfeld wrote that bipartisan Congressional support would be 
needed to protect the Navy from the civilian leadership of the Defense Department.494 
The CNO was riding out the storm while awaiting the report of the House hearings. This 
report, due to come out after the Congressional winter recess, would determine if his 
testimony had been effective and would guide his future strategy for the protection of his 
service's and the Nation's interests.
Denfeld hoped that he would be allowed to continue to advocate the Navy's 
interests as Chief o f Naval Operations. In his letter to Dudley White, the Admiral 
commented on the possible "purge" which might be made of the Navy's radicals: "I don't 
mind the purge, but I think for the good of the country, it would be well for me to 
continue on no matter how difficult it is for me personally. My opponents will do a lot of 
dirty infighting I know, but I have got to be prepared for that."495 During the hearings 
Denfeld had finally made the decision to lead his service by forcefully endorsing the 
majority opinion of his fellow officers, and now he wanted to continue at the head of the 
Navy team.
493Griffin interview, p. 194, and Barlow, p. 269.
494Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 18 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File 
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Secretary Matthews was of exactly the opposite mind during this period. He 
thought that the senior naval officers had gotten out o f control and that he needed to 
reassert his authority. On Friday, 14 October, the day after Denfeld's shocking statement, 
Matthews called Admiral Nimitz in New York "in urgent need o f advice."496 The 
Secretary agreed to meet the retired Fleet Admiral the next day in New York to escape 
controversy-filled Washington in order to discuss the state o f the Navy's leadership.
Nimitz's account of this meeting, as told by E. B. Potter in the Admiral's 
biography, is very detailed, yet hardly believable in its depiction of the Secretary. 
Matthews was an experienced lawyer who had firmly allied himself with Secretary 
Johnson and President Truman during the hearings. He was in a strong position, even 
though his subordinates had disagreed with his views during the hearings. Nimitz recalled 
that Matthews was "in a state o f agitation" and that "he said he felt himself to be the 
victim of a conspiracy, with Denfeld the principal conspirator. "497 Continuing this 
portrayal of Matthews as an incompetent weakling, Nimitz quoted the Secretary's 
complaint that "Denfeld never tells me anything. Is that right?" Nimitz indicated his reply 
was conditioned by his desire
not to appear critical of Denfeld whom he liked, but in all honesty, he had to 
admit that the Chief of Naval Operations had no business concealing facts 
about the Navy from the Secretary. "When I was CNO," said Nimitz, "I 
reported to Mr. Forrestal every morning."498
Admiral Denfeld was certainly guilty of not keeping the Secretary informed of his 
intentions regarding his testimony, but considering that he had not made his final decision 
until the night before his statement, there were mitigating circumstances. The CNO and
496Potter, Nimitz. p. 446.
497Ibid.
498Ibid.
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the Secretary were together on many occasions during the first week of the hearings and 
must have discussed the ongoing testimony and Denfeld's indecision on his own statement, 
but the record is silent on this point.499 The papers of Secretaries Sullivan and Matthews 
indicate that Denfeld routinely met with his civilian supervisors and shared as much as 
possible o f his concerns with the two Secretaries. This relationship must be contrasted 
with the oft-repeated story from Nimitz's tenure that Secretary Forrestal had to resort to 
walking to the Navy's communications room himself to look at messages the admirals had 
screened from him.
E. B. Potter's biography of Nimitz provides additional material on Nimitz's 
impression of Secretary Matthews:
[Nimitz] seems to have felt pity for this well-meaning but confused man who 
was caught between his duty to support the Navy and loyalty to his friend and 
patron, Secretary Johnson. The extent of Matthews' unfamiliarity with naval 
matters was revealed by his final question: "How can I get rid of Denfeld? It 
seemed impossible for a man to be Secretary of the Navy for six months and 
not know the answer to that elementary question. Nimitz patiently explained.
. . .  He told Matthews that if he really believed he could not work with 
Admiral Denfeld, he should write to Mr. Truman, asking that Denfeld be 
transferred to some other duty, and stating the reasons for the request. He 
pointed out, however, that Matthews should not list among his reasons 
Denfeld's statements before the Vinson Committee, since all officials had been 
guaranteed against reprisals for their testimony."500
In fact, the removal of Admiral Denfeld had been discussed with Secretary Johnson and 
the President on 5 October, and the Secretary's own testimony had made it clear he 
understood the reprisal problem.
499Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 - 1 3  October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library. Neither Matthews' later press conferences nor Denfeld's articles in Collier's mention whether or 
not Denfeld's options were discussed with the Secretary prior to 13 October. But, given their frequent 
meetings during the early part of October, it would have been very difficult for them to have avoided this 
topic.
50°potter, Nimitz, p. 447.
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Potter's account, although certainly putting the subject of his book in a good light, 
can not be substantiated in either the tone or substance of this characterization o f the 
Secretary. It is true that Matthews met with the ex-CNO in New York to discuss the 
removal of Denfeld.501 But Nimitz was known to be friendly with Denfeld and had 
worked with him for years. There is no reason to believe that the normally level-headed 
Matthews would put himself in such an awkward and vulnerable position with Nimitz 
unless there was another reason for the meeting. If he needed advice on how to fire 
Admiral Denfeld, Secretary Johnson would have been a much more available and suitable 
source. Jeffrey Barlow agrees that it is not plausible to suggest that Nimitz would have 
needed to remind the lawyer Matthews of Vinson's warning against reprisals.502
A more plausible reason for this meeting between the Navy's beleaguered 
Secretary and retired Fleet Admiral Nimitz was the fact that Nimitz was reportedly one of 
the few naval officers Truman trusted.503 Nimitz's statement during the hearings had been 
calm and reasonable, and his proven abilities could certainly help Matthews restore order 
in the service if he could be persuaded to follow Matthews' and Johnson's lead. It 
certainly seems plausible that the President, in the 5 October meeting, may have suggested 
bringing back the ex-CNO to restore order if Denfeld needed to be relieved following the 
hearings. Matthews may have been on a mission to sound out Nimitz about this 
possibility. In fact, Potter's book notes that Truman did call Nimitz and offer him the 
CNO position after Denfeld's removal was announced.504 Francis Matthews may have
50 Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 13 - 15  October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library, and letter from Admiral Nimitz to Father Maurice Sheehy, 13 February 1950, cited in Barlow, 
p. 364. In this letter, Nimitz reports that Matthews told him about his 4 October meeting with the CNO 
and his decision to remove Denfeld based on the Bogan incident.
502Barlow, p. 364.
5°3potter, Burke, p. 327, and Nimitz. p. 420.
504Potter, Nimitz. p. 447.
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been unfamiliar with the Navy, but he was far from the confused weakling portrayed by 
Potter.
Secretary Johnson was certainly also deeply involved in the decision whether or 
not to retain Denfeld as CNO. Paolo Coletta asserts that Denfeld's endorsement to the 
Bogan letter had made Johnson so "furious" that he instructed Matthews to keep the CNO 
in line or he would cancel Denfeld's reappointment. Coletta goes on to postulate that this 
warning prompted the Navy Secretary to court Admiral Conolly and then Vice Admiral 
Sherman as potential replacements during the hearings.505 General Eisenhower's papers 
also attest to Johnson's anger at Denfeld's actions. A transcript of a telephone 
conversation between Johnson and Eisenhower on 18 October 1949 records that Johnson 
asked for Eisenhower's help in opposing Denfeld (Eisenhower was scheduled to testify on 
20 October). Johnson declared that the CNO's testimony had been "an attack against the 
President and civilian control and economy, [and that the admirals] have really gone below 
the belt this time."506
Johnson's 24 October letter to the Service Secretaries lays out his initial plans for a 
"constructive program" to enable the Department to "go forward promptly and speedily 
with the strengthening of our military team" following the hearings. He noted that "some 
people have described the task we now face as one of'picking up the pieces.' I do not so 
regard it."507 Johnson intended to carry on with business as usual by not altering his basic 
plans while adjusting his tactics to accommodate the new lessons learned from the 
hearings. These plans included promises that no reprisals would be made, that the
505Paolo Coletta, "Louis E. Denfeld," in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations. 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 201.
506Barlow, p. 255.
507Letter from Secretary Johnson to the Service Secretaries, 24 October 1949, in Louis A. Johnson, 
Statements and Speeches of Louis A. Johnson. Secretary of Defense March 29. 1949 - September 12 
1950. Vol. II, unpublished mimeograph, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian, Washington.
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Department should improve its overall relationship with Congress, and that the services 
should adhere to the current distribution of roles and missions. In other areas, he sated 
that "my own views as to the steps we should take are by no means definitive as yet."508 
But, concerning the future of Admiral Denfeld, he already appears to have made his 
decision.
Regardless of his stated position on reprisals, it seems clear that Johnson had 
already made up his mind to remove Denfeld by the end of the hearings and was only 
waiting for Congress to recess and the Presidential approval to be processed before 
making the decision public. Robert Love and Jeffrey Barlow note that Drew Pearson's 
diaries record a 20 October meeting with Johnson where the Secretary stated 
"categorically that Denfeld will be kicked out and replaced by Forrest Sherman."509 This 
private comment to a member o f the media was made even before the hearings were 
completed. Truman's Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Dennison, felt that Matthews made the 
"arbitrary" decision to remove the CNO "probably with the concurrence of Johnson and 
maybe more than concurrence."510 Given Johnson's aggressive character and record, and 
the solid relationship between Matthews and the Secretary of Defense, it is inconceivable 
that Matthews made a unilateral decision to remove the CNO and that the Secretary of 
Defense had to be persuaded to take this course. Johnson's only concern was to avoid any 
political opposition if he appeared to violate his pledge against reprisals.
Secretaries Matthews and Johnson met with the President on Tuesday, 25 October 
to present their recommendation regarding Admiral Denfeld's future as CNO. The 
President later disclosed that the final decision to transfer Denfeld to other duties was
508Ibid.
509Barlow, p. 272, and Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U. S. Naw. 1942-1991. (Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1992), p. 332.
510Dennison interview, p. 200.
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made at this meeting.511 The only thing left to do was to process the paperwork. The 
chosen mechanism was to have Secretary Matthews send through Johnson to the 
President a letter requesting Presidential approval to transfer the CNO. This procedure 
placed the primary responsibility for the decision on Matthews rather than the politically 
ambitious Johnson. It also allowed the Navy Secretary to document his rationale for the 
transfer rather than letting the press and Congress draw the obvious conclusion that the 
action was a reprisal. The three officials understood that the decision would be seen as a 
reprisal regardless of their stated rationale, so Johnson called Senator Tydings, the 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to notify him of the pending transfer 
and to obtain his concurrence before announcing the decision. Meanwhile, Secretary 
Matthews spent most of Wednesday, 26 October at home, presumably drafting his letter 
to the President.512
Secretary Matthews' 27 October 1949 submission to the President was a carefully 
crafted letter which never mentioned the CNO's testimony or any specific deficiencies as 
causing his removal.513 It hinted that Denfeld was not fully supportive of unification, but 
never explained the details of his opposition. Matthews included a brief description of the 
4 October meeting with the CNO where he had "frankly stated to him that I feared his 
usefulness as Chief of Naval Operations had terminated." It also noted for the record that 
"the possibility o f Admiral Denfeld's replacement" had been discussed with the President 
and the Secretary of Defense on 5 October.514 Once again, no details of this discussion 
are provided.
511Omaha World Herald. 28 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
512Barlow, p. 274.
513Copies of Matthews' request and Truman's response are attached as Appendix III.
514Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, p. 2, in the Matthews Papers, 
File "Denfeld," Truman Libraiy.
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While this scenario could serve to deflect any criticism that the firing was a reprisal 
for Denfeld's testimony, it does not explain why the President and the leaders o f the 
Defense Department permitted Denfeld to testify. The Congressional hearings were 
receiving extensive press coverage, and any statement by the CNO was sure to make 
headlines. If  Matthews felt that Denfeld understood "his usefulness as CNO had 
terminated" there was no reason for him to expect the Admiral's testimony to support the 
Administration's position. Certainly, when Denfeld did not discuss his statement with 
Matthews in advance, the Secretary must have suspected that the CNO was going to 
oppose his position. Although it seems illogical that Denfeld was permitted to testify as a 
"lame duck," this anomaly was never addressed by the Secretary. The most likely 
explanation for this inconsistency is that the final firing decision had not yet been made, 
due either to Matthews' or Truman's desire to see how the hearings played out.
Ignoring this question, the Navy Secretary continued his letter to the President.
He explained his rationale for renominating the Admiral for a second term, citing the 
expected benefit o f "continuity" as one of the most significant reasons for his decision. He 
also described his "harmonious relationship" with the CNO at the time of the 
renomination, and his belief that they "were in complete agreement on all important 
questions" affecting the Department.515 But, after making this recommendation,
Matthews soon found that his "expectations would not be realized." Relations between 
the two men were described as becoming "increasingly difficult." The Secretary then 
hinted that the Admiral did not have sufficient "loyalty" and "respect for authority" to 
continue in his present assignment. This situation forced Matthews to conclude that it was 
"utterly impossible . . .  to administer the Department of the Navy in the manner 1 believe 
vital to national security." As the clinching argument, the Secretary explained his
515Ibid.
161
commitment to "civilian control over the military establishment" and requested the 
"transfer of Admiral Denfeld to other important duties" for the good of the country.516 
Matthews' letter did not directly accuse the CNO of any mismanagement or direct 
opposition, it only highlighted an unacceptable situation and proposed his prompt removal.
President Truman's response was direct and concise. He noted that he had 
"devoted considerable thought" to the Navy's problems "over a long period of time." And 
concluded that "the action which you recommend meets with my approval." He 
authorized Matthews to "carry out the transfer which you recommend."517 Truman's 
response does not even mention Admiral Denfeld by name or position, seemingly ignoring 
the man behind the situation. Despite the four pages of correspondence which effected 
Denfeld's removal, nowhere is the reason for his dismissal clearly stated.
The 4 p.m. presidential news conference of 27 October contained only one agenda 
item. President Truman announced he had received and approved a request from 
Secretary Matthews asking that he transfer Admiral Denfeld to other duties.518 The 
reason for the transfer was announced as the Admiral's endorsement of the Bogan letter 
and "other unspecified acts of disloyalty," specifically omitting the Admiral's testimony 
before the House. One of the first questions asked of Truman was whether or not Admiral 
Sherman would be Denfeld's replacement. The President declined to answer this query, 
but later stated that he had not yet decided whom he wanted to appoint. Another reporter 
asked if Admiral Denfeld had been informed of the President's decision to transfer him.
This time, Truman responded, "I suppose so," prompting another correspondent to ask if
516Ibid., pp. 2 - 3.
517Letter from President Truman to Secretary Matthews, 27 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
518Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1949. (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 531 -35 provides a transcript of the entire conference 
including the letter from Secretary Matthews and Truman's response.
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the President himself had told Denfeld. Truman replied that he "had no conversation with 
anybody but the Secretary of the Navy" on the matter, later clarifying this by noting 
Johnson had also been present.519 Despite their careful preparations, this one step had 
slipped through the cracks of Matthews' and Johnson's plans. Adding to the apparent 
callousness of the removal was the fact that, until 1949, October 27th had been celebrated 
as Navy Day. 27 October 1949 was certainly no holiday for the Navy.
Admiral Denfeld was in his Pentagon office when Truman made his announcement. 
A startled Admiral Price came into Denfeld's office and informed him that his staff had 
overheard a radio report of the President's announcement removing him as CNO. This 
unexpected news was quickly confirmed by a yeoman with a news ticker tear sheet.520 
Admiral Griffin stated that Denfeld "took it like a man but he was, no question about it, 
hurt that the President had seen fit to fire him without even calling him and telling him in 
person."521 The CNO had not met with Secretary Matthews since the morning of 
Tuesday, 25 October and had not been given the courtesy of even a telephone call to 
prepare him for the President's announcement.522 Rear Admiral Dennison, who 
considered the CNO an "old and dear friend" asked Truman if it would be acceptable for 
him, as the President's Aide, to visit Denfeld at his home the night of his removal. Truman 
had no objection, so Dennison spent the evening with the Denfelds, noting that the 
Admiral "wasn't resentful. I think he was really relieved because of the intolerable 
situation he'd been in . . ,"523
519Ibid.
520Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14. Admiral Griffin's account of this episode states that Denfeld, 
Griffin and Admiral Ingersoll (DCNO for Operations and Plans) were in a meeting when Rear Admiral 
Dennison called to notify the CNO about the announcement. (Griffin interview, p. 191.) I have used 
Denfeld's scenario, since he should have the most reliable memories of this event.
521 Griffin interview, p. 191.
522Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 24 - 28 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
523Dennison interview, pp. 141, 201 - 02.
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Later, when Secretary Matthews found out that Dennison had visited the fired 
CNO, he was furious at him for having done so. Dennison reported that Matthews "could 
hardly speak," but did say, "That's the most disloyal act that I can possibly imagine. Here 
an officer's been fired and you go up to see him." As soon as Dennison told Matthews 
that President Truman had given advance approval of this visit, "the Secretary's face fell a 
mile."524 This incident well illustrates the character and competence of Francis Matthews. 
He was a brilliant lawyer and administrator, and covered all the contingencies in his 
decision to replace Admiral Denfeld except the one action of common, human decency 
that would have been the first concern of any experienced leader.
To ensure its smooth operation, the Navy needed managers to direct its day-to-day 
activities and administration, and leaders to inspire the institution with vision, commitment 
and a sense of purpose.525 Matthews was a manager of the Navy, not its leader. He was 
not inconsiderate, only inexperienced in leading and motivating people. Denfeld, who had 
finally assumed a true leadership position following his Congressional testimony, was now 
able to rally the Navy as a courageous leader wronged by impersonal government 
bureaucrats.
Matthews called Admiral Denfeld to his office at 10 a.m. on 28 October to discuss 
his removal from office. This meeting was tense and uncomfortable and lasted for only 
nineteen minutes.526 Admiral Denfeld later described Secretary Matthews as being "cold" 
with "no pretense of politeness or remorse."527 The businessman Secretary treated this 
decision like a corporate transaction, not like the end of a patriotic career. Matthews
524Ibid., p. 202.
525A good, concise differentiation between managers and leaders can be found in Christopher H. Johnson, 
Captain, USN, (Ret), "Where's the Chief?," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. February 1995, pp. 64 - 66.
526Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 28 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman 
Library.
527Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14.
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recalled that "we had a satisfactory talk, and parted as good mutual friends." He went on 
to state that "there is nothing personal in what I have done. It is a matter of policy and 
principle. I have no ill-will toward anyone in the Navy and I am not going to entertain any 
such thoughts."528 The trouble was that this should have been treated as more of a 
personal matter. Denfeld felt "particularly bitter" about the manner in which he received 
word of Matthews' decision.529 This incident only heightened the tensions between 
Denfeld and Matthews resulting from the CNO's removal.
Matthews stated that he did not inform the CNO of the President's impending 
announcement because he did not know whether or not the Defense Secretary and the 
President would approve his request and, if they did not, he did not wish to have already 
hurt the Admiral's feelings.530 Prematurely informing the CNO of his impending removal 
also would have damaged Matthews' authority if Johnson or Truman had overruled the 
Secretary. While it seems highly unlikely that either Johnson or Truman would have 
rejected the request, especially after having concurred in this decision at their 25 October 
meeting, the potential cost of informing the CNO that he was to be removed, then having 
the President keep him on, would have destroyed the Secretary's ability to function in his 
position.
Historians have consistently objected to Matthews' failure to inform the CNO of 
Truman's planned statement. Coletta claims that the firing of the Admiral "was made in an 
utterly gross manner."531 Even Jeffrey Barlow describes as "pitiful" Matthews' excuse for
528Omaha World Herald. 29 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
529Letter from Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library, p. 8.
530Barlow, p. 365.
53Coletta, Paolo E. The United States N aw  and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: 
University of Delaware Press, 1981), p. 223.
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not informing Denfeld of his firing before the President's announcement.532 Nevertheless, 
when more "considerate actions" were taken in a very similar situation in 1994, the result 
was even more damaging to the Defense Department. Shortly after taking office, new 
Navy Secretary Dalton announced that he had recommended the removal o f his CNO, 
Admiral Kelso, for poor leadership during the Tailhook scandal. When the Secretary of 
Defense rejected Dalton's request, both Kelso's and Dalton's effectiveness had been 
seriously degraded. The astute lawyer Matthews may have actually considered this 
possibility and opted to hurt Denfeld rather than risk other embarrassments. But no 
matter what Matthews' concerns were, he could have clearly communicated the fact that 
Denfeld's removal was a real possibility. This was not done and the opportunity to 
forewarn Denfeld was lost. Admiral Denfeld was forced to pay the price for the 
President's haste to make his announcement and Matthews' and Johnson's failure to act 
with any sense of common courtesy.
Matthews' letter had not recommended firing the CNO, but instead, transferring 
him to other important duties. The Navy Secretary saw this as an important distinction 
and often criticized reporters who described his action as a "firing."533 A transfer was 
certainly less susceptible to being seen as a reprisal, and Secretary Matthews still 
reportedly held the Admiral in great esteem. After meeting with Denfeld on the morning 
of 28 October, the Secretary announced that he was trying to arrange a new assignment 
for the CNO "where he could complete his outstanding Navy career with distinction."534 
Regardless o f the new position, Denfeld would have to accept a cut in pay as well as loss 
o f face, since his position as CNO included a tax-free expense account o f four to five
532Barlow, p. 365.
533Transcript of Secretary Matthews' appearance on "Meet the Press," 28 January 1950, p. 5, in the 
Matthews Papers, File "Speeches," Truman Library.
534"Denfeld Offered New Navy Post," Washington Star. 28 October 1949, p. 1.
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thousand dollars and handsome living quarters.535 He would also lose his status as the 
senior officer in the Navy to his relief.
The new position Matthews offered Denfeld turned out to be Admiral Conolly's 
job in London as Commander in Chief of the Navy’s forces in the North Eastern Atlantic 
and Mediterranean. Conolly had been in this billet for three years and was due to be 
transferred. Admiral Denfeld was not sure if he wanted to accept this new position or 
even to remain in the service because he was eligible to retire at any time. He therefore 
asked the Secretary to give him sixty days o f leave to allow him to think the possibilities 
over. Matthews agreed and the meeting broke up. Although Matthews insisted he did not 
"fire" the CNO, this semantics argument was weak. He had removed the Admiral from his 
current position and was prepared to shift him to one of lower pay, status, and 
importance. In this writer's view, the Secretary's action clearly meets the criteria to be 
termed a firing.
The immediate reaction to Denfeld's firing was highly emotional. The Omaha 
World Herald recorded that "two admirals wept openly when they visited Admiral Denfeld 
to express sympathies."536 In the afternoon of the 28th, "a demonstrating crowd of 250 
Navy enlisted men" packed the CNO's office to offer their condolences. Their spokesman 
told Denfeld, "Admiral, when you are President we hope you will put the Navy back on its 
feet."537 On Saturday the 29th, Matthews and Denfeld had been scheduled to attend the 
Navy - Notre Dame football game in Baltimore. Denfeld appeared and received a 
"standing ovation from the Midshipmen that lasted fully three minutes." Matthews
535"New Leader Being Sought by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 29 October 1949, in the Douglas 
County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
536Omaha World Herald. 28 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
537Ibid., and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 546.
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canceled his appearance just before kickoff.538 Denfeld was accompanied to the game by 
Father Maurice Sheehy of Catholic University, well known as a friend of both the CNO 
and the Navy Secretary.
Sheehy knew all the key players in this incident and had strong ties of personal 
friendship to Louis Denfeld. His bond to Matthews was also strong, given both men's 
commitment to the Navy and the Catholic Church. The three had shared dinner as 
recently as 2 October 1949. Regardless of his feelings of friendship for both men, Sheehy 
quickly lashed out at Matthews for his action. In a hastily scheduled 27 October news 
conference, the Catholic leader declared that those responsible for the removal of Admiral 
Denfeld "have committed a heinous crime against their country and against national 
security." He went on to term 27 October 1949 "another day of infamy."539 Sheehy sent 
five telegrams to Matthews between 27 October and 2 November urging him to either 
reconcile with the CNO or resign. Finally, after receiving no response, he concluded his 
efforts on 2 November and telegrammed the Secretary, "May God forgive you."540
Admiral Denfeld was still serving as CNO during these first few days following 
Truman's announcement pending the identification of his relief The Admiral was deeply 
hurt, but had decided that he had no regrets. He wrote to Captain C. W. Wilkins on 31 
October that
you probably know as well as anyone what a terrific time we were having in 
the JCS. Finally, I just had to make it an issue. Result - 1 am no longer CNO!
538"Midshipmen Roar Approval of Admiral Denfeld at Game," Washington Star, 30 October 1949, p. 5.
539"Sheehy Flays Ouster of Denfeld, Calls on Matthews to Resign," Washington Star. 28 October 1949, 
p. 3.
540Telegrams from Father Maurice Sheehy to Secretary Matthews, 27, 28, 30 October and 1 and 2 
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I am very proud of what I did and at least can look myself straight in the eye
for the balance of my life.541
Matthews issued orders to his CNO on 1 November detaching him from his 
position following the announcement that President Truman had nominated Vice Admiral 
Forrest Sherman to be the new Chief of Naval Operations. Quite in keeping with recent 
Defense Department operating procedures, Denfeld first learned of this nomination from 
his driver who had heard about it on a radio newscast. Denfeld’s orders of 1 November 
directed him upon their receipt to "stand relieved of your duties as Chief of Naval 
Operations. You will report to the Secretary of the Navy for duty pending further 
assignment." A more specific set of orders was delivered to him on 3 November, 
authorizing his requested sixty days of leave to begin on 10 November and directing him 
to report to the Commandant o f the First Naval District in Boston for duty upon the 
completion of his leave period.542 The Secretary attached a personal endorsement to the 
second set, specifically granting Denfeld the authority "to continue to bear the title and 
wear the uniform of an Admiral, U. S. Navy."543 This permission was not given lightly. 
Most senior officers who are relieved for cause are reduced in rank or immediately retired 
because the number of officers authorized to hold Admiral's rank in the Navy is limited by 
Congress. Since Denfeld retained his four stars, the Navy was unable to promote another 
officer. With this small token of appreciation, Louis Denfeld left the Pentagon to ponder 
his future.
541Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Captain C. W. Wilkins, the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. 
Manchester. 31 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, File "Correspondence - W," Naval Historical 
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542Military Change of Duty Orders, from Secretary Matthews to Admiral Denfeld, 1 November and 3 
November 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
543Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Admiral Denfeld, 3 November 1949, in the Matthews 
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRING
"I am unimportant, but what happened to me, and the manner of its 
happening, are of the greatest moment to the nation." (1950 - Admiral 
Denfeld)544
"Admiral Denfeld has been made to walk the plank for having testified before 
the Armed Services Committee." (28 October 1949 - Congressman 
Vinson)545
The removal o f Admiral Denfeld did not end the problems of unification or help 
the leadership o f the Defense Department settle on a effective and affordable national 
security strategy. The root issues remained. The services still could not agree on the 
nature of future warfare, and defense budgets continued to be sparse. Denfeld had not 
been the cause of the Department's difficulties, he had been only one man trying to do the 
best he could for his service and his country under adverse circumstances. His removal 
had sent a clear message to all senior officers that to disagree with Secretary Johnson's 
policies in public was, in effect, a resignation. Congress also reached this conclusion and 
challenged the policies o f the Department as threatening the ability of Congress to 
properly carry out its constitutional function to raise and organize armies and navies. 
Although Johnson had ended the "Revolt o f the Admirals" with his firing of Louis 
Denfeld, the dust was far from settled.
Denfeld's removal as Chief of Naval Operations unified the Navy as few other 
events or individuals could have done. When the crowd of enlisted well-wishers visited 
the CNO's office on 28 October, Denfeld "faltered with emotion" and told the crowd that 
this demonstration of support was "the most wonderful thing that has happened to me in 
all my years in the Navy."546 Dynamic leadership for constructive purposes had proven
544Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 13.
545Press statement by Congressman Carl Vinson, 28 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, File 
"Correspondence - V," Naval Historical Center.
546"Denfeld Offered New Navy Post," Washington Star, 28 October 1949, p. 1.
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successful in unifying the Navy behind the CNO where two years of conciliatory behavior 
and compromises had failed. The departing CNO's response to his supporters was to urge 
them to continue the fight to save the Navy and ensure national security. "The Navy is 
bigger than any individual, bigger than me, bigger than anyone in government, but only as 
big as all o f us together. In order to keep it that way, the thing to do is go back to your 
jobs and do the best you can."547 Nevertheless, Navy spirits sagged. The following "New 
Prayer for the Navy in 1949 A.D. (After Denfeld)" was circulated in the Navy's offices:
Our Father, who art in Washington
Truman be thy name
Thy Navy's done . . . The Air Force won
On the Atlantic as on the Pacific
Give us this day our appropriations
And forgive us our accusations
As we forgive our accusers
And lead us not into temptation, but
Deliver us from Matthews and Johnson
For thine is the power, O B-36
The Air Force forever and ever,
Airmen.548
Although like his service, Louis Denfeld was "considerably crushed" at his 
removal, according to Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times, he "emerged from it 
more of a hero than he had been as Chief of Naval Operations."549 Just as Secretary 
Sullivan had seen his popularity skyrocket when he resigned in protest over the 
cancellation of the flush-deck carrier, so Denfeld found he was more recognized and 
sought after than he had ever been before. Given his political interests and his connections 
on Capitol Hill, it was inevitable that he would be tempted to try his hand at electoral 
politics rather than continuing to labor at the beck and call of civilians he was unable to
547Ibid.
548Anonymous "New Prayer for the Navy in 1949 A.D. (After Denfeld)," in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, 
File "Misc. Correspondence, 1948 - 49," Naval Historical Center.
549Interview with Hanson W. Baldwin, by John T. Mason, 1975, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, 
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effectively oppose. As the Admiral contemplated his future, the battles raged on in 
Washington.
Secretary Matthews was under considerable pressure, but he was confident that he 
was in control o f the situation. Many members o f Congress and the press echoed Father 
Sheehy's outrage and called for Matthews' resignation. Matthews responded, "I'm 
confident I'm the boss and when I'm not, the President will have to find a new Secretary 
. . . .  I haven't the slightest intention of resigning."550 He continued to justify his actions 
logically and dispassionately: "the prime reason for relieving Admiral Denfeld, in my 
opinion, is that it was not possible for us to function harmoniously. It is necessary to get a 
Chief o f Naval Operations who believes in unification."551
He had a valid need for a good relationship with the CNO and certainly had a 
strong motivation to remove Denfeld. But his comments about unification were mere 
window dressing. As has been discussed, "unification" meant, and continues to mean, 
whatever a listener decides he wants it to mean. Denfeld had repeatedly testified that he 
was in favor o f unification, yet Matthews' letter requesting his transfer contained several 
veiled allegations that his opposition to unification was one of the key causes o f his 
problems with the Secretary.552 In fact, both Denfeld and Matthews favored closer 
cooperation between the services. Only on the means of implementing "unification" did 
they disagree.
Despite Matthews' bravado and public confidence, the rumors persisted that he 
was also on the way out. George Dixon of the Omaha World Herald sent in a humorous 
piece which captured the spirit o f the situation:
550Omaha World Herald. 31 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
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A Washington news photographer was sent to the Pentagon to get pictures of 
Admiral Denfeld gloomily packing out. Instead, the photographer ran into the 
Navy's Secretary, and, misunderstanding his assignment, asked Matthews to 
pose for some shots unhappily packing his bags after his firing. Matthews 
complied with the request, probably wondering all the time what the 
photographer knew that he didn't.553
Matthews tried to ignore the public controversy and concentrate on the selection of 
Admiral Denfeld's replacement.
Secretary Matthews had always wanted Forrest Sherman to replace Denfeld when 
the appropriate time came to select a new CNO. Now all the Navy Secretary needed to 
do was to convince Sherman to take the job, persuade Secretary Johnson and President 
Truman to make the nomination, and then shepherd it through the angry Senate. In his 28 
October meeting with Denfeld, Matthews requested that the CNO order Admiral Sherman 
back to Washington to meet with the Secretary. Matthews had been unable to transmit 
this message himself since Sherman was at sea and could not be reached except through 
Navy communications circuits. It then became obvious to Denfeld that his fears about 
Sherman's behavior during the hearings had been correct.554
The President decided to explore another option for Denfeld's successor. Retired 
Fleet Admiral Nimitz had probably already received hints from Secretary Matthews about 
Truman’s interest in recalling him to active duty to resume his place as CNO. When 
Truman called him on Monday, 31 October 1949, Nimitz stated that "only an order from 
[the President] would bring me to Washington as CNO."555 The retired Fleet Admiral had 
already committed himself to a United Nations' diplomatic mission to Kashmir and felt that 
he was too old for the Navy job. He recommended either Conolly or Sherman for CNO, 
preferring Sherman since he was "younger and even less involved in politics."556 Although
553George Dixon, "Photographer's Error Starts 'Speculation,'" Omaha World Herald. 5 November 1949, 
p.3, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
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555Nimitz's diary entry, quoted in Potter, Nimitz. p. 447.
556Ibid.
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this effort to return Nimitz to Washington failed, it did provide Matthews with an 
unexpected supporter in the debates over Denfeld's firing. Nimitz wrote to Father Sheehy 
that, at their 15 October meeting in New York, Matthews had told him the decision to 
remove Denfeld had been made following the Bogan incident. This conversation 
convinced the former-CNO that "I cannot accept the statement that Denfeld was removed 
by Secretary Matthews as an act o f reprisal for the testimony which he gave."557
Speculation and recommendations about the new CNO came from all corners 
during this week. Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois wrote the President on 28 October 
to inform him "many officers . . . seemed emphatically to prefer Admiral Blandy or 
Admiral Radford to Admiral Sherman."558 Regardless of the Navy's preferences, Sherman 
was still the media's best bet to replace Denfeld. The Omaha World Herald even 
mentioned the intriguing combination of Admiral Nimitz returning as CNO with Sherman 
as his second in command.559 Denfeld refused to comment on his preferences for a 
successor.
Secretary Johnson had no favorite candidate but certainly wanted the new Navy 
Chief to be someone who would be willing to work within Johnson's system. Many of the 
potential candidates had disqualified themselves due to their testimony during the 
Congressional hearings. Blandy's and Conolly's statements had been harsher than 
Denfeld's, and Radford certainly would be a poor choice to heal the wounds within the 
Department. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wilfred McNeil stated that Matthews sold 
Johnson on Sherman as the officer who could bring the Navy into line. McNeil felt that 
the decision to choose Sherman was Matthews' most consequential act as Secretary of the
557Letter from Fleet Admiral Nimitz to Father Sheehy, 13 February 1950, quoted in Barlow, p. 364.
558Letter from Governor Adlai Stevenson to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman 
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Navy.560 Matthews was very happy with his new CNO. Admiral Sherman had previously 
shown a willingness to work with the lawyer from Nebraska. He overcame the initial 
resistance of many naval officers who saw him an enemy, and quickly demonstrated his 
proactive leadership style that built on the Navy's strengths and rapidly made 
improvements in its morale.
Most defense insiders approved of Sherman's selection. Army Lieutenant General 
Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff, wrote General Eisenhower that he was 
"extremely well pleased" with Admiral Sherman, describing the new CNO as "probably the 
smartest U. S. planner living today."561 Newsmen Robert Allen and William Shannon 
drew a perceptive comparison between the incoming and outgoing CNOs: "'Uncle Louie' 
Denfeld was affectionately regarded by men who did not respect him as a commander; 
Sherman is respected by many who will never love him."562 One notable dissenting voice 
in this parade of praise was Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times. Maybe because 
of his friendship with Admiral Denfeld, this correspondent saw another side of Sherman: 
"he was not as straight-forward as others that I knew. . . .  I may be quite unfair to him in 
saying that he was a manipulator, but he handled power like that."563 President Truman 
approved Matthews' choice on 2 November. That same day Forrest Sherman was sworn 
in as Denfeld's replacement for a four-year term.564 Senate confirmation would have to 
wait until January when Congress returned to session.
The public outcry over the removal of Admiral Denfeld was loud and long. 
President Truman's files contain innumerable letters and telegrams commenting on this
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removal, most of which were strongly opposed to Matthews', Johnson's and the 
President's actions.565 Included in this massive outpouring were messages from Senators 
and Congressmen demanding to know what the Chief Executive intended to do to ensure 
the freedom of military officers to speak their mind in testimony before Congress without 
fear of reprisals. Many messages compared Admiral Denfeld to Army Air Corps General 
Billy Mitchell as men who sacrificed their careers for what they believed were the defense 
needs of the Nation. Others charged that Johnson was establishing a "communist-type" 
dictatorship in the Defense Department.566
Congressman Vinson captured the feelings of many Americans when he issued the 
following statement in response to the announcement of Denfeld's transfer:
Admiral Denfeld has been made to walk the plank for having testified before 
the Armed Services Committee that the Navy is not being consulted as to its 
functions, that the Navy's roles and missions are being altered, that the Naval 
Air Arm is being forced into a state of weakness, and that the Navy is not 
accepted in full partnership in the National Defense structure. For having 
warned Congress and the country that such a state of affairs in his opinion 
exists in the Navy, he has been relieved of his high office. The security of the 
Nation demands that responsible military men at all times be free to give to the 
Congress and the country the true state of affairs as they see it in the Armed 
Services even though their views run counter to those of the civilian heads, and 
in consequence of their having done so, there should be no reprisals. . . . The 
Congress and the Committee cannot sit quietly by and permit reprisals against 
witnesses who have testified before them.567
Although Matthews was certainly persuaded that his removal of Denfeld had improved his 
control over the Navy, the consequent public outcry forced the Secretary to devote much 
o f the next three months to defending his action.
Other members o f Congress, dispersed across the country, also reacted 
passionately to the firing of Admiral Denfeld, but in an uncoordinated manner. Some joint
565Harry S. Truman Papers, Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
566Ibid.
567"Statement to the Press by the Honorable Carl Vinson," 28 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, 
File "Correspondence - V," Naval Historical Center.
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statements were issued, but as Truman and Johnson had expected, their delay in removing 
the Admiral until after Congress recessed certainly hindered the Legislative Branch's 
ability to respond. Leslie Arends (R - 111.) appears to have been the first Representative to 
react to the firing. He heard about it before the President's news conference and 
immediately cabled Vinson to recommend an immediate recall of the House Armed 
Services Committee to address "this insult to Congress." He feared that "a campaign of 
terror" was being initiated in the Pentagon and wanted to exert Congressional pressure to 
protect the witnesses.568
Senator Robert C. Hendrickson of New Jersey telegrammed the President on 28 
October to characterize Denfeld's removal as "shocking" and "reminiscent o f purges in 
Russia and Nazi Germany."569 Congressman George Bates, a Republican from 
Massachusetts, sent an angry telegram to Secretary Johnson on the evening of Denfeld's 
removal:
I consider [the] Denfeld removal distinct violation your pledge of no reprisals.
Such action would have very serious repercussions in both Congressional and
Naval circles at time we are trying to find solution of very complex problem.
Acting as conciliator you can make great contribution to these ends.570
Johnson chose to send an explanation of his actions to Congressman Bates in response to 
this telegram, and to release both pieces of correspondence to the press to head off any 
other criticism. Quoting from his letter to the Service Secretaries on 24 October, the 
Secretary of Defense explained to Congressman Bates that a lack of "necessary 
qualifications" and not offensive testimony had caused Denfeld's removal.
568,1 AHm Denfeld Loses Post in Service Row," Army and N aw  Journal. 29 October 1949, p. 236.
569Telegram from Senator Robert C. Hendrickson to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. 
Truman Papers, Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
570Telegram from Representative George Bates to Secretary Johnson, 27 October 1949, in Louis A. 
Johnson, Statements and Speeches of Louis A. Johnson. Secretary of Defense March 29. 1949 - September 
12, 1950, Vol. II, p. 515, unpublished mimeograph, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian, 
Washington.
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Four members o f the House Armed Services Committee; Sasscer (D-Md.), Hebert 
(D-La.), Arends (R-Ill.), and Cole (R-N.Y.), issued a sharp statement on the firing on 29 
October. Their blast charged that Johnson's justification for firing Denfeld due to his "lack 
o f qualifications" took the "prize for outright quackery and injustice." Furthermore, they 
asserted that any suggestion "that his removal is not a reprisal would be laughable were 
the situation not so tragic. . . . Evasive and misleading excuses and specious arguments do 
not cover up this reprisal."571 Committee Chairman Vinson issued a sharp condemnation 
o f the firing, but decided not to act on the matter until January when tempers would have 
cooled. Although this decision effectively sealed Admiral Denfeld's fate, Vinson probably 
made a choice that well served the national defense.572 Any hasty actions could have 
inflamed the conflict and made its settlement more difficult.
Congressman W. Sterling Cole sought information from senior Navy and Marine 
Corps officers to support his view that the firing would effectively "gag" widespread 
military dissent. He sent telegrams to all flag and general officers of the naval services:
"In strict confidence, please advise if you are in accord with views expressed by Admiral 
Denfeld before Armed Services Committee."573 Matthews got wind of this survey and 
authorized his senior officers to reply, provided they sent the him a copy of their response. 
Even with this monitoring, 55% of the 308 officers who received Cole's telegram 
responded to it. 16% of those who responded stated they could not answer the question 
due to Navy regulations. Of the rest, 82% supported Denfeld and the remainder gave 
non-committal replies.574 When Congress returned to Washington in January 1950,
571 Statement of the four Representatives, quoted in "Johnson, Matthews 'Not Just.'" Omaha World Herald. 
1 November 1949, and "House Committee Members Angered at Denfeld Relief," Army and Navv Journal. 
5 November 1949, p. 250.
572Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 547. Congressman Vinson's statement was quoted 
in the previous section of this paper.
573Ibid.
574Ibid., and Paolo E. Coletta, "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947 - 50: The Navy," Prologue. Spring 
1975, p. 15.
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Admiral Denfeld's removal, and the larger issue of protecting witnesses from reprisals, 
would receive great attention.
The reaction of senior naval officers to the removal of the CNO was 
understandably bitter. Vice Admiral Felix Stump, the Commander o f the Atlantic Fleet's 
Air Forces, wrote to Admiral Denfeld on 31 October to praise his testimony as 
"courageous" and predicted that Denfeld would "go down in history as one who stood 
courageously for what was right."575 On 4 November, retired Admiral Standley sent 
Congressman Vinson a letter characterizing Matthews' action as a "crucifixion" o f Admiral 
Denfeld.576 Admiral Radford considered the firing to be "punitive and cynical."577 
Denfeld's patron, retired Fleet Admiral Leahy, wrote sadly to one o f his Naval Academy 
classmates that "Denfeld is the only one who put up a rational defense for the Navy and he 
is now being removed. . . . He will be replaced by a stooge. Things like that did not 
happen in our day."578 Despite these sentiments, there was no cohesiveness to the 
opposition to the Secretary's action, and most of the "revolting admirals" muttered in the 
background without taking any effective action. When reporters asked Vice Admiral 
Bogan to comment on Denfeld's removal, he offered no opinion, stating only, "I learn 
quickly."579
Of course, the Navy's foremost publicist, Rear Admiral Gallery, continued his 
unofficial campaign to raise public awareness of the Navy's predicament. His January 
1950 Collier's article, "If This Be Treason - " attacked the firing and its implications. He 
described the issue of permitting military officers freedom of expression before Congress
575Letter from Vice Admiral Felix Stump to Admiral Denfeld, 31 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, 
Box 9, File "Correspondence - S," Naval Historical Center.
576Letter from Admiral W. H. Standley to Representative Vinson, 4 November 1949, in the Denfeld 
Papers, Box 9, File "Correspondence - S," Naval Historical Center.
577Jurika, p. 217.
578Letter from retired Fleet Admiral Leahy to Joe Powell, quoted in Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: 
The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press, 
1985), p. 339.
579"Denfeld Offered New Navy Post," Washington Star, 28 October 1949, p. 1.
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as a matter "bigger . . . than the B-36 or even the fate of the Navy." Gallery saw Denfeld's 
removal as a reprisal which would effectively gag all officers' future testimony. He went 
on to charge that "while we are pouring billions into Europe to stop the Communist 
advance abroad, we have seen fit to adopt their thought-control tactics in the United 
States." Gallery characterized Johnson's claims that the firing was not a reprisal as 
"pettifoggery."580 He helped raise public awareness of the Navy's understanding of 
national defense and anger at Denfeld's removal, but could not change the fact that 
Admiral Denfeld was no longer CNO.
The public was very interested in the struggle between the armed services and 
responded vigorously to the firing of the CNO. The President's and Navy Secretary's files 
in the Truman Library contain thousands of letters and telegrams commenting on the 
decision. By a ratio of about 50 to 1, they objected to Admiral Denfeld's removal.581 
Winona Mensch of Williamsport, Pennsylvania asserted that the "timing of the dismissal 
seems to have been cunningly planned - on what we all honor as Navy Day and at a time 
when Congress was not in session. "582 Los Angeles' Katherine Calvin cabled that the 
"firing is [a] deliberate crucifixion of [a] patriotic honest man."583 Harry Burkett of 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania wrote Truman that "I never expected you to pull such a rotten, 
low down trick as to fire Admiral Denfeld for speaking his mind in defense of his 
Navy."584 And Ruth Begley of Honolulu chided the President, for having sacked "a man 
just because he doesn't agree with you. That's not the American way to do things, that's
580Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral USN, "If This Be Treason - Collier's. 21 January 1950, p. 14 - 16.
581Truman Papers, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," and Matthews Papers, Box 27, File "Denfeld 
Correspondence," Truman Library.
582Letter from Winona Mensch to President Truman, 30 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
583Telegram from Katherine Calvin to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman 
Papers, Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
584Letter from Harry Burkett to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
180
Russia's way o f doing things."585 The majority of the letters were not from Denfeld's 
friends or acquaintances but from average Americans who were more concerned about 
protecting democratic, representative Government than about the fate of the Navy.
A typical submission in support of Secretary Matthews' action shows the opposite 
focus. "Your displacing of Admiral Denfeld is applauded. Not only have his recent 
utterances shown him to be in the wrong place, but his strangely sleepy, slouching 
appearance long have marked him as not up to the high position of Chief of Naval 
Operations."586 In this case, the letter's author, Walter Strong, reacted to the details o f the 
situation rather than its broader implications and precedent.
Another peculiar undercurrent of opinion in the debate on the firing of the CNO 
involved religious rather than constitutional issues. Matthews' public image as a 
prominent Catholic caused Christian Century magazine to charge that he was "turning the 
U. S. Navy over to the Pope as a Catholic convert."587 Mrs. Paul Regalia of San 
Francisco echoed this fear in her 28 October letter to the President, "I implore you, for the 
good of the country, do not replace Admiral Denfeld with a Catholic. One Catholic is 
Enough!"588 The Secretary was a devout Roman Catholic, but there is no evidence that 
his religious beliefs in any way influenced any of his decisions or his overall performance 
as a member of Truman's cabinet.
The press was much more evenly divided on the firing of Admiral Denfeld than 
either the public or Congress. David Lawrence, a consistent Navy supporter, wrote that 
Admiral Denfeld might become a "martyr to the cause of free government," and that "a 
good case for impeachment" of Matthews and Johnson could be made. He contended that
585Letter from Ruth Begley to President Truman, 27 December 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
586Letter from Walter W. Strong to President Truman, 29 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
587H. W. Becker, "St. Pat Was His Patron Saint," Dundee (Omaha. Nebraska) Sun. 11 March 1976, p. 15- 
A, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
588Letter from Mrs. Paul Regalia to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, 
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civilian control was not at issue but only the ability of military officers to express their 
views freely to Congress.589 The San Francisco Chronicle added that "the public has more 
reason to be impressed with Admiral Denfeld's judgment than with that of Matthews."590 
The editors of the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Honolulu Advertiser also opposed the 
firing o f the Admiral. The former stated that "there is nothing that can excuse the ruthless 
manner in which President Truman 'fired' Admiral Denfeld," and that "laying a whip over 
the shoulders of able officers and gagging them into terrorized silence" is no way to 
achieve true unification.591 The Hawaiian daily concluded that "for expressing his honest 
opinion, born of experience and a sense of duty to his service and his nation, Admiral 
Denfeld has been publicly fired."592
Attempts to maintain journalistic objectivity were few. The Army and Navy 
Journal, whose readership was obviously divided over this issue, reported that Secretary 
Matthews had not mentioned Denfeld's testimony in his letter to the President. But it 
went on to assert that "it was obvious" Denfeld's statements before the Armed Services 
Committee "relative to the administration of the Unification Act were those to which the 
Secretary took such vigorous exception."593 The Naval Academy's alumni magazine, 
Shipmate, observed that "the management of the military establishment is entirely 
political," and excused some of the confusion within the Navy and the inter-service 
misunderstanding by stating that the uniformed leaders' "lips have been sealed by orders 
. . .  or by the need to protect naval secrets."594 Nevertheless, the article advocated a more 
vocal Navy campaign to get the sea services' message across.
589David Lawrence, "Contempt of Congress," U. S. News and World Report. 4 November 1949, p. 34.
590"Denfeld Ouster Outrageous," San Francisco Chronicle. 29 October 1949, p. 10.
591Philadelphia Inquirer, quoted in "House Committee Members Angered at Denfeld Relief," Army and 
N aw  Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 250.
592"The Ouster of Admiral Denfeld," Honolulu Advertiser. 29 October 1949, p. 6.
593"Adm. Denfeld Loses Post in Service Row," Army and N aw  Journal. 29 October 1949, p. 236.
594"The Navy on Capitol Hill," Shipmate. November 1949, p. 2.
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The Alsop brothers and Drew Pearson o f the Washington Post came out strongly 
in favor of Secretary Matthews' stand against the rebellious admirals. Pearson compared 
him to Woodrow Wilson's Navy Secretary, Josephus Daniels, who banned alcohol from all 
naval vessels, as a civilian leader who could stand up to the Navy's "brass."595 The Alsop 
brothers, while recognizing Denfeld's dilemma of trying to please both his aviators and the 
Secretary, praised Matthews for his "courage and conviction" in taking an action both 
logical and essential to continued civilian control of the Armed Forces.596 From Britain, 
the London Economist asked: "What faith can the United States have in Chiefs o f Staff 
who behave like children? What faith can the powers who signed the North Atlantic 
Treaty have when their strongest partner shows much internal weakness?"597
Probably the most perspicacious comment on the affair came in Cedric Worth's 
Mutual Radio broadcast o f 28 October 1949. Worth was a friend o f Secretary Matthews 
and had spoken with the Navy Secretary several times during the day following the 
President's announcement. According to a transcript of a 28 October conversation 
between Matthews and Worth, the Secretary informed the broadcaster that there were 
some sensitive matters relative to Denfeld's removal which he could not discuss.
Matthews asserted that his decision to transfer the CNO had been made on 4 October, but 
told Worth that "I can't tell you why that is because I won't talk about that even on the 
phone."598 Based on the Secretary's later statements, the unspoken reasons centered 
around Denfeld's signing of the blank endorsement to Admiral Bogan's letter. Worth 
understood the Secretary's reasoning if not the specifics, and stated that "there is a great
595Drew Pearson, "Civilian Control Essential," Washington Post. 31 October 1949. Matthews liked this 
comparison, later borrowing it for use in a 7 November interview with the Washington Star. (Martin S. 
Hayden, "'Revolt' is Over, Matthews Says in Revealing Role in Navy Fight," Washington Star. 8 
November 1949, p. 1.)
596Joseph Alsop and Stewart Alsop, "The Denfeld Story," Washington Post. 31 October 1949.
597"State of the Unification," London Economist. 22 October 1949, quoted in Phillip S. Meilinger, 
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," Parameters. September 
1989, p. 94.
598Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and Cedric Worth, 28 October 1949, 
in the Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, Matthews Papers, Truman Library.
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deal more to the controversy in Washington than has been revealed on the air or in the 
press, and there is a great deal which will never be revealed because it is locked in the 
hearts o f men."599
Admiral Denfeld's opinion of his removal was one aspect of the controversy which 
was unclear at this juncture. He avoided making any statements and only expressed his 
feelings privately to friends. He planned to maintain a low profile during his sixty days of 
leave by making some repairs to his home in Massachusetts and possibly spending some 
time at Miami Beach.600 Captain Karig, his public relations officer, told the media on 29 
October that he thought Admiral Denfeld would probably retire rather than accept a 
"lesser post," but this was by no means a foregone conclusion.601 Denfeld wrote to retired 
Admiral Stark that "my conscience is clear and each morning I can look myself in the face 
while I shave, which I am quite sure many others we know cannot do."602 He later told 
Admiral Staton that "it is my fervent hope that the issue will be kept alive until the 
reconvening of Congress and at least clarified to such an extent that other members of the 
Armed Forces will feel free to appear before the elected representatives of the people 
without fear of reprisal."603 The Admiral understood that he was not in a position to 
demand an inquiry and did not want to follow Captain Crommelin's example. He planned 
to wait for public opinion and Congressional discontent to provide him with an 
opportunity to challenge his removal.
599Transcript of Cedric Foster's 28 October 1949 radio broadcast in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library.
600Letters from Admiral Denfeld to Captain P. D. Stroop, 22 November 1949 and W. L. Tabb, Jr., 21 
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Admiral Denfeld was not the only participant in the "revolt" to suffer the wrath of 
the Navy Department. In November Captain Burke's OP-23 office was closed down by 
the Navy's Inspector General for two days at Secretary Matthews' direction. This allowed 
the Department to search the organization's files for any evidence tying OP-23 to Captain 
Crommelin's disclosures or other breeches of security. Burke himself narrowly escaped 
Matthews' anger to continue his career to an eventual term as CNO.604 The investigation 
of OP-23 found no incriminating evidence, and both Matthews and Burke downplayed its 
significance. Nevertheless, one of Admiral Sherman's first acts as CNO was to disband 
this organization, stating that "its functions had been completed."605
Vice Admiral Bogan had also clearly lost Secretary Matthews' support. In 1949, 
Bogan's memorandum had precipitated the split between the Secretary and the CNO and 
had irretrievably connected his name with the Navy "rebellion." Shortly after Denfeld's 
removal, Bogan heard through the press that he was going to be issued orders to report as 
Commanding Officer o f the Atlantic Fleet Air Command in Pensacola. This two-star billet 
was significantly junior to his current three-star fleet command. Bogan asked to retire 
rather than accept this demotion. Under normal circumstances, his retirement would have 
been accompanied by a ceremonial promotion to four-star Admiral, but Secretary 
Matthews is reputed to have personally canceled this promotion.606 Denfeld later wrote 
that "I never let such a thing occur when I was Chief of Naval Personnel."607
Admiral Blandy, passed over twice for CNO, had also had enough, and elected to 
retire effective 1 February 1950. Denfeld, although never especially close to Blandy, felt
604The details of this attempt are outside the scope of this study, but can be found in Potter, Burke, pp. 
326 - 28, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 548.
605"OP-23 Disbanded," Army and N aw  Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 251, and Harold B. Hinton, 
"Sherman Puts End to 'Operation 23'," New York Times. 4 November 1949, p. 1.
606Edward P. Stafford, Commander USN (Ret.), "Saving Carrier Aviation - 1949 Style," U. S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. January 1990, p. 50.
607Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 15.
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that the callous firing of the CNO influenced Blandy's decision to end his naval career.608 
Vice Admiral Price, Denfeld's Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was transferred to another 
lower-ranking position shortly after Admiral Sherman's arrival, but this was not unusual. 
Typically an aviator was chosen as VCNO when a non-aviator was CNO. Now that the 
airman Sherman held the Navy's top spot, Price needed to be moved to retain this balance. 
Nevertheless, some saw Price's transfer as another reprisal against the officers who had led 
the Navy's "revolt."
On several occasions during November, Denfeld discussed his own proposed 
transfer to Conolly's European position with Secretary Matthews, but did not decide 
whether or not to accept it until 10 December.609 On that date, he informed the Secretary 
that he intended to decline the European post because he felt he would be unable to obtain 
"the necessary respect and confidence" from allied governments. Denfeld based his 
concern on the Secretary's veiled allegations in his letter to the President that Denfeld 
lacked "loyalty and respect for authority." He also feared that his opinions on allied 
planning would either be discounted or would "reopen the recent controversy to the 
embarrassment of my colleagues, my superiors and our government."610 Denfeld had been 
the champion of a conventional response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Since the 
proponents of the "atomic blitz" had seemingly prevailed in the recent hearings, placing 
Denfeld in another position where he would be forced to either repudiate his convictions 
or openly oppose his civilian superiors did not seem to be in the Nation's best interests.
Matthews believed that Denfeld had made a bad decision, but accepted it and let 
the Admiral return to Massachusetts to complete his leave.611 The press agreed with the
608Ibid. The correspondence relative to Admiral Blandy's retirement can be found in the Truman Papers, 
Official Files, Box 1285c, File "Department of the Navy - 1950," Truman Library.
609Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 28 October - 10 December 1949, Matthews Papers, 
Truman Library.
610Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 14 December 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
61 transcript of Secretary Matthews' interview on "Meet the Press," 28 January 1950, in the Matthews 
Papers, File "Speeches," Truman Library.
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Secretary. The Washington Post's 21 December editorial described Denfeld's action as 
one of "picayunishness," based on "pouting."612 The Milwaukee Journal similarly asserted 
that Denfeld's "bitterness" determined his decision and that his conduct was characterized 
by a "pettiness and peevishness that is beneath him."613 Now that the initial shock of 
Denfeld's firing had worn off and the Admiral seemed to be placing personal concerns over 
national interests, popular support for his position seemed to diminish.
His refusal to take Conolly's position did not force Denfeld into retirement. 
Previously, the Secretary had offered to consider the ex-CNO "for any other four-star job 
in the Navy."614 Denfeld wrote to Matthews that he would "be glad, o f course, to serve in 
any assignment that you may choose in which the handicaps imposed by recent events will 
not be present. "615 But at the time, the Secretary had nothing else to offer Denfeld. 
Matthews later stated that upon adjournment of the 10 December meeting, Denfeld had 
told the Secretary that if he had been in Matthews' place, he would have done the same 
thing (removed the CNO). This amiable parting was consistent with Matthews' other 
statements that the two Navy leaders retained a cordial relationship even after Denfeld's 
transfer. But Denfeld objected to this account, informing Senator Knowland that "I don't 
recall ever having said t h a t . . . .  I was not in a mood that would have given rise to such a 
statement."616 The differences between Matthews' and Denfeld's views on this situation 
were hardening, just in time for Congress to return from its recess and begin to look into 
the matter.
Secretary Johnson certainly believed himself to be totally in control of the 
Department following his triumph in the Congressional hearings. Although he knew that
612,'Denfeld's Refusal,'' Washington Post. 21 December 1949.
613J. D. Ferguson, "Admiral Denfeld Hurts Himself," Milwaukee Journal, 21 December 1949.
614Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14.
615Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 14 December 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File 
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"Denfeld," Truman Library.
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members of Congress would demand an investigation of the removal of the CNO, he 
believed that he could defend his decisions and had the President's support. In December 
1949 he visited Admiral Conolly's headquarters in London and, according to the Admiral, 
was very contemptuous of Conolly and his service. Johnson was reported to have told a 
crowd of British and American naval officers, "we're going ahead and we're going to build 
up the Air Force . . . .  I'm a great friend of the Air Force." Later in the visit Johnson 
privately told Conolly, "Well Admiral, all I want to tell you is, you'd better keep your nose 
clean."617 Shortly thereafter, Admiral Conolly was transferred to a "twilight tour" as 
President of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Secretary Johnson seemed 
fully to have consolidated his authority over the Department.
617Conolly interview, pp. 402 - 04.
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CONGRESS EXAMINES THE REMOVAL OF THE CNO
"The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving 
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against 
effective representative government. . . "  (1950 - House Armed Services 
Committee Report on the Hearings on Unification and Strategy)618
"I have waited in the hope that some Committee of Congress would ask me. I 
have been willing at all times to testify and have never had the slightest 
objection to anything in connection with the whole matter being made public." 
(1950 - Admiral Denfeld)619
Congress returned to Washington in early January 1950 to many unanswered 
questions regarding the Navy's future and the firing of the CNO. Congressman Vinson's 
Committee was preparing its formal report on the unification and strategy hearings and 
intended therein to address the Denfeld firing. While this report was being compiled, the 
Senate's Armed Services Committee quickly took up Admiral Sherman's confirmation and 
the accompanying investigation into the removal o f his predecessor.
Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman answered questions before Senator 
Tydings' Committee on 12 January 1950. Their questions concentrated on Matthews' and 
Sherman's views on the freedom of naval officers to testify before Congress. Both 
Matthews and Sherman stated that witnesses were always able to give their personal views 
to Congress without fear o f punishment, yet "punishment" did not include transfers within 
the service. They asserted that the Navy depended on loyalty and a unified chain of 
command. If  an officer did not agree with his superior on an important principle, he 
should be moved to another position.620 When Secretary Matthews was asked his opinion 
of Rear Admiral Gallery's recent accusations in Collier's about reprisals, the Secretary
618House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 56.
619Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, p. 10, in the Matthews Papers, 
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
620John G. Norris, "Senate Unit Indorses Sherman: Denfeld Ouster Probe Dropped," Washington Post.
13 January 1950, p. 1.
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restated his belief that moving an officer out o f the chain of command did not "constitute a 
'reprisal' or 'punishment.'"621 He also claimed that he "could not have administered the 
Navy with Admiral Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations."622
The new Navy team was convincing. Admiral Sherman impressed the Senators, 
and Matthews' explanation of his views about Congressional testimony seemed to quiet 
some of his critics. John Norris' 13 January 1950 article in the Washington Post stated 
that, following the Secretary's presentation, both Tydings and Vinson had decided that no 
formal investigation into the Denfeld ouster would be necessary.623 Admiral Denfeld 
recognized that the Congressional "day in court" he had hoped for was slipping away. He 
wrote to his friend Davis Merwyn,
He [Matthews] is cleverly trying to lay stress on the Crommelin matter and the 
Bogan letter to put up a smoke screen so that it will look as though he fired me 
for those two incidents, before my testimony before the Committee, but you 
and I know that our relations were most cordial up to the time I made my 
statement and that is the reason I was replaced.624
Republican members of the Senate Armed Services Committee continued to call for an 
official investigation of the firing, but Senator Tydings was able to override their 
objections and get Sherman's confirmation to the Senate floor by 13 January.
It is often said that among the best ways to judge a man is to identify his enemies. 
Under that criteria, Secretary Matthews received a fine compliment when the then-obscure 
Senator Joseph McCarthy rose on the Senate floor to challenge the Navy Secretary's 
actions. The Senator from Wisconsin did not object to Admiral Sherman, but desired to
621 Ibid., p. 12.
622Omaha World Herald. 13 January 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
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discuss the '"viciously dangerous' situation of lowering an 'iron curtain' between Congress 
and the Armed Services."625 Using tactics which he would later make infamous, the 
Senator dramatically questioned the integrity of Secretary Matthews rather than dealing 
with the pertinent facts of the case.
Matthews testified before the Armed Services Committee on 12 January that 
Admiral Denfeld had not been given his commission for his second term even though the 
Senate had confirmed his nomination. Since his commission had not been delivered, a 
vacancy in the CNO position had existed since 15 December. Because Denfeld had 
vacated the office, Sherman had a clear title and could be confirmed using standard 
procedures.626 Both Matthews and the Committee saw this issue as a mere technicality 
and moved on to other matters. But Senator McCarthy latched onto this point like a 
bulldog.
Somehow the Wisconsin Senator had obtained a photostatic copy of Denfeld's 
signed commission for a second term, and he waved it like a flag while he charged the 
Navy's Secretary with providing incorrect testimony to the Senate. McCarthy asserted 
that the commission raised the question of whether a vacancy did exist in the CNO's 
office, and "whether the Secretary of the Navy is a man who is incompetent or just plain 
untruthful."627 Addressing the vacancy issue, the Senator pointed to a 1935 Supreme 
Court decision where the Court ruled the President did not have the authority to fire a 
public official merely because his views differed from those of his superiors.628 McCarthy 
had done his homework so well that Senator Tydings was unable to respond to this charge 
without additional study.
625John G. Norris, "Senate Unit Indorses Sherman: Denfeld Ouster Probe Dropped," Washington Post.
13 January 1950, p. 12.
626Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Senator Tydings, 23 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, 
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
627Senator McCarthy's statement is reprinted in "Denfeld Commission for 2d Tour Revealed," Army and 
N aw  Journal. 21 January 1950, p. 554.
628This decision is "Humphrey's Executory. U. S.," 27 May 1935.
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Senator McCarthy's tactics disturbed Denfeld, who had no intent to ruin Matthews 
or to get his position back. After the events of the last several months, he recognized that 
he would be unable to effectively run the Navy as CNO. To guide the Senate's attention 
back to the issue of free testimony, Louis Denfeld announced that he was requesting 
retirement effective 1 March 1950 "in order to remove any legal technicalities."629 He 
announced that "it has never occurred to me to question the President's authority to 
remove me, or to claim that I was still CNO." The Admiral also realized that retirement 
would allow him to freely express his concerns about national security and, in his view, 
enable him to better serve the Navy and the Nation.630
Secretary Matthews had the Navy's Legal Counsel prepare a position paper on the 
legal precedents and attached this to his own 8-page explanation of how Denfeld's 
commission was delivered.631 This package helped convince the Committee that a 
vacancy did exist. The Omaha World Herald wrote that "Senator Tydings called the 
whole issue a 'sham battle' and added: 'The President could have removed Admiral 
Denfeld if he had taken 10 oaths, signed 75 commissions, affixed 415 seals to it, and 
served in the office for 15 years 6 months.'"632 This debate was easily settled in Matthews' 
favor, but McCarthy's other points were more difficult to refute.
McCarthy had pointed out Matthews' unfamiliarity with the Navy and questioned 
how he was able to require that any officer "disloyal to his concept of naval strategy," or 
"who disagreed with him on how to run the Navy will be transferred to the Siberia o f an 
inferior post." The Senator went on to ridicule Matthews' position, observing that he had 
"no background which could even remotely entitle him to this claim of being a great naval
629Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 24 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
630Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," pp. 15 and 63.
63 Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Senator Tydings, 23 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, 
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
632Omaha World Herald. 24 January 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File 
"Matthews."
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strategist." McCarthy had served with the Marines in the Pacific during World War II and 
had high praise for "outstanding naval officers" such as Captain Crommelin and Vice 
Admiral Bogan who placed the good of the country above their own careers. He 
recommended strengthening the current laws on reprisals to prevent any recurrence of the 
Denfeld removal.633
Senator McCarthy had conducted some research to support his contention that 
officers saw Admiral Denfeld's removal as a signal to conform or be quiet.
I have talked with many of the officers in the Pentagon during the past few 
weeks. . . .  I asked them if they would be willing to testify if the unification 
hearings were reopened. The strange thing to me was the unanimity of their 
replies. You could sum them up as, "I would be willing to testify today only if 
I was prepared to resign tomorrow." Isn't that a strange situation? Isn't it an 
unhealthy one?634
McCarthy had raised enough questions concerning the entire episode that Admiral 
Sherman's confirmation and the Denfeld firing were referred back to Tyding's Committee 
for further study.
The Republican members o f the Senate Armed Services Committee clamored for 
Matthews to be subpoenaed to answer McCarthy's charges, but Tydings and his allies 
defeated their proposal. Rather than demand the Secretary's views, Tydings asked 
Matthews to appear to try and "clear up the Denfeld thing." Apparently, Matthews had 
previously told the Senator of the blank Bogan endorsement issue, and Tydings felt that 
this "story . . . might put a different light on it, and it might end the whole thing."635 On 
30 January 1950, the Secretary testified in closed session for over 5 hours and answered 
extensive and difficult questions from all sides. The transcript o f this discussion is not
633Senator McCarthy's statement is reprinted in "Denfeld Commission for 2d Tour Revealed," Army and 
N aw  Journal. 21 January 1950, p. 554.
634Ibid.
635Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and Senator Tydings, 10 January 
1950, in the Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, Matthews Papers, Truman Library.
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available, but excerpts are included in a 10-page rebuttal Admiral Denfeld submitted to the 
Committee and which is included in the Matthews Papers.636 News reports stated that 
Matthews "did a good job" and "satisfied" the Committee.637 Senator Tydings1 statement 
concluded that Denfeld's removal resulted from an "honest difference o f opinion upon 
Navy Department policy," and that there was no existing condition which would preclude 
naval officers from presenting honest testimony to Congress. Although the Committee 
took no formal vote, there was "no dissent," and Sherman's nomination went back to the 
Senate floor where it was quickly confirmed.638
The fragments of Matthews' testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee included in Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland give the best 
indication of the Secretary's true rationale for firing the CNO. Admiral Denfeld was never 
asked to provide his side of the story, even though he made it clear that he was ready to 
testify if asked. Senator Knowland recommended that the Committee provide Denfeld a 
copy o f Matthews' testimony and give him an opportunity to respond.639 This option was 
approved, yet Senator Tydings announced his assessment of the CNO's removal before 
Denfeld's comments were even requested. Although Denfeld's extensive response seems 
to have had no influence on the Congressional debate, it can help researchers understand 
the circumstances of Denfeld's removal.
The most precise statement of Matthews' actual thought process in firing the CNO 
can be found in an exchange with Senator Cain during the 30 January session:
636The transcript of this session was at least 259 pages long, but is not available to the public. Letter from 
Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman 
Library.
637" B o s s  of the Navy Now in Solid," Omaha World Herald. 12 February 1950, in the Douglas County 
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
638"Denfeld Firing Probe Closes," Omaha World Herald. 31 January 1950, in the Douglas County 
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
639Letter from Senator Knowland to Admiral Denfeld, 2 February 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
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Senator Cain: It seems clear to me that Admiral Denfeld's usefulness to you 
was not terminated because of the Bogan letter and the two endorsements, 
but it was terminated because of the illegitimate release of those documents.
Have I put that right?
Secretary Matthews: No that is not true. Not because of illegitimate release 
but it was because of what was in the endorsement and the manner in which 
he handled i t . . . the release had nothing to do except in so far as it indicated 
a lack of control of his own office.640
Secretary Matthews also testified that he believed Admiral Denfeld was "in opposition to 
things I had publicly announced and the policies in which I believed," clearly meaning 
unification.641 Based on the available excerpts, Matthews' primary reasons for firing the 
CNO were their philosophical differences on unification and the Secretary's concern about 
Denfeld's ability to administer his office effectively.
On 1 February, Drew Pearson gave some details about the closed hearings based 
on "inside Senate sources." Pearson reported that Matthews believed Admiral Denfeld 
had played a part in the Crommelin incidents and asserted that the CNO's signing a blank 
endorsement to the Bogan letter persuaded the Secretary that this "double-dealing" 
behavior "had to be stopped immediately."642 This article was the only public hint that 
Matthews had any reservations about Admiral Denfeld's abilities. The Secretary's letter to 
the President had not indicated any problem with Denfeld's performance or talents. In 
fact, in a 28 January 1950, "Meet the Press" interview, Matthews stated that "I was very 
careful not to criticize Admiral Denfeld in any particular . . . [and was] careful to see that 
he kept his rank as a full Admiral."643 Historians are unlikely ever to determine whether 
this hesitancy publicly to criticize Denfeld was based on friendship or a very "lawyer-like"
640Excerpt from Secretary Matthews' discussion before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 January 
1950, in letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 7, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library.
641Ibid., p. 5.
642Drew Pearson, "Talk About Dissension in the Navy," Washington Post, 1 February 1950, p. 12-F.
643Transcript of Secretary Matthews' interview on "Meet the Press," 28 January 1950, pp. 6 and 9, in the 
Matthews Papers, File "Speeches," Truman Library.
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fear o f possible slander charges. Nonetheless, Matthews' interview revealed a 
performance dimension to Admiral Denfeld's removal not previously publicized.
The ex-CNO strenuously objected to many of the Secretary's statements. He told 
Senator Knowland that "there are in the record which you sent me many contradictions 
and inaccurate observations, revealing, I regret to say, the unfamiliarity o f the Secretary of 
the Navy with the simplest procedures of the Office o f the Chief of Naval Operations."644 
The Admiral singled out Matthews' concerns over the blank endorsement as particularly 
ill-founded. Regarding unification, Denfeld wrote that "I have always been for unification 
and did my level best to make it work satisfactorily."645 He thereby repeated statements 
he had made in Congressional testimony and again when he announced his decision to 
retire.646 No matter how much Denfeld protested, he continued to be labeled as an 
opponent o f unification.
Equally revealing are Denfeld's comments that he had become convinced after his 
testimony that he would be fired because he "felt that the Secretary's attitude was such 
that we could not get along together. "647 Admiral Denfeld also indicated that he "was 
particularly bitter about the manner" by which he had been informed o f his removal. "At 
that time [28 October] I was not sure o f the part the Secretary had played in having me 
removed, because he had not kept me informed of what he was doing."648 Denfeld's 
statement to Senator Knowland much more explicitly addressed the firing than did 
comments he later published. He therein presented a detailed explanation of the 
circumstances surrounding his endorsement of Vice Admiral Bogan's letter and concluded
644Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 2, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library.
645Ibid„ p. 5.
646His 19 January 1950 press statement included the following line on unification: "I have always been 
for it and believe it would work out." (Omaha World Herald, 20 January 1950, in the Douglas County 
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews.")
647Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 8, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library.
648Ibid.
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that "in spite o f the Crommelin incident and the Bogan letter, the decision to remove me 
was made as a result of my testimony."649 This conclusion is consistent with the Admiral's 
other statements. What is unusual is the seemingly unconscious highlighting of the poor 
communications which existed between Matthews and Denfeld. This situation, even 
without the other issues, could have justified Matthews' decision to change CNOs.
Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland stated that the House Armed 
Services Committee had requested a copy of the Secretary's testimony of 30 January to 
facilitate their evaluation of the hearings and the firing of the CNO. Understandably, the 
Admiral requested that a copy of his submission be forwarded to Chairman Vinson's 
Committee along with the other material.650 This request seems reasonable, but, based on 
the House's final report issued on 1 March, neither Matthews' nor Denfeld's statements 
were ever given to the House. Communications problems were not confined to the Navy.
Matthews continued to demonstrate his feelings of friendship for the fired Admiral. 
When the Commander of the Boston Naval District, Rear Admiral Thebaud, asked the 
Secretary if he could plan a standard retirement ceremony for the ex-CNO given the 
possibility for negative publicity, Matthews responded very positively. He "heartily 
approved" o f Rear Admiral Thebaud's plans and authorized the typical honors for 
someone retiring with four stars, but he made no mention of any award for the CNO for 
his years of dedicated service.651 There were other indications that relations between the 
two men were not close at all. John Floberg, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air 
since November 1949, recalled that "the feelings of animosity between those two 
incidentally, were highly reciprocal. I was on good terms with both of them, but there was
649Ibid., p. 9.
650Ibid., p. 3.
65 better from Rear Admiral Thebaud to Captain Ruble (Secretary Matthews' Aide), 27 January 1950, and 
letter from Captain Ruble to Rear Admiral Thebaud, 31 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File 
"Denfeld,” Truman Library.
197
certainly no love lost between them."652 What comes out of a complete review of their 
correspondence and statements during this period is a sense that they had enjoyed a good 
personal relationship, but the firing had transformed their friendship into mere surface 
civility.
Matthews and Denfeld spent February 1950 waiting for the House's report to put 
the firing to bed. Tensions remained high given Vinson's earlier pronouncements and the 
many telegrams and letters from members of his Committee supportive o f Denfeld's 
position and the principle of free testimony. The Navy Secretary was still smarting from 
Senator McCarthy's accusations in the Senate and almost became involved in a fist fight 
with the ex-Marine from Wisconsin when they met at a Washington party. Amazingly, 
only the timely intervention o f Secretary Symington prevented physical violence.653 
Matthews' patience with the entire issue was wearing thin. He was uncharacteristically 
harsh in his 8 February response to J. D. Ryan's criticism of his decision to fire the CNO:
"I am giving you the foregoing with the suggestion that before you pass judgment on 
something you know nothing about, you secure a knowledge of the facts involved."654
Denfeld maintained a low profile, waiting until his retirement to begin a public 
campaign to reverse the Navy's fortunes. He hoped that Congressman Vinson would 
continue to support his position. In his 9 February letter to Senator Knowland he justified 
his Congressional testimony by claiming that he would "have been derelict" in his duty if 
he had altered his convictions "to suit the expediencies of the moment."655 Concerning the 
Bogan endorsement and the commission issue, he complained that
652Letter from Assistant Secretary John Floberg to Paolo Coletta, 1976, quoted in Paolo E. Coletta, The 
United States N aw  and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware 
Press, 1981), p. 208.
653George Dixon, "First McCarthy vs. Matthews Meeting Almost Exploded," Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, 
21 February 1950.
654Letter from Secretary Matthews to J. D. Ryan of Larchmont, New York, 8 February 1950, in the 
Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
655Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 1, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," 
Truman Library.
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all these minor circumstances have been magnified out of all proportion with 
the result that the real point in this case is beclouded, namely, that I was 
punished for having expressed my honest convictions before a committee of 
the Congress of the United States.656
The long-awaited House Report on the Hearings on Unification and Strategy was 
issued on 1 March 1950. Its 58-page narrative summary is a masterpiece of dispassionate 
analysis. Vinson thereby provided a report which avoided placing Congress in the position 
of evaluating military weapons or constructing war plans, even though much of the 
testimony seemed to ask for the House Committee's vote on these issues. The report 
encouraged the services to settle their differences through training and mutual respect 
rather than public argument. It supported the assessment o f weapons such as the B-36 by 
the Department's Weapons System Evaluation Group, criticized the National Security 
Council for failing to provide the JCS with an adequate national security strategy to 
support military planning, and pointed out many specific areas where unification could be 
improved. The report concluded by stating that the Committee found "no unification 
Puritans in the Pentagon."657
The report urged the services to "resolve their professional differences fairly and 
without rancor and to perform their professional duties . . . with dignity, with decorum, 
and" with due respect to the other services' views.658 It praised the "extended frank and 
honest testimony" and recognized that petty rivalry was not the cause of the disagreements 
but rather "a genuine inability for these services to agree, fundamentally and 
professionally, on the art of warfare."659 Noting the emotional moments during and after 
the hearings, the report labeled the witnesses "patriotic men" and characterized the
656Ibid., p. 2.
657House Unification and Strategy Report, pp. 1 -42 .
658Ibid„ p. 55.
659Ibid„ p. 33.
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"captious criticism of such men" as "unworthy and a disservice to the Nation's defense."660 
Only one of the report's 33 conclusions was not approved unanimously - its 
characterization of the firing of Admiral Denfeld as a reprisal for his testimony.
Much of the report dealt with the fundamental issue of the freedom of witnesses to 
testify without fear before Congress. Three pages were devoted to describing the 
assurances given by Matthews and Johnson that there would be no reprisals. The 
Committee stated that if free testimony was hindered, "effective representative 
government in this country [would be] gravely imperiled. "661 Given this understanding, 23 
of the Committee's 31 members supported the finding that
the removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving testimony 
to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against effective 
representative government in that it tends to intimidate witnesses and hence 
discourages the rendering of free and honest testimony to the Congress; it 
violated promises made to the witnesses by the Committee, the Secretary of 
the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense; and it violated the Unification Act, 
into which a provision was written to specifically prevent actions of this nature 
against the Nation's highest military and naval officers.662
The report expands on this finding, stating that "the Committee deeply regrets and 
deplores this retaliation against a witness who gave a committee of Congress, at its 
request, his honest, frank and candid views of matters of great national importance."663 
The document rejects the arguments that "some more distant cause" led to Denfeld's 
removal, and warns that if this type of reprisal is repeated, "the Committee will ask the 
Congress to exercise its constitutional power of redress."664
The eight dissenting Representatives on the House Armed Services Committee 
issued a supplemental explanation of why they did not think Admiral Denfeld's removal
660Ibid., p. 9.
661Ibid., p. 10.
662Ibid., p. 56.
663Ibid., p. 53.
664Ibid.
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was a "reprisal." All eight Congressmen were Democrats: Kilday (Texas), Havenner 
(Calif.), Price (111 ), Fisher (Texas), Green (Pa.), Walsh (Ind.), Clemente (N.Y.), and Doyle 
(Iowa). Four of them had previously served in the Army or the Air Force, and another 
had had a son killed in World War II with the Army Air Corps.665 Their statement noted 
Secretary Matthews' "carefully weighed words" in his letter to the President and 
concluded that "there is absolutely nothing before the Committee, privately or publicly, to 
controvert this statement of the Secretary of the Navy." Taking a very legalistic approach, 
the group decided that the Committee's conclusion was based entirely on "a priori 
reasoning" and that it had made the Secretary appear to have been a liar.666
It is difficult to argue with this minority opinion's logic. The Committee had held 
no new hearings following the firing of the CNO and had not even obtained copies of 
Matthews' January testimony before the Senate on this issue, yet most of its members felt 
adequately informed to judge the motivation of Secretary Matthews. The dissenting 
statement contended that although the Secretary o f the Navy had "adequately settled the 
matter" in his Senate hearing, "the House Armed Services Committee has reached a 
diametrically opposite conclusion without hearing the testimony of the Secretary o f the 
Navy against whom the verdict is rendered." Neither side mentioned the fact that Admiral 
Denfeld had not been given any opportunity to air his views on this matter. The eight 
Representatives concluded their statement by asserting, "this is an unsound manner in 
which to conduct public business. It is prejudging a case without hearing the evidence. It 
is assuming, not proving, the facts of a case."667
Because the House Committee was not a court and delivered no legal verdict, it 
was not required to cite evidence in support of its 1 March report. Nevertheless, the 
Committee's credibility suffered greatly from the perception that it was only based on
665Congressional Directory: 81st Congress. 1st Session. (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1949).
666House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 57.
667Ibid., p. 58.
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rumor and supposition. The Omaha World Herald supported the minority opinion and 
concluded that the report was "manifestly unfair" on its characterization of the Denfeld 
firing as a reprisal.668 Even the ten Representatives in the majority who advocated turning 
the matter over to the Justice Department agreed that only "a prima facie  case" had been 
made.669 For whatever reason, Vinson's Committee had chosen to take an aggressive 
stand against the civilian leadership of the Defense Department based on supposition and 
circumstantial evidence.
The ten Congressmen who urged the Justice Department to look into the firing 
included nine Republicans and one Democrat, Hebert of Louisiana. The Republicans in 
this group included Representatives Arends, Cole, and Van Zandt who had played 
prominent roles in earlier stages of the hearings. Their recommendation followed the 
defeat o f a motion in Committee to seek criminal action against Secretary Matthews for 
injuring a witness.670 The ten believed that he had violated Title 18 of section 1505 of the 
United States Criminal Code, "Influencing or Injuring Witness Before Agencies and 
Committees." It authorized a maximum penalty o f $5,000 and/or five years imprisonment 
for injuring "any party or witness in his person or property on account of his . . . testifying 
or having testified."671
This recommendation seems to have been the most legally correct of the three 
because it made no attempt to pass judgment without evidence or reject out o f hand any 
possibility o f impropriety. This group made the logical recommendation to pass the 
investigation of this matter to an agency which was authorized to investigate possible 
criminal acts and determine possible legal action based on the available evidence:
668"The Navy is a Team," Omaha World Herald. 3 March 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] 
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
669House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 58.
670The vote on this motion was 21 to 11. John Jarrell, "Denfeld Case Was Reprisal," Omaha World 
Herald. 1 March 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
671House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 58.
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we do not question the powers inherent in the executive establishment to 
transfer or demote personnel. Nor do we attempt to pass judgment on the 
motives which may have actuated those in responsible positions . . . .  We 
simply state that a prima facie  case has been made which indicates that the 
statutes o f the United States relating to the protection of witnesses may have 
been violated.672
Although this option appears in hindsight to have been the most logical o f the choices 
open to Congressman Vinson, he elected to merely state his majority opinion that 
Matthews had fired Denfeld as a reprisal, and take no action on any further investigation. 
There is no evidence that the Justice Department ever made any attempt to look into the 
matter, and the two houses of Congress made no effort to reconcile their different 
interpretations o f the firing o f Admiral Denfeld.
The ex-CNO was now retired and free to openly express his frustrations. Denfeld 
chose to issue a series o f three articles in Collier's magazine to tell his side of the firing and 
to try to convince the American people that the Navy's position in the hearings had been 
correct. His first piece, "Why I Was Fired," appeared in the 18 March 1950 issue of this 
magazine and is a concise and factual representation of his impressions of the 
circumstances involved in his removal. The only significant omissions are the Admiral's 
signing of the blank endorsement to Bogan's letter and Admiral Sherman's role in the 
hearings. Denfeld never directly criticized the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the 
Secretary of the Navy, preferring to keep his points professional and respectful. He 
defended his record on unification by asserting that "no one can say t ha t . . .  I did not do 
my level best to make unification work."673 Despite his strong support for an unpopular 
position, Denfeld felt he had received only "contemptuous treatment" at the hands of his 
civilian supervisors. Regarding the charge that he did not demonstrate sufficient loyalty,
672Ibid., p. 59.
673Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 64.
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he wrote that "a superior cannot expect loyalty from his subordinates unless he gives it in 
full measure. And one essential o f loyalty . . . [is] common everyday politeness."674
Denfeld describes himself as "the first victim of the reprisal" and asserts that "there 
is not the slightest doubt that the reason for my removal was my testimony. "675 He based 
this conclusion on his sense that relations between himself and the Navy Secretary had 
been good until he had testified before Congress. He acknowledged the Secretary's 
statement at their 4 October meeting concerning his continued usefulness as CNO, but 
believes that the words were not meant to indicate that the Secretary had decided to 
remove him. Regarding his future, Denfeld notes that he had been urged to run for 
political office, but "I have no thought of doing so. The last thing I want to do is become 
a political issue."676 This concern seems incredible given the political firestorm which his 
statement and firing had already produced.
"Why I Was Fired" presents the Admiral's case well, but not so comprehensively 
and forthrightly as his private letter to Senator Knowland had done. His omission of the 
blank endorsement issue and reticence to criticize the Navy's civilian leaders weakened this 
article. All incidents therein described support the conclusion that a leadership vacuum 
existed in the Navy and that a communication breakdown between the CNO and the 
Navy's senior officers caused the former's removal.
The Admiral's second article appeared on 25 March and was titled "The ONLY 
CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK." It concentrated on the circumstances surrounding 
the cancellation of the U.S. S. United States and the functioning of unification in the 
Department o f Defense. More directly than the Admiral's first submission, it included 
some emotional descriptions and accusations about the participants in the cancellation of 
the carrier. Denfeld came very close to calling Secretary Johnson a liar in reflating the
674Ibid., p. 13.
675Ibid., pp. 13 and 64.
676Ibid., p. 63.
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Defense Secretary's statement that he had read all the Joint Chiefs' statements on the 
carrier project by Friday, 22 April. The ex-CNO claimed that his draft hadn't even been 
completed until late on that day, and reports that he "was never able to find any official 
record indicating that he [Johnson] was given the Joint Chiefs' views before . . . April 
23rd."677 Denfeld offers several recommendations for improving the operation of the 
Defense Department, including the adding o f the Commandant o f the Marine Corps to the 
JCS, and adopting a new law to require Congressional approval for any "administrative 
cutbacks" in approved defense budgets.678
In his third and final article, the retired Admiral focused on the future. "The 
Nation NEEDS the Navy" attempts to justify the requirement for a strong sea service by 
analyzing the various missions assigned to the Navy and assessing the forces required to 
accomplish them. Denfeld points out that "we have a tremendous fleet - in mothballs," 
and continues his advocacy for each service to control the use of its allocated funds, rather 
than allowing a 2-to-l vote in the JCS to restrict vital weapons development projects.679 
In the realm o f strategic planning, he writes that "the Navy has been plagued by having its 
strategy dictated by nonprofessionals who are ignorant of the conduct o f warfare in 
general, and by others who know nothing o f the Navy or its use of air power."680 Sadly, 
Denfeld's arguments all appeared to object to civilian control and unification, no matter 
how many times he claimed to have supported these principles.
Secretary Matthews declined to comment on Denfeld's Collier's pieces, but did 
ruffle some feathers with a March speech in Denfeld's home state. The Navy Secretary 
was effusive in his praise for the great job Admiral Sherman was doing to restore order to 
the Department. Admiral Denfeld refused to comment on this matter.681 By this time,
677Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," p. 46.
678Ibid„ p. 51.
679Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," p. 44.
680Ibid., p. 37.
681 "Denfeld Tight-Lipped on Navy Chiefs Blast," Boston American, 15 March 1950, p. 11.
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Denfeld had decided to run for the Republican nomination as Governor o f Massachusetts 
and was forced to repress his personal feelings in the interest of his campaign. Secretary 
Matthews had begun to feel much more confident in his position after having weathered 
the "Revolt o f the Admirals" with flying colors.
In early 1950, the Defense Department began to recover from the bitter hearings. 
The Weapons System Evaluation Group finally presented its assessment of the current 
strategic bombing plans to the President in January. Its report concluded that the "atomic 
blitz" strategy "could be carried out presently only in theory" and estimated a 30 to 50 
percent B-36 attrition rate on the initial missions.682 It went on to note the lack of reliable 
intelligence on Soviet air defenses and generally echoed all of Denfeld's concerns about 
this plan. In yet another indication o f the poor communications in the Nation's defense 
leadership, a witness to this briefing recorded that "as the briefing ended, Johnson 
exclaimed, 'There, I told you they'd say the B-36 is a good plane,' but Truman looked 
disgusted and snapped, 'no damnit, they said just the opposite.'"683 Even an 18 month 
evaluation could not settle this basic question or bring the Defense leadership together.
The Navy made several notable changes after Denfeld's removal. Admiral 
Sherman recognized the poor job that the Navy's public relations office had done during 
the unification controversies and overhauled its organization along lines Admiral Denfeld's 
friend Captain Karig had recommended. The newly created "Chief o f Naval Information" 
would work directly for the CNO in the future.684 In an amazing turnaround, Johnson 
approved the construction o f a new aircraft carrier on 22 June 1950, only three days 
before the North Korean attack. This new vessel was to be named after Secretary 
Forrestal and, although not the revolutionary flush-deck type that Denfeld had wanted, 
was capable o f carrying modem jet aircraft.685 Even using its existing carriers, the Navy
682Rearden, p. 409.
683Ibid., p. 410.
684Coletta, The United States N aw  and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. p. 214.
685"Navy Carrier Has Go-Ahead," Omaha World Herald. 23 June 1950, p. 1.
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began taking nuclear weapons to sea with attack aircraft in February 1950 and has 
continued to deploy a sea-based nuclear capability to this day.686 Admiral Sherman was 
proving capable of getting done what Denfeld had only dreamed of doing, but it will never 
be known if this was due to his own performance or was merely a consequence of his 
predecessor's personal sacrifice.
The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 highlighted many other 
deficiencies in the Nations' defense structure. Truman's and Johnson's economy plan had 
been based on the premise that there would be no war in the near future. Now that they 
had been proven wrong, the President allowed his Defense Secretary to take most o f the 
criticism for the lack of preparedness. Because Johnson had already fallen out o f favor 
with the President due to what the President saw as his "egotistical desire to run the entire 
government" and his poor performance in managing the Defense Department, Truman 
requested his resignation on 19 September 1950.687 Rear Admiral Dennison stated that 
one reason why Truman decided to remove Johnson was his displeasure at Johnson's part 
in the firing of Admiral Denfeld.688 Although never publicly acknowledged, the poor 
grades given the B-36 by the Weapons System Evaluation Group and the demonstration 
of the Navy's utility following the Korean attack had validated much of Denfeld's position 
and discredited his opponents.
Secretary Matthews eventually outlasted both Johnson and Admiral Sherman but 
not by much. Admiral Denfeld's successor died of a sudden heart attack in July 1951 after 
having done a spectacular job in his brief tenure as CNO. Secretary Matthews stayed on 
but was removed by the President at the end of this same month for having "indiscreetly 
called for a preventive war against the Soviet Union."689 Matthews was given the post of
686Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Naw. 1943 - 1946. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 256.
687McCullough, p. 792.
688Dennison interview, p. 142.
689Potter, Nimitz. p. 448.
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Ambassador to Ireland but only lived until October 1952. Within three years o f Denfeld's 
removal, his strategic concepts had come back into favor and his opponents had been 
discredited, yet his reputation did not recover.
The ex-CNO failed in his quest to become the Governor of Massachusetts and 
settled in as the Shell Oil Company's Washington office manager, a position he retained 
until his death in March 1972. He held various voluntary jobs including President o f the 
Naval Academy's Alumni Association from July 1951 through 1955, but never regained 
his national prominence. In 1951, he joined Leahy, Nimitz, Halsey, King, Radford,
Blandy, and Spruance as honorary pall bearers at Admiral Sherman's funeral, but he never 
joined these legendary naval heroes in the history books.690 The Navy named entire 
classes of ships after Leahy, Nimitz, Sherman, Forrestal and Burke, and individual 
combatant vessels for Blandy, Conolly, and even Crommelin, but Denfeld's name has not 
even graced the stern of a yard tug.691 Even President Truman was honored in 1995 by 
having named after him an aircraft carrier twice as big as the "supercarrier" he had 
canceled in 1949. Admiral Denfeld was left to take comfort in his real achievements 
which had generally been obscured by the enduring ignominy of the "Revolt o f the 
Admirals."
The inter-service rivalry of the 1940s continues somewhat muted to the present 
day. A 1993 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings article actually called for another 
"Admirals' Revolt" to oppose the Army's and Air Force's efforts to redistribute the roles 
and missions of the Armed Services.692 The Navy Times observed in March 1994 that 
these conflicts "are deeply ingrained and seemingly intractable, and every now and then 
they manifest themselves in bizarre ways."693 Another March 1994 newspaper article,
690"Admiral Sherman Laid to Rest," Shipmate. September 1951, p. 6.
69 dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. 8 vols., (Washington: Naval History Division, Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, 1991).
692James L. George, "Where's the Admirals' Revolt?" U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1993, 
pp. 66-71.
693N aw  Times, 14 March 1994, p. 31.
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titled "Navy, Air Force in Power Struggle Bombers vs. Carriers," would certainly not have 
seemed unusual Denfeld's day.694 In 1994, Admiral Boorda, the CNO, employed a 
football analogy borrowed from General Bradley's "Fancy Dans'" speech and reiterated 
Admiral Denfeld's basic arguments in stating that "we can't put all our money into defense, 
offense, or special teams . . .  We have to be good at all three or we will lose. One player, 
or set o f players, will not win the Super B o wl . . .  it takes 'em all. "695 Neither Admiral 
Denfeld's efforts as a conciliator nor his courageous stand in the Congressional hearings 
were able to materially effect the course of this debate. Many of 1949's passionate issues 
and philosophical differences continue to dominate the Department in 1995.
694"Navy, Air Force in Power Struggle Bombers vs. Carriers," Norfolk Virginian Pilot. 21 March 1994,
p. 1.
695Jeremy M. Boorda, Admiral USN, "Naval Service Day Presentation, CNO Brief to the Roles and 
Missions Commission, 20 September 1994," Copy of briefing slides in author's possession.
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CONCLUSION
Admiral Denfeld was a man of conscience, committed to the defense o f his Nation 
and the best interests of his service. He was placed in the extremely difficult position of 
having to implement the President's passionate desire for military unification while 
maintaining the morale and efficiency of his subordinates who were not convinced of the 
wisdom of this course. Denfeld appeared to compromise and postpone wherever possible, 
thereby acting as an impediment to progress rather than a constructive force for change or 
restraint. He neglected to keep his subordinates informed of his efforts and compromises, 
thereby causing them to lose confidence in his leadership and eventually so exasperating 
them that they took matters into their own hands.
Compounding these difficulties, the CNO seems to have failed in communicating 
clearly and promptly both up and down the chain o f command. All evidence indicates that 
Denfeld and Matthews liked each other personally but never understood each other 
professionally. This divided and dysfunctional leadership team was doomed to fail. 
Matthews was an intelligent and patriotic individual who was far from being Johnson's 
loyal lackey. If the Admiral and the Secretary had been able to agree on a consistent and 
compelling policy, the history of the Defense Department in the year before the Korean 
War probably would have been less chaotic and painful. The poor communications 
between Denfeld and Matthews hamstrung the Navy and justified a change in CNOs.
Secretary Matthews' greatest mistake in dealing with the firing was his having 
explained his decision too much like a lawyer and not enough like a statesman. His public 
contention that the Bogan endorsement alone caused him to decide to remove Denfeld 
certainly could not have been disproved but was not persuasive. Matthews' private 
mention of Denfeld's mismanagement allowed the Secretary to convince the Senate that he 
was acting properly while protecting Denfeld's reputation. But this strategy did not have
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any impact on the House, the Navy, or the public. Matthews seems to have forgotten that 
he was no longer in an insulated courtroom with a twelve-person jury. The verdict on his 
conduct was delivered by millions of citizens who had no knowledge of all the information 
concerning Denfeld's performance at Matthews' disposal. His misjudgment hurt the 
President and the country by unnecessarily adding fuel to the already-burning fire o f inter­
service rivalry.
Admiral Denfeld was a good strategist and a capable naval officer. He made a 
sincere and dedicated effort to protect the best interests o f the Nation but was not enough 
of a motivational team-builder to dispel the festering anger among naval officers over what 
they believed to be funding for an ineffective weapon - the B-36 - and Secretary Johnson's 
favoritism toward the Air Force. Denfeld's ineffective leadership and inability to 
communicate his ideas and concerns to both his subordinates and superiors inevitably led 
to his downfall. The testimony he delivered during the Congressional hearings on 
unification and strategy was courageous and, for the most part, accurate. It was not the 
cause of his removal. It does facilitate assessment of Matthews' decision to fire the CNO 
to the extent that it reveals poor coordination at the highest levels of the Navy 
Department. Admiral Denfeld failed as a communicator and as a leader; and Matthews 
was unable to make the transition from lawyer to statesman. Both Admiral Denfeld and 
Secretary Matthews, as individuals, deserve far more thorough and objective historical 
evaluation than they have heretofore received. But, as a team, their accomplishments 
were sadly deficient. The CNO's firing was driven by personality conflicts and perceived 
administrative deficiencies, not by any dramatic insubordination or disloyalty.
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.Wa sh in g to n
27 October 194-9
D ear M r. P r e s i d e n t :
When I  became S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Navy on May t w e n t y - f i f t h  « f  
t h i s  y e a r ,  I  d i d  so  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  
th e n  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  t h e  N avy  a n d  w h ic h  we d i s c u s s e d  
a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  S e c r e t a r y  w ou ld  
i n v o l v e  g ra v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  E v e n t s  w h ich  h a v e  s i n c e  t r a n s p i r e d  
h av e  m ore th a n  j u s t i f i e d  t h a t  a p p r e h e n s i o n .
You w i l l  rem em ber t h a t  i p  o u r  p r e l i m i n a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  my 
a p p o i n tm e n t  a s  S e c r e t a r y ,  you  e m p h a s iz e d  t h a t  v i t a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i f i c a t i o n  A ot o f  1 9 4 7 ,  a s  
e n a c t e d  by C o n g r e s s ,  I  t h e n  ' a b v i s e d  you o f  my u n q u a l i f i e d  a p p r o v a l  
o f . . t h e  p o l i c y  o f  u n i f i c a t i o n  a s  em bod ied  i n  t h a t  A c t  a n d  in  t h e  
p r o p o s e d  am endm ents t o  t h e  la v r  w h ic h  you  h a d  s u b m i t t e d  to. C o n g r e s s ,  
F u r th e r m o r e ,  I  p l e d g e d  my b e s t  e f f o r t s  a s  S e c r e t a r y  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  
N avy t o  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  u t m o s t  good  f a i t h  a s  a  f u l l  member i n  t h e  
U n i f i e d  D e fe n s e  Team,
You c a r e f u l l y  p o i n t e d  o u t  how e s s e n t i a l  i t  w o u ld  be t o  h a v e  
■the p r o p e r  m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  i n  k e y  p o s i t i o n s ,  u p  t o  a n d  i n c l u d i n g  
C h ie f  o f  N a v a l  O p e r a t i o n s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a t t a i n  t h a t  much d e s i r e d  
r e s u l t .
You a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  you  w o u ld  c o o p e r a t e  t h a t ,  a s  S e c r e t a r y ,
I  m ig h t  be s u p p o r t e d  a t  a l l  t i m e s  by i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  my own s e l e c t i o n  
i n  p o s i t i o n s  o f  e v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  s u b o r d i n a t e  c a p a c i t y .
V ery  so o n  a f t e r  I  a s su m e d  o f f i c e ,  i t  became e v i d e n t  to  me 
t h a t  t h e r e  'was d e f i n i t e  r e s i s t a n c e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  some n a v a l  o f ­
f i c e r s  t o  a c c e p t i n g  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s ,  n o t w i t h s t a n d ­
i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  by  la v ; .  T h a t  p q n d i t i o n  was 
r e f l e c t e d  by p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  s t a t e m e n t s  f ro m  v a r i o u s  s o u r c e s  
a n d  by o t h e r  m e th o d s .  Some o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h o s e  
p r o c e d u r e s  h e l d  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  a s s i g n m e n t s  i n  t h e  .Navy*
F o r  r e a s o n s  'which I  f e e l  a d e q u a t e ,  I  r e f r a i n e d  f ro m  p r o m p t l y  
b r i n g i n g  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  t o  y o u r  o f f i c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  a s  Commander 
i n  C h i e f ,
■ ■ A  .. .  ,
The President , ■ . ■ v u ' w . - y  A: 2 - _  A './y ' - . ; '.;. '/ •* 27 .October 1949, - w   ........^ . y  y; :
-2 "2- v - T - :■ ^ ;Tbl  A yyyy;;. y  iyy ik -k 'd ll
• - -One o f  , the. f i r s t ' 'duties-;:.%oj^ qon.fijopt -m e-'a^ ^ S .ecr .e tary .y th e .y  /• ■ ',„■■„■■;■.
s e l e c t i o n  o f  an  a p p o i n t e e * t o  s u c c e e d  A d m i r a l /D e n f e l d  a s  C h ie f  o f  
N a v a l  O p e r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t e r m  b e g i n n i n g  on ; t h e  f i f t e e n t h  o f  n e x t  
D ecem ber. My f i n a l  d e c i s i o n ,  a f t e r  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  v a r i o u s  
p h a s e s  o f  t h e  p ro b le m s  i n v o l v e d ,  was t o  recom m end A d m ir a l  D e n fe ld  
f o r  r e a p p o i n t m e n t ,  a n d  s u c h  a  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  w e n t  f o r w a r d  t o  y o u  
th ro u g h  S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e fe n s e  Jo h n so n  on A u g u s t  s e c o n d ,  1949* One 
o f  t h e  m ost p e r s u a s i v e  o f  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w h ic h  l e d  me t o  make 
t h i s  rec o m m e n d a t io n  was t h e  v a l u b  t o  t h e  N avy, a n d  t o  t h e  D e p a r t ­
ment o f  D e f e n s e ,  w h ic h  I  e x p e c t e d  t o  f l o w  f ro m  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  s e r v i c e  
bp A d m ira l  D e n f e ld .
At t h a t  t i m e ,  'w o rk in g  w i t h  A d m ira l  D e n fe ld  whom I  h i g h l y  
e s te e m ,  I  h a d  e v e r y  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  we w ere  i n  c o m p le te  
a g re e m e n t  on a l l  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  t h e  N avy . I  f e l t  s u r e  t h a t  s u c h  a h a rm o n io u s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p . w o u l d  c o n t i n u e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i t  so o n  became c l e a r  
t h a t  my e x p e c t a t i o n  w o u ld  n o t  be  r e a l i z e d .
On T u e sd a y ,  t h e  f o u r th ,  o f  t h i s  m o n th ,  e v e n t s  h a d  t a k e n  s u c h  
s c o u r s e  t h a t ,  in. a  c o n fe re n c e ; ,  h ad  w i t h  A d m ira l  D e n f e ld  e a r l y  t h a t ,  
day ,  I  f r a n k l y  s t a t e d  t o  him t h a t  I  f e a r e d  h i s  u s e f u l n e s s  a s  
C h ie f  o f  N a v a l  O p e r a t i o n s  had" t e r m i n a t e d .  You may r e c a l l " t h a t '  I  
m e n tio n e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  A d m ira l  D e n f e l d ’ s r e p l a c e m e n t  i n  t h e  
.. course , o f  o.ur. d i s c u s s i o n  i n  y o u r  o f f i c e  when I  was t h e r e - i n .  ..com.--- ... 
pan;/ w i t h  S e c r e t a r y  J o h n s o n  on O c to b e r  f i f t h .
My r e l a t i o n s  a s  o e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  N avy  w i t h  A d m ira l  D e n fe ld  
as  C h ie f  o f  N a v a l  O p e r a t i o n s  h a v e  f i n a l l y  become s u c h  t h a t  I  f i n d  ■ 
i t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  w ork  w i t h  h im  in  t h e  h a rm o n io u s  r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p  w h ic h  s h o u l d  p r e v a i l  bet/ween t h e  o c c u p a n t s  o f  t h o s e  two 
o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n s .
A m i l i t a r y  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  i s  n o t  a p o l i t i c a l  d e m o c ra c y .
I n t e g r i t y  o f  command i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  a t  a l l  t i m e s .  T h e re  can be 
no t w i l i g h t  z o n e  i n  t h e  m e a s u re  o f  l o y a l t y  t o  s u p e r i o r s  a n d  r e s p e c t  
f o r  a u t h o r i t y  e x i s t i n g  b e tw e e n  v a r i o u s  o f f i c i a l  r a n k s .  I n a b i l i t y  
t o  con fo rm  t o  s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  s t a b i l i t y  w ou ld  d i s ­
q u a l i f y  a n y  o f  u s  f o r  p o s i t i o n s  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h e  Commander i n  
C h i e f .
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l i n g  b e tw ee n  t h e  
h i g h e s t  c i v i l i a n  a n d  t h e  h i g h e s t  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r  o f  t h e  N avy makes 
i t  u t t e r l y  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  -me, a s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  N av y , t o  a d m i n i s t e r
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t h e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  t h e  N avy  in  t h e  m anner I  b e l i e v e  v i t a l  t o  n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y *  B e l i e v i n g  a s  I  do i n  t h e  v i t a l  im p o r t a n c e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  
c i v i l i a n  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  m i l i t a r y - e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  a  c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  
s u c h  a c o n d i t i o n  w o u ld  be  i n t o l e r a b l e  t o  me a s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  N av y ,
R e l u c t a n t l y ,  t h e r e f o r e , * b u t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i th  w h a t I  b e l i e v e  
to be f o r  t h e  go®d o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  I  r e s p e c t f u l l y  r e q u e s t  you  a s  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  Commander i n  C h ie f  t o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
A d m ira l  D e n f e ld  t o  e t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  d u t i e s ,  a n d  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
h i s  s u c c e s s o r  a s  C h ie f  o f  N a v a l  O p e r a t i o n s  a t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  c o n v e n i e n t  
d a t e .
wt/avs 
i  atrs R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t t e d ,
/s/  Francis p. Matthews
The P r e s i d e n t ,
The W h i te  M ouse , ' 
W a s h in g to n ,  D. C«
THE WHITE HOUSE
W ash in g to n
O c to b e r  27 , 1949
MEMO RAN HIM FDR: S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  N avy 
From; The P r e s i d e n t
O v e r  & l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  I  h a v e  d e v o t e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  t h o u g h t  t o  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  p r o b le m  w h ic h  
you d i s c u s s  i n  y o u r  l e t t e r  o f  t o d a y 1 s d a t e .
The a c t i o n  w h ich  you recom mend m e e ts  
■with my a p p r o v a l .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  I  h e r e b y  a u t h o r i z e  you t o  
a r r a n g e  f o r  a n d  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  w h ic h  you  recom m end ,
'£ / s /  H a rry  Truman
Fleet A d m ira l E rn est J . K in g F lee t A d m ira l C h ester N in iitz F lee t A d m ira l W illiam  F . H g lsey
A d m ir a l R ic h a r d  L . C o n o llyC a p ta in  J o h n  C r o m m e linA d m ira l L o u is  E . D e n fe ld
:p8
A ll
SW®
Admiral W ill ia m  II . P . B la n d y A d m ir a l T h o m a s  C. K in k a id A d m ir a l A r th u r  W . R a d fo r d
A t Key West, 1948: from left, A dm irals  Radford and D enfe ld , General  
Gruenther, F leet A dm iral Leahy, A ssistant Secretary o f  D e fen se  M c N e i l ,  
Secreatary  o f  D efense  Forrestal, Generals Spaatz, N orstad t,  Bradley, and  
Wedemeyer. Courtesy o f  Mrs. Arthur W. Radford

■ if  w q;

D E N F E L D  C H R O N O L O G Y
1947
15 December
1948
11 - 1 4  March 
20 - 22 Aug
1949
28 March
7 April
18 April 
23 April 
25 April 
25 May
9 June
25 June
2 August
9 Aug - 25 Aug
10 August
11 August
15 August 
10 September
14 September
ADM Denfeld assumed duties as 
CNO
20 September
Key West Conference 23 September
Newport Conference
28 September
Louis Johnson sworn in as
SECDEF 3 October
Observance of "Service Days" 
cancelled
3 October
USS United States keel laying
Carrier cancellation 4 October
Secretary Sullivan resigned
5 October
5 Oct - 22 Oct
13 October
15 October
19 October
National Security Act of 1949 
passed
President Truman forwarded 
Denfeld's renomination to the 
Senate for confirmation
Senate confirmed Denfeld's 
renomination 10 December
CAPT Crommelin made first 
press statements
27 October
28 October
2 November
Francis Matthews appointed 
SECNAV
House ordered investigation into 
the B-36 and defense unification
RADM Gallery Saturday Evening 
Post article, "An Admiral Talks 
Back to the Airmen" published
Matthews recommended Denfeld 
for second term
House hearings on the B-36
President Truman signed Denfeld's 
commission for second term as 
CNO
VADM Bogan wrote Secretary 
Matthews regarding Navy morale
Truman press conference 
announcing Russian atomic 
explosion
ADM Denfeld endorsed Bogan 
letter
Chairman Vinson met with 
Navy leaders on postponing 
second phase of hearings
Crommelin leaked Bogan letter 
and endorsements
Denfeld told by Matthews that his 
usefullness as CNO may have been 
terminated by Bogan matter
Secretary Matthews mentioned the 
possibility of removing ADM 
Denfeld to the President
House hearings on unification and 
strategy
Denfeld testimony
Matthews met with FADM Nimitz 
in New York
Gen Bradley testimony, labeled 
admirals "Fancy Dans"
Denfeld fired by President
Denfeld and Matthews met, 
discuss future assignment
ADM Forrest Sherman sworn in as 
CNO under a recess nomination
Denfeld informed Matthews he 
will not accept the European 
command
14 December
15 December
1950
5 January
12 January
18 January
18 January
23 January
1 March 
25 April 
25 June
19 September
1951
July 
30 July
1952
18 October 
1972
29 March
President Truman forwarded ADM 
Sherman's nomination for a lour 
year CNO term to the Senate for 
confirmation
Secretary Matthews testified before 
the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that ADM Denfeld's 
commission for a second term had 
not been issued to him
Senator McCarthy accusations 
against Secretary Matthews ("lying 
or just incompetent")
ADM Denfeld announced his 
application for retirement effective 
1 March
Harmon Report and WSEG 
Evaluation of strategic bombing 
briefed to President Truman
House report on Unification and 
strategy hearings issued
New carrier, USS Forrestal, 
authorized
North Korean attack on South 
Korea
SECDEF Johnson fired by 
President Truman
ADM Sherman died in office
F. P. Matthews removed as 
SECNAV. Selected as 
Ambassador to Ireland
ADM Denfeld issued formal letter 
stating his intention not to accept 
European command
ADM Denfeld's first term as CNO 
officially expired
Ambassador Matthews died
ADM Denfeld died
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